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The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) was established by Executive Order 12975,
signed by President Clinton on October 3, 1995. NBAC’s  functions are defined as follows: 
a) NBAC shall provide advice and make recommendations to the National Science and Technology
Council and to other appropriate government entities regarding the following matters: 
1) the appropriateness of departmental, agency, or other governmental programs, policies,
assignments, missions, guidelines, and regulations as they relate to bioethical issues arising
from research on human biology and behavior; and
2) applications, including the clinical applications, of that research.
b) NBAC shall identify broad principles to govern the ethical conduct of research, citing specific
projects only as illustrations for such principles. 
c) NBAC shall not be responsible for the review and approval of specific projects. 
d) In addition to responding to requests for advice and recommendations from the National Science
and Technology Council, NBAC also may accept suggestions of issues for consideration from
both the Congress and the public. NBAC also may identify other bioethical issues for the
purpose of providing advice and recommendations, subject to the approval of the National
Science and Technology Council.
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Executive Summary
Introduction
In November 1998, President Clinton charged theNational Bioethics Advisory Commission with the task
of conducting a thorough review of the issues associated
with human stem cell research, balancing all ethical and
medical considerations. The President’s request was
made in response to three separate reports that brought
to the fore the exciting scientific and clinical prospects of
stem cell research while also raising a series of ethical
controversies regarding federal sponsorship of scientific
inquiry in this area. Scientific reports of the successful
isolation and culture of these specialized cells have
offered hope of new cures for debilitating and even fatal
illness and at the same time have renewed an important
national debate about the ethics of research involving
human embryos and cadaveric fetal material.
Scientific and Medical Considerations
The stem cell is a unique and essential cell type found in
animals. Many kinds of stem cells are found in the body,
with some more differentiated, or committed, to a partic-
ular function than others. In other words, when stem
cells divide, some of the progeny mature into cells of a
specific type (e.g., heart, muscle, blood, or brain cells),
while others remain stem cells, ready to repair some of
the everyday wear and tear undergone by our bodies.
These stem cells are capable of continually reproducing
themselves and serve to renew tissue throughout an indi-
vidual’s life. For example, they constantly regenerate the
lining of the gut, revitalize skin, and produce a whole
range of blood cells. Although the term stem cell
commonly is used to refer to the cells within the adult
organism that renew tissue (e.g., hematopoietic stem
cells, a type of cell found in the blood), the most funda-
mental and extraordinary of the stem cells are found in
the early stage embryo. These embryonic stem (ES) cells,
unlike the more differentiated adult stem cells or other
cell types, retain the special ability to develop into nearly
any cell type. Embryonic germ (EG) cells, which originate
from the primordial reproductive cells of the developing
fetus, have properties similar to ES cells. 
It is the potentially unique versatility of the ES and
EG cells derived, respectively, from the early stage
embryo and cadaveric fetal tissue that presents such
unusual scientific and therapeutic promise. Indeed, sci-
entists have long recognized the possibility of using such
cells to generate more specialized cells or tissue, which
could allow the generation of new cells to be used to treat
injuries or diseases, such as Alzheimer’s disease,
Parkinson’s disease, heart disease, and kidney failure.
Likewise, scientists regard these cells as an important—
perhaps essential—means for understanding the earliest
stages of human development and as an important tool
in the development of life-saving drugs and cell-
replacement therapies to treat disorders caused by early
cell death or impairment.
The techniques for deriving these cells have not been
fully developed as standardized and readily available
research tools, and the development of any therapeutic
application remains some years away. Thus, ES and EG
cells are still primarily a matter of intense research interest.
At this time, human stem cells can be derived from
the following sources:
n human fetal tissue following elective abortion 
(EG cells),
i
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n human embryos that are created by in vitro fertiliza-
tion (IVF) and that are no longer needed by couples
being treated for infertility (ES cells),
n human embryos that are created by IVF with gametes
donated for the sole purpose of providing research
material (ES cells), and
n potentially, human (or hybrid) embryos generated
asexually by somatic cell nuclear transfer or similar
cloning techniques in which the nucleus of an adult
human cell is introduced into an enucleated human
or animal ovum (ES cells).
In addition, although much promising research cur-
rently is being conducted with stem cells obtained from
adult organisms, studies in animals suggest that this
approach will be scientifically and technically limited,
and in some cases the anatomic source of the cells might
preclude easy or safe access. However, because there are
no legal restrictions or new ethical considerations
regarding research on adult stem cells (other than the
usual concerns about consent and risks), important
research can and should go forward in this area.
Moreover, because important biological differences exist
between embryonic and adult stem cells, this source of
stem cells should not be considered an alternative to ES
and EG cell research.
Ethical and Policy Considerations
The scientific reports of the successful isolation and cul-
ture of ES and EG cells have renewed a longstanding con-
troversy about the ethics of research involving human
embryos and cadaveric fetal material. This controversy
arises from sharply differing moral views regarding elec-
tive abortion or the use of embryos for research. Indeed,
an earnest national and international debate continues
over the ethical, legal, and medical issues that arise in this
arena. This debate represents both a challenge and an
opportunity: a challenge because it concerns important
and morally contested questions regarding the beginning
of life, and an opportunity because it provides another
occasion for serious public discussion about important
ethical issues. We are hopeful that this dialogue will fos-
ter public understanding about the relationships between
the opportunities that biomedical science offers to
improve human welfare and the limits set by important
ethical obligations.
Although we believe most would agree that human
embryos deserve respect as a form of human life, dis-
agreements arise regarding both what form such respect
should take and what level of protection is required at
different stages of embryonic development. Therefore,
embryo research that is not therapeutic to the embryo is
bound to raise serious concerns and to heighten the 
tensions between two important ethical commitments: to
cure disease and to protect human life. For those who
believe that the embryo has the moral status of a person
from the moment of conception, research (or any other
activity) that would destroy the embryo is considered
wrong and should not take place. For those who believe
otherwise, arriving at an ethically acceptable policy in
this arena involves a complex balancing of a number of
important ethical concerns. Although many of the issues
remain contested on moral grounds, they co-exist within
a broad area of consensus upon which public policy can,
at least in part, be constructed.
For most observers, the resolution of these ethical and
scientific issues depends to some degree on the source of
the stem cells. The use of cadaveric fetal tissue to derive
EG cell lines—like other uses of tissues or organs from
dead bodies—is generally the most accepted, provided
that the research complies with the system of public safe-
guards and oversight already in place for such scientific
inquiry. With respect to embryos and the ES cells from
which they can be derived, some draw an ethical distinc-
tion between two types of embryos. One is referred to as
the research embryo, an embryo created through IVF with
gametes provided solely for research purposes. Many
people, including the President, have expressed the view
that the federal government should not fund research
that involves creating such embryos. The second type of
embryo is that which was created for infertility treatment,
but is now intended to be discarded because it is unsuit-
able or no longer needed for such treatment. The use of
these embryos raises fewer ethical questions because it
does not alter their final disposition. Finally, the recent
demonstration of cloning techniques (somatic cell
nuclear transfer) in nonhuman animals suggests that
transfer of a human somatic cell nucleus into an oocyte
iii
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might create an embryo that could be used as a source of
ES cells. The creation of a human organism using this
technique raises questions similar to those raised by the
creation of research embryos through IVF, and at this
time federal funds may not be used for such research. In
addition, if the enucleated oocyte that was to be combined
with a human somatic cell nucleus came from an animal
other than a human being, other issues would arise about
the nature of the embryo produced. Thus, each source of
material raises ethical questions as well as scientific,
medical, and legal ones.
Conscientious individuals have come to different con-
clusions regarding both public policy and private actions
in the area of stem cell research. Their differing perspec-
tives by their very nature cannot easily be bridged by any
single public policy. But the development of public pol-
icy in a morally contested area is not a novel challenge for
a pluralistic democracy such as that which exists in the
United States. We are profoundly aware of the diverse
and strongly held views on the subject of this report and
have wrestled with the implications of these different
views at each of our meetings devoted to this topic. Our
aim throughout these deliberations has been to formulate
a set of recommendations that fully reflects widely shared
views and that, in our view, would serve the best interests
of society.
Most states place no legal restrictions on any of the
means of creating ES and EG cells that are described in
this report. In addition, current Food and Drug
Administration regulations do not apply to this type of
early stage research. Therefore, because the public con-
troversy surrounding such activities in the United States
has revolved around whether it is appropriate for the 
federal government to sponsor such research, this report
focuses on the question of whether the scientific merit
and the substantial clinical promise of this research
justify federal support, and, if so, with what restrictions
and safeguards.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This report presents the conclusions that the
Commission has reached and the recommendations that
the Commission has made in the following areas: the
ethical acceptability of federal funding for research that
either derives or uses ES or EG cells; the means of
ensuring appropriate consent of women or couples
who donate cadaveric fetal tissue or embryos remain-
ing after infertility treatments; the need for restrictions
on the sale of these materials and the designation of
those who may benefit from their use; the need for 
ethical oversight and review of such research at the
national and institutional level; and the appropriate-
ness of voluntary compliance by the private sector with
some of these recommendations.
The Ethical Acceptability of Federal Funding 
of ES and EG Cell Research by the Source 
of the Material
A principal ethical justification for public sponsorship
of research with human ES or EG cells is that this
research has the potential to produce health benefits for
individuals who are suffering from serious and often fatal
diseases. We recognize that it is possible that the various
sources of human ES or EG cells eventually could be
important to research and clinical application because of,
for example, their differing proliferation potential, differ-
ing availability and accessibility, and differing ability to be
manipulated, as well as possibly significant differences in
their cell biology. At this time, therefore, the
Commission believes that federal funding for the use
and derivation of ES and EG cells should be limited
to two sources of such material: cadaveric fetal tissue
and embryos remaining after infertility treatments.
Specific recommendations and their justifications are
provided below.
Recommendation 1: EG Cells from Fetal Tissue
Research involving the derivation and use of
human EG cells from cadaveric fetal tissue should
continue to be eligible for federal funding.
Relevant statutes and regulations should be
amended to make clear that the ethical safeguards
that exist for fetal tissue transplantation also
apply to the derivation and use of human EG cells
for research purposes.
Considerable agreement exists, both in the United
States and throughout the world, that the use of fetal 
tissue in therapy for people with serious disorders, such
iv
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as Parkinson’s disease, is acceptable. Research that uses
tissue from aborted fetuses is analogous to the use of fetal
tissue in transplantation. The rationales for conducting
EG research are equally strong, and the arguments
against it are not persuasive. The removal of fetal germ
cells does not occasion the destruction of a live fetus, 
nor is fetal tissue intentionally or purposefully created 
for human stem cell research. Although abortion itself
doubtless will remain a contentious issue in our society,
the procedures that have been developed to prevent fetal
tissue donation for therapeutic transplantation from
influencing the abortion decision offer a model for creat-
ing such separation in research to derive human EG cells.
Because the existing statutes are written in terms of 
tissue transplantation, which is not a current feature of
EG cell research, changes are needed to make it explicit
that the relevant safeguards will apply to research to
derive EG cells from aborted fetuses. At present, no legal
prohibitions exist that would inhibit the use of such 
tissue for EG cell research.
Recommendation 2: ES Cells from Embryos
Remaining After Infertility Treatments
Research involving the derivation and use of
human ES cells from embryos remaining after
infertility treatments should be eligible for federal
funding. An exception should be made to the pres-
ent statutory ban on federal funding of embryo
research to permit federal agencies to fund
research involving the derivation of human ES
cells from this source under appropriate regula-
tions that include public oversight and review.
(See Recommendations 5 through 9.)
The current ban on embryo research is in the form of
a rider to the appropriations bill for the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), of which the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) is a part. The rider
prohibits use of the appropriated funds to support any
research “in which a human embryo [is] destroyed, dis-
carded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury greater
than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero” (Pub.
L. No. 105-78, 513(a)). The term “human embryo” in the
statute is defined as “any organism . . . that is derived by
fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other
means from one or more human gametes or human
diploid cells.” The ban is revisited each year when the
language of the NIH appropriations bill is considered.
The ban, which concerns only federally sponsored
research, reflects a moral point of view either that
embryos deserve the full protection of society because of
their moral status as persons or that there is sufficient
public controversy to preclude the use of federal funds
for this type of research. At the same time, however,
some effects of the embryo research ban raise serious
moral and public policy concerns for those who hold
differing views regarding the ethics of embryo research.
In our view, the ban conflicts with several of the ethical
goals of medicine and related health disciplines, espe-
cially healing, prevention, and research. These goals are
rightly characterized by the principles of beneficence
and nonmaleficence, which jointly encourage pursuing
social benefits and avoiding or ameliorating potential
harm.
Although some may view the derivation and use of
ES cells as ethically distinct activities, we do not believe
that these differences are significant from the point of
view of eligibility for federal funding. That is, we believe
that it is ethically acceptable for the federal government
to finance research that both derives cell lines from
embryos remaining after infertility treatments and that
uses those cell lines. Although one might argue that
some important research could proceed in the absence of
federal funding for research that derives stem cells from
embryos remaining after infertility treatments (i.e., fed-
erally funded scientists merely using cells derived with
private funds), we believe that it is important that federal
funding be made available for protocols that also derive
such cells. Relying on cell lines that might be derived
exclusively by a subset of privately funded researchers
who are interested in this area could severely limit 
scientific and clinical progress. 
Trying to separate research in which human ES cells
are used from the process of deriving those cells presents
an ethical problem, because doing so diminishes the sci-
entific value of the activities receiving federal support.
This separation—under which neither biomedical
researchers at NIH nor scientists at universities and other
research institutions that rely on federal support could
participate in some aspects of this research—rests on the
vNational Bioethics Advisory Commission
mistaken notion that the two areas of research are so 
distinct that participating in one need not mean partic-
ipating in the other. We believe that this is a misrepre-
sentation of the new field of human stem cell research,
and this misrepresentation could adversely affect scien-
tific progress for several reasons.
First, researchers using human ES cell lines will
derive substantial scientific benefits from a detailed
understanding of the process of ES cell derivation,
because the properties of ES cells and the methods for
sustaining the cell lines may differ depending on the
conditions and methods that were used to derive them.
Thus, scientists who conduct basic research and are
interested in fundamental cellular processes are likely to
make elemental discoveries about the nature of ES cells
as they derive them in the laboratory. Second, significant
basic research needs to be conducted regarding the
process of ES cell derivation before cell-based therapies
can be realized, and this work must be pursued in a wide
variety of settings, including those exclusively devoted to
basic academic research. Third, ES cells are not indefi-
nitely stable in culture. As these cells are grown, irre-
versible changes occur in their genetic makeup. Thus,
especially in the first few years of human ES cell research,
it is important to be able to repeatedly derive ES cells in
order to ensure that the properties of the cells that are
being studied have not changed.
Thus, anyone who believes that federal support of
this important new field of research should maximize its
scientific and clinical value within a system of appropri-
ate ethical oversight should be dissatisfied with a posi-
tion that allows federal agencies to fund research using
human ES cells but not research through which the cells
are derived from embryos. Instead, recognizing the close
connection in practical and ethical terms between deri-
vation and use of the cells, it would be preferable to
enact provisions applicable to funding by all federal
agencies, provisions that would carve out a narrow
exception for funding of research to use or to derive
human ES cells from embryos that are being discarded
by infertility treatment programs.
Recommendation 3: ES Cells from Embryos Made
Solely for Research Purposes Using IVF
Federal agencies should not fund research involving
the derivation or use of human ES cells from embryos
made solely for research purposes using IVF.
ES cells can be obtained from human research
embryos created from donor gametes through IVF for the
sole purpose of deriving such cells for research. The pri-
mary objection to creating embryos specifically for
research is that there is a morally relevant difference
between generating an embryo for the sole purpose of
creating a child and producing an embryo with no such
goal. Those who object to creating embryos for research
often appeal to arguments about respecting human dig-
nity by avoiding instrumental use of human embryos
(i.e., using embryos merely as a means to some other goal
does not treat them with appropriate respect or concern
as a form of human life). 
In 1994, the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel
argued in support of federal funding of the creation of
embryos for research purposes in exceptional cases, such
as the need to create banks of cell lines with different
genetic make-ups that encoded various transplantation
antigens—the better to respond, for example, to the
transplant needs of groups with different genetic profiles.
This would require the recruitment of embryos from
genetically diverse donors.
In determining how to deal with this issue, a number
of points are worth considering. First, it is possible that
the creation of research embryos will provide the only
way in which to conduct certain kinds of research, such
as research into the process of human fertilization.
Second, as IVF techniques improve, it is possible that the
supply of embryos for research from this source will
dwindle. Nevertheless, we have concluded that, either
from a scientific or a clinical perspective, there is no com-
pelling reason at this time to provide federal funds for the
creation of embryos for research. At the current time,
cadaveric fetal tissue and embryos remaining after infer-
tility treatment provide an adequate supply of research
resources for federal research projects.
Recommendation 4: ES Cells from Embryos Made
Using Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer into Oocytes
Federal agencies should not fund research involv-
ing the derivation or use of human ES cells from
embryos made using somatic cell nuclear transfer
into oocytes.
Somatic cell nuclear transfer of the nucleus of an
adult somatic cell into an enucleated human egg likely
vi
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has the potential of creating a human embryo. To date,
although little is known about these embryos as potential
sources of human ES cells, there is significant reason to
believe that their use may have therapeutic potential. For
example, the potential use of matched tissue for autolo-
gous cell replacement therapy from ES cells may require
the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer. The use of this
technique to create an embryo arguably is different from
all the other cases we considered—due to the asexual
origin of the source of the ES cells—although oocyte
donation is necessarily involved. The Commission
concludes that, at this time, federal funding should not
be provided to derive ES cells from this source.
Nevertheless, scientific progress and the medical utility
of this line of research should be monitored closely. 
Requirements for the Donation of Cadaveric
Fetal Tissue and Embryos for Research 
Potential donors of embryos for ES cell research must
be able to make voluntary and informed choices about
whether and how to dispose of their embryos. Because of
concerns about coercion and exploitation of potential
donors, as well as societal controversy about the moral
status of embryos, it is important, whenever possible, to
separate donors’ decisions to dispose of their embryos
from their decisions to donate them for research.
Potential donors should be asked to provide embryos for
research only if they have decided to have those embryos
discarded instead of donating them to another couple or
storing them. If the decision to discard the embryos pre-
cedes the decision to donate them for research purposes,
then the research determines only how their destruction
occurs, not whether it occurs.
Recommendation 5: Requirements for Donation to
Stem Cell Research of Embryos That Would
Otherwise Be Discarded After Infertility Treatment
Prospective donors of embryos remaining after infer-
tility treatments should receive timely, relevant, and
appropriate information to make informed and 
voluntary choices regarding disposition of the
embryos. Prior to considering the potential
research use of the embryos, a prospective donor
should have been presented with the option of
storing the embryos, donating them to another
woman, or discarding them. If a prospective donor
chooses to discard embryos remaining after 
infertility treatment, the option of donating to
research may then be presented. (At any point, the
prospective donors’ questions—including inquiries
about possible research use of any embryos remain-
ing after infertility treatment—should be answered
truthfully, with all information that is relevant to
the questions presented.) 
During the presentation about potential research
use of embryos that would otherwise be discarded,
the person seeking the donation should
a) disclose that the ES cell research is not
intended to provide medical benefit to embryo
donors,
b) make clear that consenting or refusing to
donate embryos to research will not affect the
quality of any future care provided to prospec-
tive donors,
c) describe the general area of the research to be
carried out with the embryos and the specific
research protocol, if known,
d) disclose the source of funding and expected
commercial benefits of the research with the
embryos, if known,
e) make clear that embryos used in research will
not be transferred to any woman’s uterus, and
f) make clear that the research will involve the
destruction of the embryos.
To assure that inappropriate incentives do not enter
into a woman’s decision to have an abortion, we recom-
mend that directed donation of cadaveric fetal tissue for
EG cell derivation be prohibited. Although the ethical
considerations supporting a prohibition of the directed
donation of human fetal tissue are less acute for EG cell
research than for transplantation, certain concerns
remain. Potential donors of cadaveric fetal tissue for EG
cell derivation would not receive a direct therapeutic
incentive to create or abort tissue for research purposes in
the same way that such personal interest might arise in a
transplant context. However, we agree that the prohibi-
tion remains a prudent and appropriate way of assuring
that inappropriate incentives, regardless of how remote
they may be, are not introduced into a woman’s decision
to have an abortion. Any suggestion of personal benefit
to the donor or to an individual known to the donor
would be untenable and possibly coercive.
vii
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Recommendation 6: No Promises to Embryo Donors
That Stem Cells Will Be Provided to Particular
Patient-Subjects 
In federally funded research involving embryos
remaining after infertility treatments, researchers
may not promise donors that ES cells derived 
from their embryos will be used to treat patient-
subjects specified by the donors.
Existing rules prohibit the practice of designated
donation, the provision of monetary inducements to
women undergoing abortion, and the purchase or sale of
fetal tissue. We concur in these restrictions and in the
earlier recommendation of the 1988 Human Fetal Tissue
Transplantation Research Panel that the sale of fetal tissue
for research purposes should not be permitted under any
circumstances. The potential for coercive pressure is
greatest when financial incentives are present, and the
treatment of the developing human embryo or fetus as an
entity deserving of respect may be greatly undermined by
the introduction of any commercial motive into the
donation or solicitation of fetal or embryonic tissue for
research purposes. 
Recommendation 7: Commerce in Embryos and
Cadaveric Fetal Tissue
Embryos and cadaveric fetal tissue should not be
bought or sold.
If and when sufficient scientific evidence and societal
agreement exist that the creation of embryos specifically
for research or therapeutic purposes is justified (specifi-
cally through somatic cell nuclear transfer), prohibitions
on directed donation should be revisited. For obvious
reasons, the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer to develop
ES cells for autologous transplantation might require
that the recipient be specified.
The Need for National Oversight and Review
The need for national as well as local oversight and
review of human stem cell research is crucial. No such
system currently exists in the United States. A national
mechanism to review protocols for deriving human ES
and EG cells and to monitor research using such cells
would ensure strict adherence to guidelines and standards
across the country. Thus, federal oversight can provide
the public with the assurance that research involving
stem cells is being undertaken appropriately. Given the
ethical issues involved in human stem cell research—
an area in which heightened sensitivity about the 
very research itself led the President to request that 
the Commission study the issue—the public and 
the Congress must be assured that oversight can be
accomplished efficiently, constructively, and in a timely
fashion, with sufficient attention to the relevant
ethical considerations.
Recommendation 8: Creation and Duties of an
Oversight and Review Panel 
DHHS should establish a National Stem Cell
Oversight and Review Panel to ensure that all fed-
erally funded research involving the derivation
and/or use of human ES or EG cells is conducted
in conformance with the ethical principles and
recommendations contained in this report. The
panel should have a broad, multidisciplinary
membership, including members of the general
public, and should
a) review protocols for the derivation of ES and
EG cells and approve those that meet the
requirements described in this report,
b) certify ES and EG cells lines that result from
approved protocols,
c) maintain a public registry of approved proto-
cols and certified ES and EG cell lines,
d) establish a database—linked to the public 
registry—consisting of information submitted
by federal research sponsors (and, on a volun-
tary basis, by private sponsors, whose propri-
etary information shall be appropriately
protected) that includes all protocols that
derive or use ES or EG cells (including any
available data on research outcomes, including
published papers),
e) use the database and other appropriate sources
to track the history and ultimate use of certi-
fied cell lines as an aid to policy assessment
and formulation,
f) establish requirements for and provide guid-
ance to sponsoring agencies on the social and
ethical issues that should be considered in the
review of research protocols that derive or use
ES or EG cells, and
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g) report at least annually to the DHHS Secretary
with an assessment of the current state of the
science for both the derivation and use of
human ES and EG cells, a review of recent
developments in the broad category of stem
cell research, a summary of any emerging ethi-
cal or social concerns associated with this
research, and an analysis of the adequacy and
continued appropriateness of the recommenda-
tions contained in this report.
The Need for Local Review 
of Derivation Protocols
For more than two decades, prospective review by an
Institutional Review Board (IRB) has been the principal
method for assuring that federally sponsored research
involving human subjects will be conducted in compli-
ance with guidelines, policies, and regulations designed
to protect human beings from harm. This system of local
review has been subject to criticism, and, indeed, in pre-
vious analyses we have identified a number of concerns
regarding this system. In the course of preparing this
report, we considered a number of proposals that would
allow for the local review of research protocols involving
human stem cell research, bearing in mind that a deci-
sion by the Commission to recommend a role for IRBs
might be incorrectly interpreted as endorsing the view
that human ES or EG cells or human embryos are human
subjects and therefore would be under the purview of the
Common Rule.
We adopted the principle, reflected in these recom-
mendations, that for research to derive human ES and EG
cells, a system of national oversight and review supple-
mented by local review would be necessary to ensure that
important research could proceed—but only under spe-
cific conditions. We recognized that for research propos-
als involving the derivation of human ES or EG cells,
many of the ethical issues associated with these protocols
could be considered at the local level, that is, at the insti-
tutions at which the research would be taking place. For
protocols using but not deriving ES cells (i.e., generating
the cells elsewhere), a separate set of ethical deliberations
would have occurred. In general, the IRB is an appropri-
ate body to review protocols that aim to derive ES or EG
cells. Although few review bodies (including IRBs) have
extensive experience in reviewing protocols of this kind,
they remain the most visible and expert entities available.
It is for this reason, for example, that we make a number
of recommendations (8, 9, 10, 11, and 12) that discuss
the importance of developing additional guidance for the
review of such protocols.
For proposals involving the derivation of human ES or
EG cells, particular sensitivities require attention through
a national review process. This process should, however,
begin at the local level, because institutions that intend to
conduct research involving the derivation of human ES
cells or EG cells should continue to take responsibility for
assuring the ethical conduct of that research. More impor-
tantly, however, IRBs can play an important role, particu-
larly by reviewing consent documents and by assuring
that collaborative research undertaken by investigators at
foreign institutions has satisfied any regulatory require-
ments for sharing research materials.
Recommendation 9: Institutional Review of
Protocols to Derive Stem Cells
Protocols involving the derivation of human ES
and EG cells should be reviewed and approved by
an IRB or by another appropriately constituted
and convened institutional review body prior to
consideration by the National Stem Cell Oversight
and Review Panel. (See Recommendation 8.) This
review should ensure compliance with any
requirements established by the panel, including
confirming that individuals or organizations (in
the United States or abroad) that supply embryos
or cadaveric fetal tissue have obtained them in
accordance with the requirements established by
the panel.
Responsibilities of Federal Research Agencies
Federal research agencies have in place a comprehen-
sive system for the submission, review, and approval of
research proposals. This system includes the use of a peer
review group—sometimes called a study section or initial
review group—that is established to assess the scientific
merit of the proposals. In addition, in some agencies,
such as NIH, staff members review protocols prior to
their transmittal to a national advisory council for final
approval. These levels of review provide an opportunity
to consider ethical issues that arise in the proposals.
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When research proposals involve human subjects, federal
agencies rely on local IRBs to review and approve the
research in order to assure that it is ethically acceptable.
(See Recommendation 9.) A grant application should not
be funded until ethical issues that are associated with
research involving human subjects have been resolved
fully. Therefore, at every point in this continuum—from
the first discussions that a prospective applicant may
have with program staff within a particular institution to
the final decision by the relevant national advisory
council—ethical and scientific issues can be addressed
by the sponsoring agency.
Recommendation 10: Sponsoring Agency Review of
Research Use of Stem Cells
All federal agencies should ensure that their
review processes for protocols using human ES or
EG cells comply with any requirements estab-
lished by the National Stem Cell Oversight and
Review Panel (see Recommendation 8), paying
particular attention to the adequacy of the justifi-
cation for using such cell lines.
Research involving human ES and EG cells raises crit-
ical ethical issues, particularly when the proposals
involve the derivation of ES cells from embryos remain-
ing after infertility treatments. We recognize that these
research proposals may not follow the paradigm usually
associated with human subjects research. Nevertheless,
research proposals being considered for funding by fed-
eral agencies must, in our view, meet the highest stan-
dards of scientific merit and ethical acceptability. To that
end, the recommendations made in this report, including
a proposed set of Points to Consider in Evaluating Basic
Research Involving Human ES Cells and EG Cells, constitute
a set of ethical and policy considerations that should be
reflected in the respective policies of federal agencies
conducting or sponsoring human ES or EG cell research. 
Attention to Issues for the Private Sector
Although this report primarily addresses the ethical
issues associated with the use of federal funds for
research to derive and use ES and EG cells, we recognize
that considerable work in both of these areas will be con-
ducted under private sponsorship. Thus, our recommen-
dations may have implications for those working in the
private sector. First, for cell lines to be eligible for use in
federally funded research, they must be certified by the
National Stem Cell Oversight and Review Panel
described in Recommendation 8. Therefore, if a private
company aims to make its cell lines available to publicly
funded researchers, it must submit its derivation proto-
col(s) to the same oversight and review process recom-
mended for the public sector, i.e., local review (see
Recommendation 9) and for certification that the cells
have been derived from embryos remaining after infertil-
ity treatments or from cadaveric fetal tissue.
Second, we hope that nonproprietary aspects of pro-
tocols developed under private sponsorship will be made
available in the public registry, as described in
Recommendation 8. The greater the participation of the
private sector in providing information on stem cell
research, the more comprehensive the development of
the science and related public policies in this area. 
Third, and perhaps most relevant, in an ethically sen-
sitive area of emerging biomedical research it is impor-
tant that all members of the research community,
whether in the public or private sectors, conduct the
research in a manner that is open to appropriate public
scrutiny. The last two decades have witnessed an
unprecedented level of cooperation between the public
and private sectors in biomedical research, which has
resulted in the international leadership position of the
United States in this arena. Public bodies and other
authorities, such as the Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee, have played a crucial role in enabling impor-
tant medical advances in fields such as gene therapy by
providing oversight of both publicly and privately funded
research efforts. We believe that voluntary participation
by the private sector in the review and certification pro-
cedures of the proposed national panel, as well as in its
deliberations, can contribute equally to the socially
responsible development of ES and EG cell technologies
and accelerate their translation into biomedically
important therapies that will benefit patients.
Recommendation 11: Voluntary Actions by Private
Sponsors of Research That Would Be Eligible for
Federal Funding
For privately funded research projects that involve
ES or EG cells that would be eligible for federal
funding, private sponsors and researchers are
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encouraged to adopt voluntarily the applicable
recommendations of this report. This includes
submitting protocols for the derivation of ES or
EG cells to the National Stem Cell Oversight and
Review Panel for review and cell line certification.
(See Recommendations 8 and 9.)
In this report, we recommend that federally funded
research to derive ES cells be limited to those efforts that
use embryos remaining after infertility treatment. Some of
the recommendations made in this context—such as the
requirement for separating the decision by a woman to
cease such treatment when embryos still remain and her
decision to donate those embryos to research—simply do
not apply to efforts to derive ES cells from embryos cre-
ated (whether by IVF or somatic cell nuclear transfer)
solely for research purposes, activities that might be pur-
sued in the private sector. Nevertheless, other ethical
standards and safeguards embodied in the recommenda-
tions, such as provisions to prevent the coercion of
women and the commodification of human reproduc-
tion, remain vitally important, even when embryos are
created solely for research purposes.
Recommendation 12: Voluntary Actions by Private
Sponsors of Research That Would Not Be Eligible
for Federal Funding
For privately funded research projects that involve
deriving ES cells from embryos created solely for
research purposes and that are therefore not eligi-
ble for federal funding (see Recommendations 3
and 4)
a) professional societies and trade associations
should develop and promulgate ethical safe-
guards and standards consistent with the prin-
ciples underlying this report, and
b) private sponsors and researchers involved in
such research should voluntarily comply with
these safeguards and standards.
Professional societies and trade associations dedicated
to reproductive medicine and technology play a central
role in establishing policy and standards for clinical care,
research, and education. We believe that these organiza-
tions can and should play a salutary role in ensuring that
all stem cell and embryo research conducted in the
United States, including that which is privately funded,
conforms to the ethical principles underlying this report.
Many of these organizations already have developed 
policy statements, ethics guidelines, or other directives
addressing issues in this report, and the Commission has
benefited from a careful review of these materials. These
organizations are encouraged to review their professional
standards to ensure not only that they keep pace with the
evolving science of human ES and EG cell research, but
also that their members are knowledgeable about and in
compliance with them. For those organizations that 
conduct research in this area but that lack statements 
or guidelines addressing the topics of this report, we 
recommend strongly that they develop such statements
or guidelines. No single institution or organization,
whether in the public or the private sector, can provide
all the necessary protections and safeguards.
The Need for Ongoing Review and Assessment
No system of federal oversight and review of such a
sensitive and important area of investigation should be
established without simultaneously providing an evalua-
tion of its effectiveness, value, and ongoing need. The
pace of scientific development in human ES and EG cell
research likely will increase. Although one cannot predict
the direction of the science of human stem cell research,
in order for the American public to realize the promise of
this research and to be assured that it is being conducted
responsibly, close attention to and monitoring of all the
mechanisms established for oversight and review are
required.
Recommendation 13: Sunset Provision for 
National Panel
The National Stem Cell Oversight and Review
Panel described in Recommendation 8 should be
chartered for a fixed period of time, not to exceed
five years. Prior to the expiration of this period,
DHHS should commission an independent evalua-
tion of the panel’s activities to determine whether
it has adequately fulfilled its functions and
whether it should be continued.
There are several reasons for allowing the national
panel to function for a fixed period of time and for eval-
uating its activities before continuing. First, some of the
hoped-for results will be available from research projects
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that are using the two sources we consider to be ethically
acceptable for federal funding. Five years is a reasonable
period of time to allow some of this information to
amass, offering the panel, researchers, members of
Congress, and the public sufficient time to determine
whether any of the knowledge or potential health bene-
fits are being realized. The growing body of information
in the public registry and database described above (par-
ticularly if privately funded researchers and sponsors
voluntarily participate) will aid these considerations.
Second, within this period the panel may be able to
determine whether additional sources of ES cells are nec-
essary in order for important research to continue. Two
arguments are evident for supporting research using
embryos created specifically for research purposes: one is
the concern that not enough embryos remain for this
purpose from infertility treatments, and the other is the
recognition that some research requires embryos that are
generated particularly for research and/or medical pur-
poses. The panel should assess whether additional
sources of ES cells that we have judged to be ineligible for
federal funding at this time (i.e., embryos created solely
for research purposes) are needed.
Third, an opportunity to assess the relationship
between local review of protocols using human ES and
EG cells and the panel’s review of protocols for the deri-
vation of ES cells will be offered. It will, of course, take
time for this national oversight and review mechanism to
develop experience with the processes of review, certifi-
cation, and approval described in this report. Fourth, we
hope that the panel will contribute to the national dia-
logue on the ethical issues regarding research involving
human embryos. A recurring theme of our deliberations,
and in the testimony we heard, was the importance of
encouraging this ongoing national conversation.
The criteria for determining whether the panel has
adequately fulfilled its functions should be set forth by an
independent body established by DHHS. However, it
would be reasonable to expect that the evaluation would
rely generally on the seven functions described above in
Recommendation 8 and that this evaluation would be
conducted by a group with expertise in these areas. In
addition, some of the following questions might be 
considered when conducting this evaluation: Is there rea-
son to believe that the private sector is voluntarily sub-
mitting descriptions of protocols involving the derivation
of human ES cells to the panel for review? Is the panel
reviewing projects in a timely manner? Do researchers
find that the review process is substantively helpful? Is
the public being provided with the assurance that social
and ethical issues are being considered?
Summary
Recent developments in human stem cell research have
raised hopes that new therapies will become available
that will serve to relieve human suffering. These devel-
opments also have served to remind society of the deep
moral concerns that are related to research involving
human embryos and cadaveric fetal tissue. Serious ethi-
cal discussion will (and should) continue on these issues.
However, in light of public testimony, expert advice, and
published writings, we have found substantial agreement
among individuals with diverse perspectives that
although the human embryo and fetus deserve respect as
forms of human life, the scientific and clinical benefits of
stem cell research should not be foregone. We were per-
suaded that carrying out human stem cell research under
federal sponsorship is important, but only if it is con-
ducted in an ethically responsible manner. And after
extensive deliberation, the Commission believes that
acceptable public policy can be forged, in part, on widely
shared views. Through this report, we not only offer rec-
ommendations regarding federal funding and oversight
of stem cell research, but also hope to further stimulate
the important public debate about the profound ethical
issues regarding this potentially beneficial research.

Introduction
L ate in 1998, three separate reports brought to thefore the debate over the scientific and clinical
prospects as well as the ethical implications of research
using human stem cells—those cells from which the
different types of cells in a developing organism grow and
that generate new cells throughout an organism’s life (Van
Blerkom 1994). The initial two reports were published
by two independent teams of scientists that had accom-
plished the isolation and culture of human embryonic
stem cells (hereafter referred to as ES cells) and embryonic
germ cells (hereafter referred to as EG cells). The first
report described the successful isolation of EG cells in the
laboratory of John Gearhart and his colleagues at The
Johns Hopkins University. This team derived stem cells
from primordial gonadal tissue obtained from cadaveric
fetal tissue (Shamblott et al. 1998). The second described
the work of James Thomson and his coworkers at the
University of Wisconsin, who derived ES cells from 
the blastocyst (~100 cells) of an early human embryo
donated by a couple who had received infertility treat-
ments (Thomson et al. 1998). Finally, an article in the
November 12, 1998, edition of the New York Times
described work funded by Advanced Cell Technology of
Worcester, Massachusetts. Although this work has not
yet been verified fully or published in a scientific journal,
the company claims that its scientists have caused human
somatic cells to revert to the primordial state by fusing
them with cow eggs to create a hybrid embryo. From this
hybrid embryo, a small clump of cells resembling human
ES cells appears to have been isolated (Wade 1998).
Human Stem Cells: An Overview
Although many kinds of stem cells exist within the
human body, scientists recognize a hierarchy of types.
Some stem cells are more committed—or differentiated—
than others. At the earliest stage of embryonic develop-
ment, the cells of the blastomere are identical to each
other and are relatively undifferentiated. Each one is
individually capable of generating a whole organism,
a quality referred to as totipotency. In the next stage,
ES cells, although they no longer are capable of produc-
ing a complete organism, remain undifferentiated and
retain the ability to develop into nearly any cell type
found in the human body, representing a type of biolog-
ical plasticity referred to as pluripotency. (The terms
totipotency and pluripotency will be discussed again later
in this chapter.) At this point, the ES cells branch out
into many types; from each differentiated line, all the
specialized cells (e.g., heart, muscle, nerve, skin, or
blood) that constitute the tissues and organs of the body
will develop (Weiss et al. 1996).
The potential versatility of ES and EG cells derived
from the early stage embryo or from cadaveric fetal tissue
offers unusual scientific and therapeutic promise.
Because these cells have the ability to proliferate and
renew themselves over the lifetime of the organism,
scientists have long recognized the possibility of using
such cells to generate a certain number of specialized
cells or tissues, which could permit the generation of new
cells or tissue as a treatment for injury or for damage
done by diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s
disease, heart disease, and kidney failure. Furthermore,
scientists regard these cells as an important, perhaps
essential, medium for understanding the details of
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human development and thus for developing life-saving
drugs and other therapies. At the same time, the current
source of these cells (the early stage embryo or cadaveric
fetal tissue) makes them the subject of significant ethical
considerations. Thus, the scientific reports of the suc-
cessful isolation of these versatile cells simultaneously
have raised the prospect of the development of new
treatments and perhaps cures for debilitating and even
fatal illnesses, while also renewing the debate regarding
the ethics of research involving human embryos and
cadaveric fetal material.
Ethical Issues
Within days of the publication of these reports and the
New York Times article, President Clinton wrote to the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission with two
requests: that the Commission consider the implications
of the purported cow-human fusion experiment and
report back to him and that it “undertake a thorough
review of the issues associated with human stem cell
research balancing all ethical and medical considera-
tions.” On November 20, 1998, we responded to the
President’s first request by stating that “any attempt to
create a child through the fusion of a human cell and a
nonhuman egg would raise profound ethical concerns
and should not be permitted.” (See Appendix C, which
includes these letters of request and response.) Our
response was based upon the same principles we relied
on when preparing our report to the President entitled
Cloning Human Beings (1997). We noted, however, that
insufficient scientific evidence is available at this time to
determine whether the fusing of a human cell with the
egg of a nonhuman animal would result in a human
embryo. In addition, if the resulting hybrid embryo were
to be used as a source of ES cells, it is not clear that those
cells would be the same in all respects to those obtained
from a nonhybrid human embryo.
The reports of the successful isolation and culture of
ES and EG cells have added a new dimension to the
ongoing controversy regarding the ethics of research
involving human embryos and cadaveric fetal material.
This controversy arises from sharply differing moral
views regarding elective abortion or the use of embryos
for research, and it has fueled the national and interna-
tional debate over the ethical, legal, and medical issues
that arise in this arena. This debate represents both a
challenge and an opportunity: a challenge because it con-
cerns important and morally contested questions regard-
ing the beginning of life, and an opportunity because it
provides another occasion for serious public discussion
about important ethical issues. We are hopeful that this
report will contribute to a dialogue that will foster
increased public understanding of the ethical issues
underlying research on ES and EG cells and an apprecia-
tion of the complexity of making responsible public pol-
icy in the face of moral disagreement and in light of a
realistic appraisal of the scientific and clinical promise of
that research.
We believe that most Americans agree that human
embryos should be respected as a form of human life, but
that disagreement exists both about the form that such
respect should take and about what level of protection is
owed at different stages of embryonic development.
Therefore, embryo research, the purpose of which is not
therapeutic to the embryo itself, is bound to raise serious
concerns for some about how to resolve the tensions
between the ethical imperative to cure diseases and the
moral obligation to protect human life. For those who
believe that the embryo has the moral status of a person
from the moment of conception, research (or any other
activity) that would destroy it is considered wrong and
should not take place. For others, arriving at an ethically
acceptable policy involves a complex balancing of a
number of important ethical concerns. Although this is a
controversial area, we should not lose sight of a broad
area of consensus on which public policy could—in
part—be constructed.
In order to respond effectively and responsibly to the
President’s request to consider issues related to human
stem cell research and to “balance all medical and ethical
considerations,” we determined that it also is necessary to
consider certain aspects of the broader issues regarding
research using embryonic and/or fetal material. One
reason for this approach is that the nature of some of the
ethical issues involved depends on the source of the stem
cells. For example, ES cells can be derived from early
embryos that are destroyed in the process of ES cell
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derivation, an act that some people find ethically unac-
ceptable. The use of cadaveric fetal tissue to derive EG
cell lines is somewhat less controversial because the fetus
is deceased prior to the initiation of the research and
because a well-developed system of public oversight for
such research is already in place. In addition, the recent
demonstration of nuclear transfer techniques (somatic
cell nuclear transfer [SCNT]) suggests that transfer of 
an adult nucleus into an oocyte might under certain
conditions create an embryo. However, the use of this
technique to combine an animal oocyte with a human
diploid nucleus raises additional issues regarding both
the nature of the embryo produced and the ethical issues
involved. In addition, each source of material bears a
unique set of scientific, ethical, and legal distinctions.
We believed that it was especially important to take a
broad view of the status of the human embryo and of
fetal tissue in relation to biomedical research, because it
is likely that science will uncover additional characteris-
tics of the early ex utero human embryo or fetal tissues
that will raise additional important and unique therapeu-
tic possibilities, separate from those that derive from 
ES or EG cells. If these developments occur, all of the
same ethical considerations that pertain to embryo
research and fetal tissue research in general would arise
once again.1 In fact, the 1994 National Institutes of
Health Human Embryo Research Panel designated 13 areas
in which embryo research could advance scientific
knowledge or could lead to important clinical benefits.
Among these areas is “the isolation of pluripotential
embryonic stem cell lines for eventual differentiation and
clinical use in transplantation and tissue repair.”2
Recent scientific developments require the updating
and review of the important work of U.S. bodies that
have met previously to address the role of the ethical
complexities of human embryo and fetal tissue research,
particularly as they relate to the role of federally funded
research. In addition, new policy statements from other
countries (such as Canada and the United Kingdom) 
suggest well-thought-out novel approaches that must be
considered carefully. In responding to the President’s
request, therefore, we elected to take a comprehensive
approach that built on the work of these reflective efforts,
both in this country and abroad.
In our 1997 report, Cloning Human Beings, we
addressed a specific aspect of cloning, namely where
genetic material would be transferred from the nucleus of
a somatic cell of an existing human being to an enucleated
human egg with the intention of creating a child. At the
time that we were preparing this report, the issues sur-
rounding embryo research were not revisited, although
we began our discussions recognizing that any effort 
in humans to transfer a somatic cell nucleus into an
enucleated egg likely involves the creation of an embryo,
which has the potential to be transferred to a uterus and
developed to term. We recognized that ethical concerns
surrounding issues of embryo research recently had
received extensive analysis and noted that under current
law, the use of SCNT to create an embryo solely for
research purposes is prohibited in any project involving
federal funds. The President’s request—together with
new developments concerning human ES and EG cell
research using embryos remaining after infertility treat-
ments or fetal tissue following elective abortion—
requires that we reconsider the appropriateness of using
these sources of cells for research purposes.
In this respect it is important to note that research on
human embryos, or the creation of human embryos for
research purposes, is not only legal in the United States
but proceeds without any public oversight as long as 
1) federal funds are not involved, 2) Food and Drug
Administration regulations do not apply, and 3) the laws
of the state in which the research is to be conducted do
not forbid such activity. Consequently, most of the
public controversy surrounding such activities in the
United States has focused on whether it is appropriate for
the federal government to sponsor such research when it
has significant scientific merit and substantive clinical
promise. This question is also the focus of this report.
Framework for This Report
As noted above, President Clinton directed the
Commission to conduct a thorough review of the issues
associated with human stem cell research balancing all
ethical and medical considerations. This approach—
balancing or weighing difficult issues—often is used in
public policy discussions and has much to recommend
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it, particularly when such balancing involves a serious
consideration of different moral points of view, the state
of scientific and medical developments, and other fac-
tors. As discussed more fully in Chapter 4, some of the
issues associated with research on human stem cells—the
moral status of the human embryo, for example—are
especially sensitive and do not lend themselves easily to
balancing. We did not, for example, deem the views of
those who consider the fetus to have the moral status of
a human person from the moment of conception to be of
less (or more) moral weight than the views of those who
consider the fetus to lack this moral status. Similarly, we
did not come to our conclusions simply by balancing
potential medical benefits against the potential harms,
because the possibility of social benefits, by itself, is not
a sufficient reason for federal support of such controver-
sial research, particularly given the interest in stem cell
research in the private sector. Nor did we approach this
issue based simply upon an interpretation of the existing
legal environment. Instead, we combined, as thought-
fully as we could, a number of different perspectives on
and approaches to this topic.
Through ongoing discussion and dialogue—
informed by scientists, philosophers, legal and religious
scholars, members of the public, and others—we devel-
oped our moral perspectives on the appropriateness of
federal sponsorship of stem cell research involving the
derivation and/or use of ES and EG cells, principally
focusing on the ethical and scientific issues. We consid-
ered the sources of human EG and ES cells and the 
relevant moral differences that should be evaluated in
determining the acceptability of federal funding for the
derivation and/or use of cells from each of these sources.
In this regard, we were assisted by a number of commis-
sioned papers each of which addressed different aspects
of the problem.3 We also benefited from the input of a
group of religious scholars from diverse faith traditions
whose views within and across traditions reflected the
diversity found within the public as a whole. We then
considered some associated ethical issues including
voluntary informed consent, the just distribution of
potential benefits from stem cell research, and the com-
modification and sale of the body and its parts. Finally,
we considered how and to what extent a mechanism of
national oversight and review would provide the neces-
sary assurance that research, conducted responsibly and
with accountability, could go forward while protecting
and honoring a number of deeply held values. These
shared values include
n securing the safety and efficacy of clinical and/or 
scientific procedures, especially when fundamental
ethical and social issues are involved,
n respecting human life at all stages of development,
and
n ensuring the responsible pursuit of medical and 
scientific knowledge.
Although this report primarily addresses the ethical
issues associated with the use of federal funds for
research to derive and use ES and EG cells, we recognize
that considerable work in both of these areas will be con-
ducted under private sponsorship. Thus, our recommen-
dations also may have implications for those working in
the private sector.
Definitions Used in This Report
We recognize the need to define clearly the terms that are
central to an understanding of this report. Because cer-
tain terms, such as embryo and totipotent, are not always
used consistently, it is important to explain how the
Commission uses this terminology.
It is most important that the reader understand how
the term embryo is used. The Canadian Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies eluci-
dated the confusion surrounding the term well in its
1993 report entitled Proceed with Care: Final Report of the
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies:
…In the language of biologists, before implantation
the fertilized egg is termed a ‘zygote’ rather than an
‘embryo.’ The term ‘embryo’ refers to the developing
entity after implantation in the uterus until about
eight weeks after fertilisation. At the beginning of the
ninth week after fertilisation, it is referred to as a
‘fetus,’ the term used until time of birth. The terms
embryo donation, embryo transfer, and embryo
research are therefore inaccurate, since these all occur
with zygotes, not embryos. Nevertheless, because the
terms are still commonly used in the public debate,
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we continue to refer to embryo research, embryo
donation, and embryo transfer (607). 
For the sake of consistency and accuracy, when refer-
ring to the details of the developmental stages of an entity,
we use the following terminology: 1) the developing
organism is a zygote during the first week after fertiliza-
tion, 2) the organism is an embryo during the second
through eighth weeks of development, and 3) the organ-
ism is a fetus from the ninth week of development until
the time of birth. However, in other contexts, we will
continue to use the broad terms embryo research, embryo
donation, and embryo transfer to refer to zygotes, because
this is how the public commonly uses them.
Because there are several sources of human stem cells,
we decided that each type of stem cell should be named
in a way that clarifies its original source. Therefore, as
discussed earlier, cells derived from the inner cell mass of
a blastocyst—those cells within the conceptus that form
the embryo proper—are called ES cells, and cells that 
are derived from primordial germ cells of embryos and
fetuses are called EG cells. In addition, cells derived
from teratocarcinomas—malignant embryonic tumors—
are called embryonal carcinoma cells, and stem cells found
in the adult organism are called adult stem (AS) cells.
Two other terms that require explanation—because
the scientific community disagrees about their meaning—
are totipotent and pluripotent. Some differentiate between
the two terms by defining totipotency as the ability to
develop into a complete organism and pluripotency as
the ability to develop into all of the various cell types of
an organism without the capability of developing into an
entire organism. Others define a totipotent cell as any cell
that has the potential to differentiate into all cells of a
developing organism, but that does not necessarily have
the ability to direct the complete development of an
entire organism. These scientists would then define a
pluripotent cell as any cell that has the ability to differ-
entiate into multiple (more than two) cell types. Rather
than engage in this debate, for the sake of clarity, we
decided to avoid using this terminology in this report,
unless it refers directly to specific work or to the state-
ments of others in which these words were included.
Instead, this report uses descriptions of the stage of
development and the differentiation potential of cells to
make clear to the reader which types of cells are being
discussed.
Organization of This Report
This report comes at a time when the Commission has
completed deliberations regarding the use of human bio-
logical materials in research (1999). In that report, we
recognized that in research involving such materials as
DNA, hair, and skin biopsies, a number of significant eth-
ical issues must be addressed by Institutional Review
Boards, researchers, and others; these include issues of
privacy and confidentiality, potential discrimination,
and stigmatization. As important as these issues are—and
they must be handled satisfactorily in order for research
to proceed with appropriate protections for human sub-
jects—research on human stem cells, whether they are
obtained from fetal tissue following elective abortions
or from tissue obtained from embryos remaining after
infertility treatments, requires additional and perhaps
even deeper ethical reflection.
The Commission’s primary goal for this report was
the development of a set of recommendations that would
provide guidance on the appropriateness of permitting
the federal government to fund human ES and EG cell
research and on what sorts of constraints, if any, should
be placed on such support. This report first presents a
summary of some of the key scientific issues involved in
stem cell research (Chapter 2). To place our analysis in
context and to understand the implications of any new
recommendations regarding the oversight and regulation
of research using fetal tissue and embryos, Chapter 3
describes the historical and current status of law and
regulation governing the research use of these materials.
Chapter 4 explores the various ethical issues surrounding
the moral status of the embryo and cadaveric fetal tissue
and ethical concerns governing the acceptable use of
these materials in research. Finally, Chapter 5 offers our
conclusions and recommendations regarding federal
sponsorship of research and appropriate oversight
activities in these ethically controversial areas.
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Notes
1 For example, it has been generally recommended by most gov-
ernmental and professional bodies that have previously examined
this issue that research on the ex utero pre-implantation embryo
should not be conducted beyond the 14th day following fertiliza-
tion. At 14 days, the first stages of organized development begin,
leading over the next few days to the first appearance of differenti-
ated tissues of the body. The Commission concurs with this time
limit on research involving the ex utero human embryo.
2 The 1994 National Institutes of Health Human Embryo Research
Panel was asked to consider various areas of research involving the
ex utero pre-implantation human embryo and to provide areas that
1) are acceptable for federal funding, 2) warrant additional review,
and 3) are unacceptable for federal support. The panel did not
consider research involving in utero human embryos, or fetuses,
because guidelines for such research already exist in the form of
regulations.
3 See Appendix H for a list of the papers that were prepared for
the Commission. These papers are available in Volume II of this
report.
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Introduction
The stem cell is a unique and essential cell type foundin animals. Many kinds of stem cells are found in
the human body, with some more differentiated—or
committed—to a particular function than others. In
other words, when stem cells divide, some of the progeny
mature into cells of a specific type (e.g., heart, muscle,
blood, or brain cells), while others remain stem cells,
ready to repair some of the everyday wear and tear
undergone by our bodies. These stem cells are capable of
continually reproducing themselves and serve to renew
tissue throughout an individual’s life. For example, they
continually regenerate the lining of the gut, revitalize
skin, and produce a whole range of blood cells. Although
the term stem cell commonly is used to refer to the cells
within the adult organism that renew tissue (e.g.,
hematopoietic stem cells, a type of cell found in the
blood), the most fundamental and extraordinary of the
stem cells are found in the early stage embryo (Van
Blerkom 1994). These embryonic stem (ES) cells, unlike
the more differentiated adult stem (AS) cells or other cell
types, retain the special ability to develop into nearly any
cell type. Embryonic germ (EG) cells, which originate from
the primordial reproductive cells of the developing fetus,
have properties similar to ES cells.
Because stem cells are able to proliferate and renew
themselves over the lifetime of the organism—while at
the same time retaining all of their multilineage
potential—scientists have long recognized that such cells
could be used to generate a large number of specialized
cells or tissue through amplification, a possibility that
could allow the generation of new cells that would treat
injury or disease.1 In fact, if it were possible to control
the differentiation of human ES cells in culture, the
resulting cells could be used to repair damage caused by
such conditions as heart failure, diabetes, and certain
neurodegenerative diseases.
In late 1998, three separate reports brought to the
fore not only these scientific and clinical prospects but
also the controversies inherent in human stem cell
research. The first two reports, published by two inde-
pendent teams of scientists supported by private funds
from Geron Corporation, a biotechnology company
located in Menlo Park, California, describe the first suc-
cessful isolation and culture in the laboratory of human
ES and EG cells. One team, led by John Gearhart of
The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine in
Baltimore, Maryland, derived human EG cells from pri-
mordial gonadal tissue, which was obtained from fetal
tissue following elective abortion (Shamblott et al. 1998).
The second team, led by James Thomson of the
University of Wisconsin, derived human ES cells from
the blastocyst stage of early embryos donated by couples
who had undergone infertility treatment (Thomson et al.
1998). The ES and EG cells derived by each of these
means appear to be similar in structure, function, and
potential, although additional research is needed in order
to verify this claim (Varmus 1998). Finally, an article in
the November 12, 1998, edition of the New York Times
described work funded by Advanced Cell Technology of
Worcester, Massachusetts. Although this work has not yet
been verified fully or published in a scientific journal, the
company claims that its scientists have caused human
somatic cells to revert to the primordial state by fusing
them with cow eggs to create a hybrid embryo. From this
hybrid embryo, a small clump of cells resembling human
ES cells appears to have been isolated (Wade 1998). 
7
Human Stem Cell Research 
and the Potential for Clinical
Application
2Chapter Two
8Chapter 2: Human Stem Cell Research and the Potential for Clinical Application
The methodologies used by these investigators for
deriving human ES and EG cells are based on techniques
that have been used in mice since the early 1980s and,
more recently, from nonhuman primates and other ani-
mals. The isolation and culturing of these cells, however,
for the first time open certain avenues of important
research and future clinical possibilities. At the most
basic level, the isolation of these cells allows scientists to
focus on how human ES and EG cells differentiate into
specific types of cells, with the goal of identifying the
genetic and environmental signals that direct their spe-
cialization into specific cell types. Such studies using
mouse stem cells are ongoing, but comparable studies
with human cells will be required in order to determine
whether the signals are the same. This research might, for
example, lead to the discovery of new ways to treat a
variety of conditions, including degenerative diseases,
birth defects, and cancer and would build on investiga-
tions conducted over the last decade, in which labora-
tory animals have been used to determine whether ES
cells can be used to re-establish tissue in an adult organ-
ism (Corn et al. 1991; Diukman and Golbus 1992; Hall
and Watt 1989; Hollands 1991). Through processes sci-
entists are only beginning to understand, these primitive
stem cells can be stimulated to specialize so that they
become precursors to different cell types, which then
may be used to replace tissues such as muscle, skin,
nerves, or liver. For example, in mid-1999, scientists
used mouse ES cells to successfully generate glial
(myelin-producing) cells that when transplanted into a
rat model of human myelin disease were able to effi-
ciently myelinate axons in the rat’s brain and spinal cord
(Brustle et al. 1999).
Stem Cell Types
Scientists often distinguish between different kinds of
stem cells depending upon their origin and their poten-
tial to differentiate. Cells derived from malignant embry-
onic tumors, or teratocarcinomas, are called embryonal
carcinoma (EC) cells; cells derived from the inner cell mass
of a blastocyst-stage embryo are ES cells, and cells that are
derived from precursors of germ cells from a fetus are 
EG cells. In addition, stem cells can be found in the adult
organism, for example, in bone marrow; they may possi-
bly also be found in skin and intestine. These AS cells
serve to replenish tissues in which cells often have 
limited life spans, such as the skin, intestine, and blood.
Although interesting new data suggest that stem cells
found in the adult organism are not restricted to produc-
ing cells from the tissue in which they reside (Bjornson et
al. 1999), it is unlikely that these cells are capable of dif-
ferentiating into all cell types. In contrast, because
human ES and EG cells are believed to be capable of dif-
ferentiating into all cell types, they are likely to be of clin-
ical use in treating a variety of diseases, especially those
for which organ-specific stem cells are difficult to isolate
and/or use. 
EG Cells
Primordial germ cells are the embryonic precursors of
the sperm and ova of the adult animal (Donovan 1998).
The establishment of the germline in the embryo involves
the separation of primordial germ cells from the somatic
cells, the proliferation of primordial germ cells, the
migration of these cells to the gonads, and finally their
differentiation into gametes (Donovan 1994). Primordial
germ cells are the only cells in the body that can give rise
to successive generations, while the somatic cells that
form the body of the animal lack this capability as soon
as they start to differentiate (Matsui 1998). 
In culture, primordial germ cells can give rise to EG
cells that are capable of differentiating into cells of multi-
ple lineages (Donovan 1998). (See Figure 2-1.) Primordial
germ cells normally give rise to gametes, but sometimes
if the developmental process goes awry, they become EC
cells, the stem cells of benign teratomas and malignant
teratocarcinomas, which are tumors containing deriva-
tives of the three primary germ layers (Donovan 1998).
EG cells form embryoid bodies in culture, give rise to
teratomas when introduced into histocompatible ani-
mals, and form germline chimeras when introduced into
a host blastocyst (Donovan 1998). The derivation of EG
cells directly from primordial germ cells provides a
mechanism to study some aspects of primordial germ cell
development, such as imprinting and differentiation
(Donovan 1994). At the same time, it may be difficult to
obtain an adequate supply of appropriate fetal tissue to
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provide the relevant cell lines needed for both research
and clinical uses.
ES Cells
In mammalian embryonic development, cell division
gives rise to differentiated daughter cells that eventually
comprise the mature animal. As cells become committed
to a particular lineage or cell type, a progressive decrease
in developmental potential presumably occurs. Early in
embryonic development (until about 16 cells), each cell
of the early cleavage-stage embryo has the developmen-
tal potential to contribute to any embryonic or extra
embryonic cell type (Winkel and Pedersen 1988).
However, by the blastocyst stage, the cells of the tro-
phectoderm are irreversibly committed to forming the
placenta and other trophectoderm lineages (Winkel and
Pedersen 1988). By six to seven days postfertilization, the
inner cell mass has divided to form two layers, which
then give rise to the embryo proper and to extra
embryonic tissues (Gardner 1982). (See Exhibit 2-A
and Figure 2-2 for a description of early human
embryonic development.)
Although the cells of the inner cell mass are precur-
sors to all adult tissues, they can proliferate and replace
themselves in the intact embryo only for a limited time
before they become committed to specific lineages
(Thomson and Marshall 1998). ES cells are derived from
cells of the inner cell mass. Once they are placed in the
appropriate culture conditions, these cells seem to be
capable of extensive, undifferentiated proliferation in
vitro and maintain the potential to contribute to all adult
cell types (Evans and Kaufman 1981; Martin 1981). (See
Figure 2-3.)
Even though these embryonic cells are stem cells,
they differ substantially from the stem cells found within
the fully developed, or adult, organism (see below). Most
important, ES cells are highly proliferative, both in the
embryo as well as in culture, while some stem cells of the
adult can be nearly quiescent and may be more difficult
to maintain and expand in culture (Van Blerkom 1994).
Therefore, it appears that if stem cells were someday to
be used for the treatment of disease, it might be advanta-
geous to use ES cells to treat certain disorders.
Sources of Human ES Cells
We have distinguished between three sources of 
ES cells, which are derived from early embryos in cul-
ture: 1) embryos created by in vitro fertilization (IVF) for
infertility treatments that were not implanted because
they were no longer needed, 2) embryos created by IVF
Fertilization
Blastocyst
(6–7 days) (5–9 weeks)
Primordial
Germ Cells Cultured ES Cells
Specific Cell and 
Tissue Types
Cleavage
Elective
Abortion
Figure 2-1.  Isolation and Culture of Human ES Cells from Embryonic/Fetal Tissue
EMBRYO/
FETUS
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expressly for research purposes, and 3) embryos resulting
from somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or other
cloning techniques. SCNT technology has, in fact, opened
the door to a possible alternative approach to creating ES
cells. (See Figure 2-4.) If the nucleus is removed from an
immature egg (oocyte) and a mature diploid nucleus is
inserted, the resulting cell will divide and develop with
many characteristics of an embryo. In animal experiments
in which a SCNT-derived embryo is transferred to a
surrogate mother, a successful pregnancy may be estab-
lished. (This was the technique used to generate the now-
famous cloned sheep Dolly.) If, instead of being transferred
to a surrogate, the SCNT-derived embryo is kept in culture,
is allowed to divide, and is then dissociated, ES cells can
Exhibit 2-A: Early Development of the Human Embryo 
In humans, fertilization (the union of an oocyte [egg] and sperm) occurs in the fallopian tubes and results in the 
formation of the zygote. In the three to four days it takes for the zygote to travel down the fallopian tube to the uterus,
several cell divisions (cleavages) occur.
The first division occurs approximately 36 hours after fertilization, when the zygote begins to cleave into two cells
called blastomeres. At about 60 hours following fertilization, the two blastomeres divide again to form four blas-
tomeres. At three days postfertilization, the four blastomeres divide to form eight cells. Each blastomere becomes
smaller with each subsequent division. In this early stage of development, all of the blastomeres are of equal size.
These cells are unspecialized and have the capacity to differentiate into any of the cell types of the embryo as well
as into the essential membranes and tissue that will support the development of the embryo.Therefore, one or more
of the blastomeres can be removed without affecting the ability of the other blastomeres to develop into a fetus. In
fact, if an embryo separates in half during this early stage of development, identical twins—two genetically identical
individuals—will develop.
When the cell division reaches approximately 16 cells, the zygote is called a morula. The morula leaves the 
fallopian tube and enters the uterine cavity three to four days following fertilization. After reaching the uterus,
the developing zygote usually remains in the uterine cavity an additional four to five days before it implants in the
endometrium (uterine wall), which means that implantation ordinarily occurs on the seventh or eighth day following
fertilization.
Cell division continues, creating a cavity known as a blastocele in the center of the morula. With the appearance
of the cavity in the center, the entire structure is now called a blastocyst. This first specialization event occurs just
before the zygote attaches to the uterus, approximately six to seven days after fertilization, when approximately 100
cells have developed. This specialization involves the formation of an outer layer of trophoblast cells, which will give
rise to part of the placenta, surrounding a group of about 20 to 30 inner cells (the inner cell mass) that remain 
undifferentiated. At this stage, these cells no longer can give rise to all of the cells necessary to form an entire
organism and therefore are incapable of developing into an entire human being. In general, as cells further
differentiate, they lose the capacity to enter developmental pathways that were previously open to them.
As the blastocyst attaches to the uterus, the outer layer of cells secretes an enzyme, which erodes the epithelial
uterine lining and creates an implantation site for the blastocyst. Once implantation has taken place, the zygote
becomes an embryo. The trophoblast and underlying cells proliferate rapidly to form the placenta and the various
membranes that surround and nourish the developing embryonic cells.
In the week following implantation, the inner cells of the blastocyst divide rapidly to form the embryonic disc,
which will give rise to the three germ layers—the ectoderm, the mesoderm, and the endoderm. These three layers
will eventually develop into the embryo. By 14 days, the embryonic disc is approximately 0.5 mm in diameter and
consists of approximately 2,000 cells. It is at this time that the first stage of organized development, known as 
gastrulation, is initiated, leading over the next few days to the first appearance of differentiated tissues of the 
body, including primitive neural cells. Gastrulation is the process by which the bilaminar (two-layered) embryonic disc
is converted into a trilaminar (three-layered) embryonic disc, and its onset at day 14 in vivo is marked by the appear-
ance of the primitive streak, a region in which cells move from one layer to another in an organized way.
During the third week, the embryo grows to 2.3 mm long, and the precursors of most of the major organ systems
begin to form. At the beginning of the third month, the embryo becomes a fetus. During the third to ninth months,
the organ systems and tissues of the fetus continue to develop, until birth.
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be derived. The potential advantage of using SCNT tech-
nology to create ES cells is that a somatic cell from an
individual can be used to create ES cells that are com-
pletely compatible with that individual’s tissue type. If
cells or tissues are generated from these ES cells for trans-
plant into a person, this tissue type compatibility may
avoid many of the problems associated with tissue graft
rejection that are currently encountered in the treatment
of a variety of diseases.
The use of SCNT into an oocyte has been criticized as
an asexual or “unnatural” way of creating a human
embryo. However, it is important to distinguish the tech-
nique of SCNT from the type of cell that is created; in
other words, SCNT techniques also might be used with
recipient cells other than oocytes. For example, ES cells with
matched tissue types for transplant might be generated
by SCNT into an enucleated ES cell.2 This possibility
has not yet been explored, but it may be less morally
Sperm
Egg
In Utero
Fertilization
Day 6–7
Blastocyst
Day 1– 6
Cell Division
(Cleavage)
Zygote
(week 1)
Embryo
(weeks 2–8)
Fetus
(months 3–9)
Figure 2-2.  Stages of Development of the Human Embryo and Fetus
Embryo Fetus
In Vitro
Fertilization
Blastocyst
(6–7 days)
Cells from
Inner Cell Mass Cultured ES Cells
Specific Cell and Tissue Types
Cleavage
Inner Cell Mass
Figure 2-3.  Isolation and Culture of Human ES Cells from Blastocysts
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problematic to many citizens, because the cell created
would not be an embryo with the potential to continue
developing. 
Stem Cells Found in the Postnatal 
and Adult Organism
In the adult mammal, cell division occurs in order to
maintain a constant number of terminally differentiated
cells in tissues in which cells have been lost due to injury,
disease, or natural cell death. Cells with a high turnover
rate are replaced through a highly regulated process of
proliferation, differentiation, and apoptosis (programmed
cell death) from relatively undifferentiated stem cells, or
precursor cells (Thomson and Marshall 1998). The best
known example of an AS cell is the hematopoietic stem
cell, which is found in bone marrow and which is
responsible for the production of all types of blood cells
(Iscove 1990). Other examples of stem cells include the
skin epithelium and the epithelium of the small intestine
(Hall and Watt 1989). In the human small intestine, for
example, approximately 100 billion cells are shed and
must be replaced daily (Potten and Loeffler 1990). These
tissues contain subpopulations of dividing stem cells that
generate replacements for the relatively short-lived, ter-
minally differentiated cells. Much of the debate in the
stem cell field revolves around determining the breadth
of the potential of these cells: Can they generate only the
cells of that organ or are they capable of differentiating
into several types of cells when given the proper stimuli?
The successful cloning of Dolly demonstrated that
even somatic cells are capable of forming every cell of an
organism after nuclear transfer into an oocyte (Wilmut et
al. 1997). Preliminary studies of stem cells obtained from
various systems of the adult organism suggest that in
some cases the reactivation of dormant genetic programs
may not require nuclear transfer or experimental modifi-
cation of the genome. Although research in this area is
preliminary, this particular class of stem cells (i.e., AS
cells) might be able to differentiate along several cell
lineages in response to an appropriate pattern of
stimulation.
Neural Stem Cells
For a number of years, scientists have recognized
that transplantation of fresh fetal neural tissue into the
diseased adult brain may be a promising therapy for
neurodegenerative disorders. This type of transplantation
recently has been shown to be effective in younger
patients with Parkinson’s disease (Freed et al. 1999). This
technique has several disadvantages, however, such as
the need to time the surgery according to the availability
of large amounts of fresh fetal tissue, the need to quickly
Enucleated
Egg
Somatic
Cell
Blastocyst
(6–7 days)
Cells from
Inner Cell Mass Cultured ES Cells
Specific Cell and 
Tissue Types
CleavageSomatic
Cell Nuclear
Transfer
Figure 2-4.  Isolation and Culture of Human ES Cells from SCNT
13
National Bioethics Advisory Commission
screen for infectious diseases, and the limited amount of
donor fetal tissue available (Bjorklund 1993; Cattaneo
and McKay 1991). By developing techniques to culture
and expand primary fetal neural cells before transplanta-
tion, some of the problems of using fresh tissue may be
eliminated. In addition, it might be possible to direct cul-
tured cells to develop along certain lineages or to express
specific genes before they are transplanted, so that, for
example, dopamine-producing cells could be selectively
grown to treat Parkinson’s disease (Cattaneo and McKay
1991; Snyder 1994).
Indeed, it has already been demonstrated that neural
stem cells are capable of gene (Snyder, Taylor, and Wolfe
1995) and cellular (Rosario et al. 1997; Snyder et al.
1997; Yandava, Billinghurst, and Snyder 1999) replace-
ment in models of neural disease. In many of these exper-
iments, one stable clone of mouse neural stem cells could
be used from individual to individual, strain to strain,
and disease to disease, regardless of recipient age within
the species, without immunorejection or the need for
immunosuppression. This suggests that unique immune
qualities may exist within stem cells that might allow
them to be universal donors. Moreover, the possibility
exists that many of the instructive cues for differentiation
actually might originate from interaction with damaged
central nervous system tissue itself.
The embryonic nervous system arises from the
ectoderm. The first cell type to differentiate from the
uncommitted precursor cells is the neuron, followed by
the oligodendrocyte, and then the astrocyte (Frederiksen
and McKay 1988). Recently, Angelo Vescovi, a neurobiol-
ogist at the National Neurological Institute Carlo Besta in
Milan, Italy, and his colleagues reported that neural stem
cells, which give rise to the three main types of brain
cells, also can become blood cells when transplanted
into mice in which the blood-forming tissue—the bone
marrow—has been mostly destroyed (Bjornson et al.
1999). Although the study did not explain what caused
the neural cells to turn into blood cells, the investigators
speculate that the neural cells might be responding to the
same signals that normally stimulate the few remaining
blood stem cells to reproduce and mature after irradia-
tion destroys most of the bone marrow (Strauss 1999).
Although this research is preliminary and has not yet
been conducted using human cells, it raises the possibil-
ity of using neural stem cell transplants to treat human
blood cell disorders such as aplastic anemia and severe
combined immunodeficiency. This is an appealing
prospect, because bone marrow stem cells do not replen-
ish themselves well in laboratory cultures. The problem
of access to such cells in humans remains, as they must
be obtained from the brain—an invasive and risky pro-
cedure. This research also opens up the possibility that
other apparently restricted AS cells may retain the ability
to differentiate into several different types of cells if
exposed to a conducive external environment. It is clear
that further research is required in this area.
Mesenchymal Stem Cells
Human mesenchymal stem cells, which are present in
adult bone marrow, can replicate as undifferentiated cells
and have the potential to differentiate into lineages of
mesenchymal tissues, including bone, cartilage, fat, ten-
don, muscle, and marrow stroma (Pittenger et al. 1999).
In a recent experiment, cells that have the characteristics
of human mesenchymal stem cells were isolated from
marrow aspirates of volunteer donors. Individual stem
cells were identified that, when expanded to colonies,
retained their multilineage potential. These results
demonstrate that isolated expanded human mesenchy-
mal stem cells in culture will differentiate, in a controlled
manner, to multiple but limited lineages. One might
speculate that these particular AS cells could be induced
to differentiate exclusively into the adipocytic, chondro-
cytic, or osteocytic lineages, which then might be used to
treat various bone diseases.
The specific environmental cues needed to initiate the
proliferation and differentiation of these cells are not
understood (Pittenger et al. 1999). The ability to isolate,
expand, and direct the differentiation of such cells in
culture to particular lineages, however, offers the oppor-
tunity to study events associated with cell commitment
and differentiation. The human mesenchymal stem cells
isolated by Pittenger and colleagues appear to have the
ability to proliferate extensively and to maintain the abil-
ity to differentiate into certain cell types in culture. Their
cultivation and selective differentiation should provide
further information about this important progenitor of
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multiple tissue types and the potential of new therapeu-
tic approaches for the restoration of damaged or diseased
tissue (Pittenger et al. 1999). 
Animal Models
ES cells were first derived from mouse embryos, and the
mouse has become the principal model for the study of
these cells (Evans and Kaufman 1981; Martin 1981). If
mouse ES cells are injected into the developing blasto-
cyst, they have the ability to contribute to all three germ
layers of the mouse, including the germline, to form a
chimeric animal. This is one of the unique properties of
the mouse ES cell. More recently, cells with some prop-
erties of ES cells have been derived from cows, pigs, rats,
sheep, hamsters, rabbits, and primates (Pedersen 1994).
(See Table 2-1.) However, only in cows, pigs, and rats
did these ES cells contribute to a chimeric animal, and in
none of these cases was there contribution to the
germline by ES cells, one of the most stringent criteria for
defining ES cells.
Mouse ES Cells
ES cells were first isolated from mouse blastocysts in
1981 (Evans and Kaufman 1981; Martin 1981). These
blastocysts were placed in culture and allowed to attach
to the culture dish so that trophoblast cells spread out,
while the undifferentiated inner cells (the inner cell mass)
continued to grow as a tight but disorganized cluster.
Before the inner cell mass developed into the equivalent
of the embryonic disc, it was drawn up into a fine
pipette, dissociated into single cells, and dispersed into
another dish with a rich culture medium. Under these
circumstances, the dissociated cells continued to grow
rapidly for an extended period.
Mouse ES cells cannot become organized into an
embryo by themselves or implant into the uterus if
placed there. However, if the cells are injected back into
a new blastocyst, they can intermingle with the host
inner cell mass to make a chimera and participate in nor-
mal development, eventually contributing to all of the
tissues of the adult mouse, including nerve, blood, skin,
bone, and germ cells (Robertson and Bradley 1986). This
Table 2-1. Stem Cells Isolated from
Mammals
Species References
Mouse Evans and Kaufman 1981
Martin 1981
Rat Iannaccone et al. 1994
Hamster Doetschman, Williams, and
Maeda 1988
Mink Sukoyan et al. 1992
Sukoyan et al. 1993
Rabbit Moreadith and Graves 1992
Giles et al. 1993
Graves and Moreadith 1993
Sheep Handyside et al. 1987
Piedrahita, Anderson, and
Bondurant 1990
Notarianni et al. 1991
Pig Piedrahita et al. 1988
Evans et al. 1990
Notarianni et al. 1990 
Piedrahita et al. 1990
Hochereau-de Reiviers and
Perreau 1993
Talbot et al. 1993
Wheeler 1994
Shim et al. 1997
Cow Evans et al. 1990
Saito, Strelchenko, and 
Niemann 1992
Strelchenko and Stice 1994
Cibelli et al. 1998
Common Marmoset Thomson et al. 1996
Rhesus Monkey Thomson et al. 1995
Human Bongso et al. 1994
Shamblott et al. 1998 
Thomson et al. 1998
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indicates that mouse ES cells have not lost the capacity to
give rise to specialized tissues, but they will not do so
unless placed in a conducive environment.
The ability of mouse ES cells to enter the germline in
chimeras allows the introduction of specific genetic
changes into the mouse genome and offers a direct
approach to understanding gene function in the intact
animal (Rossant, Bernelot-Moens, and Nagy 1993).
Using the technique of homologous recombination in
which a gene is either modified or disabled (“knocked
out”), mouse ES cells that contain specific gene alter-
ations may be derived. These genetically altered cells can
then be used to form chimeras with normal embryos,
subsequently generating a mouse lacking one specific
gene or containing an extra or altered gene.
Mouse ES cells also have been extremely useful as
models of the early differentiation events that occur dur-
ing the development of mammalian embryos (Pedersen
1994), as shown in the following examples:
n When mouse ES cells were allowed to differentiate in
culture, beating heart cells formed spontaneously,
providing a model for cardiac-specific gene expres-
sion and the development of cardiac muscle and
blood vessels (Chen and Kosco 1993; Doetschman et
al. 1993; Miller-Hance et al. 1993; Muthuchamy et al.
1993; Robbins et al. 1990; Wobus, Wallukat, and
Heschler 1991).
n Blood formation will occur spontaneously in ES cell-
derived embryoid bodies and can be augmented by
modifying the culture conditions (Snodgrass,
Schmitt, and Bruyns 1992). Therefore, hematopoietic
stem cells have been studied extensively in an effort
to determine the conditions for differentiation, sur-
vival, and proliferation of blood cells.
n Several studies have highlighted the importance of
growth and differentiation factors in the regulation of
mammalian development. For example, the mainte-
nance of mouse ES cells in an undifferentiated state
was found to require the presence of leukemia
inhibitory factor, a differentiation-inhibiting factor
(Fry 1992). Other studies have found several growth
and differentiation factors to be important in ES cell
development and differentiation, including activins,
colony-stimulating factor, erythropoietin, basic
fibroblast growth factor, insulin-like growth factor 2,
interleukins, parathryoid hormone-related peptide,
platelet-derived growth factor, steel factor, and trans-
forming growth factor ß (Pedersen 1994).
n In midgestation embryos and the adult mouse, only
one parental allele of imprinted genes is expressed.
However, studies have suggested that there is
limited relaxation of imprinting in ES cells so that
both maternal and paternal alleles are expressed
(Pedersen 1994).
By understanding the mechanisms responsible for
growth and differentiation in embryonic development, it
may then be possible to attempt to regulate the differen-
tiation of ES cells along specific pathways. The knowl-
edge gained from these types of studies could someday
lead to the effective treatment of certain important
human diseases.
Historically, because of its well-defined genetics, short
gestational time, ease of cultivation, and large litters, the
mouse has been one of the primary models for the study
of mammalian embryonic development. However, there
are several differences between early mouse development
and early human development, including 
n the timing of embryonic genome expression (Braude,
Bolton, and Moore 1988),
n the formation, structure, and function of the fetal
membranes and placenta (Benirschke and Kaufmann
1990; Luckett 1975, 1978), and
n the formation of an egg cylinder (mouse) as opposed
to an embryonic disc (human) (Kaufmann 1992;
O’Rahilly 1987).
Thus, other animal models as well as new models that
would allow the direct study of human embryonic devel-
opment are crucial in order to comprehend early human
development and to understand the growth requirements
of human stem cells of specific lineages.
Bovine ES Cells
The first bovine ES-like cells were reported by Saito,
Strelchenko, and Niemann in 1992. More recently, trans-
genic bovine ES-like cells were derived by using nuclear
transfer of fetal fibroblasts to enucleated bovine oocytes
(Cibelli et al. 1998). This technique involved introducing
a marker gene into bovine fibroblasts from a 55-day-old
fetus and then fusing the transgenic fibroblasts to
enucleated oocytes to produce blastocyst-stage nuclear
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transplant embryos (Cibelli et al. 1998). ES-like cells
then were derived from these embryos and were used 
to create chimeric embryos. When reintroduced into 
pre-implantation embryos, these transgenic ES-like cells
differentiated into derivatives from the three EG lay-
ers—ectoderm, mesoderm, and endoderm (Cibelli et al.
1998). Bovine ES cells would be useful in agricultural
production of transgenic cows and also may have the
potential for generating tissues and organs for use in
cross-species transplantation (xenotransplantation) in
order to treat human diseases.
Primate ES Cells
Primate ES-like cells have been derived from both the
rhesus monkey (Thomson et al. 1995) and the common
marmoset (Thomson et al. 1996). When allowed to grow,
both marmoset and rhesus ES cells spontaneously differ-
entiate into more complex structures, including cardiac
muscle, neurons, endoderm, trophoblast, and numerous
unidentified cell types (Thomson and Marshall 1998).
Essential characteristics of these primate ES-like cells
include 1) derivation from the pre-implantation or peri-
implantation embryo, 2) prolonged undifferentiated pro-
liferation, and 3) stable developmental potential to form
derivatives of all three EG layers even after prolonged
maintenance in culture (Thomson and Marshall 1998).
In addition, although mouse ES cells rarely contribute to
trophoblast in chimeras (Beddington and Robertson
1989), primate ES cells differentiate into all three germ
layers and trophoblast-like cells (Thomson and Marshall
1998). Furthermore, some primate ES cell lines have
maintained a normal karyotype through undifferentiated
culture for at least two years, sustained a stable develop-
mental potential throughout this culture period, and
maintained the potential to form trophoblast in vitro
(Thomson et al. 1995, 1996).
Although there is some variation between species,
nonhuman primate ES cell lines appear to provide a
useful in vitro model for understanding the differentiation
of human tissues (Thomson and Marshall 1998), and
primate ES cells provide a powerful model for under-
standing human development and disease. Furthermore,
because of the similarities between human and primate
ES cells, primate ES cells provide a model for developing
strategies to prevent immune rejection of transplanted
cells and for demonstrating the safety and efficacy of ES
cell-based therapies (Thomson et al. 1995).
Human Models
Human ES Cell Lines Derived from Blastocysts
The first successful isolation of cells from the human
inner cell mass of blastocysts and their culture in vitro for
at least two series of cell divisions was reported by
Bongso and colleagues in 1994. Starting with 21 spare
embryos donated by nine patients in an IVF program,3
this group isolated cells with typical stem cell character-
istics from 17 five-day-old blastocysts (approximately
100 cells) (Bongso et al. 1994). These cells were like ES
cells. They were small and round with high nuclear to
cytoplasmic ratios, they stained positively for alkaline
phosphatase (a biochemical marker for stem cells), and
they maintained a normal diploid karyotype. However,
after the second subculture, the cells differentiated into
fibroblasts or died (Bongso et al. 1994).
In later work, Thomson and his colleagues were able
to isolate human ES-like cell lines and grow them con-
tinuously in culture for at least five to six months.
Although these cells have not passed the most stringent
test—as have mouse ES cells—to determine whether
they can contribute to the germline, we will continue to
use the term ES cell throughout this report because both
scientists and nonscientists alike have widely applied this
term to refer to these cells. This renewable tissue culture
source of human cells—capable of differentiating into a
wide variety of cell types—is believed to have broad
applications in basic research and transplantation therapies
(Gearhart 1998).
In Thomson’s work, human ES cells were isolated
from embryos that were originally produced by IVF 
for clinical reproductive purposes. (See Exhibit 2-B.)
Individuals donated the embryos, following an informed
consent process. The consent forms and the entire
research protocol were reviewed and approved by an
appropriately constituted Institutional Review Board
(IRB) (Thomson et al. 1998). Thirty-six embryos were
cultured for approximately five days. The inner cell mass
was isolated from 14 of the 20 blastocysts that developed,
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and five ES cell lines, originating from five separate
embryos, were derived (Thomson et al. 1998). The tech-
nique used to derive these human ES cells is essentially
the same as that used to isolate nonhuman primate ES
cell lines (Thomson et al. 1995).
The resulting human ES cell lines had normal kary-
otypes (two male and three female) and were grown in
culture continuously for at least five to six months
(Thomson et al. 1998). In addition, the cell lines
expressed cell surface markers that also are found on
nonhuman primate ES cells (Thomson et al. 1998). Most
important, the cell lines maintained the potential to form
derivatives of all three EG layers—endoderm, mesoderm,
and ectoderm (Thomson et al. 1998).
Many believe that research using human ES cells
might offer insights into developmental events that can-
not be studied directly in the intact human embryo but
that have important consequences in clinical areas such
as birth defects, infertility, and miscarriage. Some specu-
late that the origins of many human diseases (e.g., juvenile-
onset diabetes) are due to events that occur early in
embryonic development. Such cells also will be particu-
larly valuable for the study of the development and func-
tion of tissues that differ between mice and humans.
These cells allow for studies that focus on the differenti-
ation of cells into specific tissues and the factors that
bring about differentiation, so that cells can be manipu-
lated to generate specific cell types for therapeutic trans-
plantation. Moreover, it may be possible to identify gene
targets for new drugs, to manipulate genes that could be
used for tissue regeneration therapies, and to understand
the teratogenic or toxic effects of certain compounds
(Thomson et al. 1998). 
Human EG Cells from Fetal Primordial 
Germ Cells
Primordial germ cells also can give rise to cells with
characteristics of ES cells, and, as discussed previously,
Exhibit 2-B: In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)
The procedure of IVF today is widely available in many countries throughout the world, including the United
States. Originally developed for the treatment of infertility due to blocked fallopian tubes, IVF has been extended
to assist patients with premature depletion of oocytes, recurrent failure of embryos to implant, and low production
of functional sperm. More recently, the technique has been used in conjunction with pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis to enable fertile couples at risk for transmitting severe or fatal inherited diseases to have healthy 
children.
Although details of the IVF procedures vary from center to center, the basic approach is to treat oocyte donors
over several days with a regimen of hormones designed to stimulate the final maturation of several follicles 
within the ovary. This is known as hyperstimulation, a procedure that carries the risk of an adverse reaction of less
than 1 percent. Following completion of the hormone treatment, mature follicles are detected by sonography and
an average of ten are collected by transvaginal aspiration while the patient is sedated. The oocytes are then fer-
tilized by sperm collected from a male donor and cultured in sterile fluid for about two days. When the zygote has
reached the four- to eight-cell stage, between three and six zygotes are transferred to the uterus, and the untrans-
ferred embryos, if they are developing normally, are usually frozen. Nonviable embryos are discarded. (See also
Figure 2-5.) More recently, IVF specialists have begun culturing embryos to the blastocyst stage before transfer
to the uterus.
The efficiency of the IVF procedure is relatively low, with approximately 20 percent of fertilized eggs resulting
in successful pregnancies, depending on factors such as age of the recipient and the reason for infertility. In 
comparison, approximately 30 percent of normally conceived human embryos result in successful pregnancies.
Embryos that are not transferred can be cryopreserved and stored indefinitely.
Sources:
National Institutes of Health (NIH). Human Embryo Research Panel. 1994. Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel. 2 vols. 
Bethesda, MD: NIH.
New York State Task Force on Life and the Law. 1998. Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy.
New York: New York State Task Force on Life and the Law.
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Figure 2-5. 1996 Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Success Ratesa
9,005 (62%) of live
births resulted in 
single births
5,519 (38%) of live
births resulted in 
multiple births
993 (18%) of 
multiple births were
triplets or greater
4,526 (82%) of 
multiple births 
were twins
aSource: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology, and RESOLVE. 1998. 1996 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates, National Summary and
Fertility Clinic Reports. Atlanta, GA: CDC. 
bData are from 300 U.S. fertility clinics that provided and verified information about the outcomes of all ART cycles started in
their clinics in 1996.
cFresh, nondonor cycles were canceled, most commonly because too few (egg) follicles developed. Illness unrelated to the 
ART procedure also may lead to cancelation. In general, cycles are canceled when chances of success are poor or risks are 
unacceptably high. 
dAdverse outcomes included spontaneous abortion (83%), induced abortion (10%), stillbirth (4%), and ectopic pregnancy (3%).
eA total of 20,659 babies were born as a result of the 64,036 ART cycles carried out in 1996.
64,036 
ART cyclesb
7,044 (11%) 
of ART cycles 
were canceledc
2,766 (16%) of 
pregnancies resulted
in adverse outcomesd
14,524 (84%) of 
pregnancies resulted
in live birthse
17,290 (27%) of ART
cycles resulted in
pregnancies
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have been designated as EG cells in order to distinguish
their tissue of origin (Gearhart 1998). A 1998 report from
John D. Gearhart and his colleagues describes the estab-
lishment of human EG cell lines from human primordial
germ cells (Shamblott et al. 1998). Using an IRB-
approved protocol, the human EG cells were isolated
from the developing gonads of five- to nine-week-old
embryos and fetuses that were obtained following elec-
tive abortion (Shamblott et al. 1998). These human EG
cell lines have morphological, immunohistochemical,
and karyotypic features consistent with those of previ-
ously described ES cells and have a demonstrated ability
to differentiate in vitro into derivatives of the three germ
layers (Shamblott et al. 1998).
Fusion of Human Somatic Cells with Cow Eggs
to Create Hybrid Embryonic Cells
Advanced Cell Technology of Worcester, Massachusetts,
announced in November 1998 that its scientists had
made human somatic cells revert to the primordial state
by fusing them with cow eggs to create a hybrid embryo
(Wade 1998). This work with human cells was per-
formed in 1996 by Jose Cibelli. Using 52 of his own
cells—some of them white blood cells and others scraped
from the inside of his cheek—Cibelli used a pulse of elec-
tricity to fuse each cell with a cow egg from which the
nucleus containing the DNA had been removed.4 Out of
these 52 attempts, only one embryo, derived from a
cheek epithelial cell, developed into a blastocyst.
Approximately 12 days after the fusion of cheek cell and
cow egg, sufficient cells existed to allow harvesting of the
inner cell mass to produce cells resembling human ES
cells. The researchers observed that the hybrid cell quickly
became more human-like as the human nucleus took
control and displaced bovine proteins with human pro-
teins. However, it is difficult to judge the validity of this
work and the nature of the “embryo-like” material pro-
duced because the work is extremely preliminary and has
not been submitted for peer review or for publication in
a scientific journal.
The stated purpose of these experiments was to cre-
ate an embryo solely for the purpose of establishing an
ES cell line that might be used to treat any disease caused
by the loss or malfunction of cells, such as Parkinson’s
disease, diabetes, and heart disease. The researchers
emphasized that they had no intention of transferring the
resulting hybrid embryos to a uterus, as they considered
this to be both unethical and unsafe (Wade 1998).
Growth and Derivation of ES Cells
Human ES cells are different from many adult cells
because they have the ability to divide extensively in cul-
ture. Although this property has been interpreted by
nonscientists as an indication that investigators simply
can use existing human ES and EG cell lines (which can
be extensively reproduced for a limited time) to study
their properties, this is not the case and is a reflection of
a misunderstanding of the science that is involved.
Evidence from mouse ES cell research suggests that it is
essential to derive new ES cell lines repeatedly in order to
further our understanding of how to differentiate these
cells and grow them extensively in culture.
There are several reasons why it is necessary to
repeatedly derive new ES cell lines. First, the properties
of ES cells differ depending on the methods used to
derive them.5 Cells derived under some conditions may
be limited in their potential to differentiate into a partic-
ular tissue type. Second, ES cells are not stable cell types
that can simply be mass produced and supplied to an
unlimited number of researchers. As these cells grow in
culture they accumulate irreversible changes, and the
conditions used to grow them can influence the speed at
which these changes accumulate. Typically, researchers
look only at the ability of ES cells to contribute to some
tissues. In one study, however, the ability of ES cells to
generate all tissue in a mouse was tested (Nagy et al.
1993). This research has shown dramatically that existing
cell lines commonly in use by many researchers have lost
the ability to generate all mouse tissues and thus to com-
pletely generate live mice. When new ES cells were
derived and grown for only a short time in culture, they
did allow all tissues to be generated. However, after about
14 doublings in culture, even these cells lost their ability
to contribute to all tissues. The researchers conclude…
“[P]rolonged passage in culture reduces the potential of
the ES cell population as a whole. The proportion of
cells that retain full potential diminishes with extended
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passage” (Nagy et al. 1993). Exactly what changes occur
during culture are not yet clear. The chromosome com-
plement remains normal, indicating that this criterion,
although frequently used to characterize ES cells, is not a
very stringent assay. It could be an accumulation of muta-
tions, changes in gene expression, or epigenetic changes
(Nagy et al. 1993). Thus, if one scientist were to obtain
cells from a colleague’s laboratory, the properties of the
cells would depend greatly on the history of how those
cells were grown. For this reason, many people who
work with mouse ES cells re-derive the cells periodically
to be sure the cells have the potential to differentiate into
or contribute to many different tissues.
Finally, perhaps the most important reason for deriv-
ing new ES cell lines rather than simply working with
existing cell lines is that a tremendous amount remains to
be learned during the process of derivation itself. It took
many laboratories more than ten years to ascertain
appropriate conditions for the derivation and growth of
mouse ES cells. Research on the growth and derivation of
ES cells from other mammalian species is only in its early
stages. In fact, only mouse ES cells have the property of
contributing to the germline cell lineage—the most strin-
gent criterion for ES cells. Thus, cells from other species
are referred to as ES-like cells (Pedersen 1994). Further
basic research into the proper conditions to maintain
ES cells from many species is ongoing in an attempt to
understand the factors necessary to generate stable ES
cells. Given that only two successes have been reported
on the derivation of human ES and EG cells, it is likely
that significant basic research into the appropriate condi-
tions to generate stable stem cells will be needed.
Potential Medical Applications of
Human ES Cell and EG Cell Research
Although research into the use of ES and EG cells is still
at an early stage, researchers hope to make a contribution
to disease treatment in a variety of areas. The ability to
elucidate the mechanisms that control cell differentiation
is, at the most elemental level, the promise of human ES
and EG cell research. This knowledge will facilitate the
efficient, directed differentiation of stem cells to specific
cell types. The standardized production of large, purified
populations of human cells such as cardiomyocytes and
neurons, for example, could provide a substantial source
of cells for drug discovery and transplantation therapies
(Thomson et al. 1998). Many diseases, such as
Parkinson’s disease and juvenile-onset diabetes mellitus,
result from the death or dysfunction of just one or a few
cell types, and the replacement of those cells could offer
effective treatment and even cures. 
Substantial advances in basic cell and developmental
biology are required before it will be possible to direct
human ES cells to lineages of human clinical importance.
However, progress has already been made in the differ-
entiation of mouse ES cells to neurons, hematopoietic
cells, and cardiac muscle (Brustle et al. 1997; Deacon et
al. 1998; Shamblott et al. 1998). Human ES and EG cells
could be put to use in targeting neurodegenerative dis-
orders, diabetes, spinal cord injury, and hematopoietic
repopulation, the current treatments for which are either
incomplete or create additional complications for those
who suffer from them.
Use of Human ES Cells and EG Cells in
Transplantation
One of the major causes of organ transplantation and
graft failure is immune rejection, and a likely application
of human ES and EG cell research is in the area of trans-
plantation. Although much research remains to be done,
ES cells derived through SCNT offer the possibility that
therapies could be developed from a patient’s own cells.
In other words, a patient’s somatic cells could be fused
with an enucleated oocyte and developed to the blastocyst
stage, at which point ES cells could be derived for the
development of cell-based therapy. This essentially is an
autologous transfer. Thus, issues of tissue rejection due to
the recognition of foreign proteins by the immune system
are avoided entirely. In addition, research to establish
xenotransplantation (i.e., interspecies transplantation) as
a safe and effective alternative to human organ transplan-
tation is still in its infancy. Alternately, other techniques
that would be immunologically compatible for trans-
plantation purposes could be used to generate stem cells,
such as
1) banking of multiple cell lines representing a spectrum
of major histocompatibility complex (MHC) alleles to
serve as a source for MHC matching, and/or
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2) creating universal donor lines, in which the MHC
genes could be genetically altered so rejection would
not occur, an approach that has been tried in the
mouse with moderate success (NIAID 1999). 
Autologous transplants would obviate the need for
immunosuppressive agents in transplantation as it
would decrease a central danger to transplant patients—
susceptibility to other diseases. Autologous transplants
might address problems ranging from the supply of
donor organs to the difficulty of finding matches
between donors and recipients. Research on ES cells
could lead to cures for diseases that require treatment
through transplantation, including autoimmune dis-
eases such as multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis,
and systemic lupus erythematosus. These cells also
might hold promise for treating type-I diabetes (Melton
1999; Varmus 1998), which would involve the trans-
plantation of pancreatic islet cells or beta cells produced
from autologous ES cells. These cells would enter the
pancreas and provide normal insulin production by
replacing the failing resident islet cells.
Studies of Human Reproduction and
Developmental Biology
Research using human ES and EG cells could offer
insights into developmental events that cannot be stud-
ied directly in the intact human embryo but that have
important consequences in clinical areas, including birth
defects, infertility, and pregnancy loss (Thomson et al.
1998). ES and EG cells provide large quantities of homo-
geneous material that can be used for biochemical analy-
sis of the patterns of gene expression and the molecular
mechanisms of embryonic differentiation. 
Cancer Therapy
Human ES and EG cells may be used to reduce the
tissue toxicity brought on by cancer therapy (NCI 1999).
Already, bone marrow stem cells, representing a more
committed stem cell, are used to treat patients after high-
dose chemotherapy. However, the recovered blood cells
appear limited in their ability to recognize abnormal
cells, such as cancer cells. It is possible that injections of
ES and EG cells would revive the complete immune
response to patients undergoing bone marrow transplan-
tation. Current approaches aimed at manipulating the
immune system after high-dose chemotherapy so that 
it recognizes cancer cells specifically have not yet been
successful.
Diseases of the Nervous System
Some believe that in no other area of medicine are the
potential benefits of ES and EG cell research greater than
in diseases of the nervous system (Gearhart 1998;
Varmus 1998). The most obvious reason is that so many
of these diseases result from the loss of nerve cells, and
mature nerve cells cannot divide to replace those that are
lost. For example, in Parkinson’s disease, nerve cells that
make the chemical dopamine die; in Alzheimer’s disease,
it is the cells that make acetylcholine that die; in
Huntington’s disease the cells that make gamma
aminobutyric acid die; in multiple sclerosis, cells that
make myelin die; and in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, the
motor nerve cells that activate muscles die. In stroke, brain
trauma, spinal cord injury, and cerebral palsy and mental
retardation, numerous types of cells are lost with no built-
in mechanism for replacing them.
Preliminary results from fetal tissue transplantation
trials for Parkinson’s disease suggest that supplying new
cells to a structure as intricate as the brain can slow or
stop disease progression (Freed et al. 1999). Yet the diffi-
culty of obtaining enough cells of the right type—that is,
dopamine-producing nerve cells—limits the application
of this therapy. In 1999, scientists developed methods in
animal models to isolate dopamine precursor cells from
the dopamine-producing region of the brain and coax
them to proliferate for several generations in cell culture.
When these cells were implanted into the brains of
rodents with experimental Parkinson’s disease, the ani-
mals showed improvements in their movement control
(NINDS 1999). Scientists also have learned to instruct a
stem cell from even a nondopamine region to make
dopamine (Wagner et al. 1999). A large supply of
“dopamine-competent” stem cells, such as ES cell lines,
could remove the barrier of limited amounts of tissue.
(See Exhibit 2-C.) 
Another recent development eventually may provide
treatments for multiple sclerosis and other diseases that
attack the myelin coating of nerves. Scientists have suc-
cessfully generated glial cells that produce myelin from
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mouse ES cells (Brustle et al. 1999). When these ES cell-
derived glial cells were transplanted in a rat model of
human myelin disease, they were able to interact with
host neurons and efficiently myelinate axons in the rat’s
brain and spinal cord (Brustle et al. 1999). 
Other diseases that might benefit from similar types
of approaches include spinal cord injury, epilepsy, stroke,
Tay-Sachs disease, and pediatric causes of cerebral palsy
and mental retardation. In mice, neural stem cells already
have been shown to be effective in replacing cells
throughout the brain and in some cases are capable of
correcting neurological defects (Lacorazza et al. 1996;
Rosario et al. 1997; Snyder et al. 1997; Snyder, Taylor,
and Woolfe 1995; Yandava, Billinghurst, and Snyder
1999). Human neural stem cells also have recently been
isolated and have been shown to be responsive to devel-
opmental signals and to be willing to replace neurons
when transplanted into mice (Flax et al. 1998). These
recent discoveries of ways to generate specific types of
neural cells from ES cells hold much promise for the
treatment of severe neurological disorders that today
have no known cure.
Diseases of the Bone and Cartilage
Because ES and EG cells constitute a relatively self-
renewing population of cells, they can be cultured to gen-
erate greater numbers of bone or cartilage cells than could
be obtained from a tissue sample. If a self-renewing, but
controlled, population of stem cells can be established
in a transplant recipient, it could effect long-term cor-
rection of many diseases and degenerative conditions in
which bone or cartilage cells are deficient in numbers or
defective in function. This could be done either by
transplanting ES and EG cells to a recipient or by genet-
ically modifying a person’s own stem cells and returning
them to the marrow. Such approaches hold promise for
the treatment of genetic disorders of bone and cartilage,
such as osteogenesis imperfecta and the various
chondrodysplasias. In a somewhat different potential
application, stem cells perhaps could be stimulated
in culture to develop into either bone- or cartilage-
producing cells. These cells could then be introduced
into the damaged areas of joint cartilage in cases of
osteoarthritis or into large gaps in bone that can arise
from fractures or surgery. This sort of repair would have
a number of advantages over the current practice of 
tissue grafting (NIAMS 1999).
Blood Disorders
The globin proteins are essential for transport of oxy-
gen in the blood, with different globins expressed at dif-
ferent developmental stages. The epsilon globin gene is
expressed only in embryonic red blood cells. When this
gene—which is not normally expressed in the adult—is
artificially turned on in sickle cell patients, it blocks the
sickling of the cells that contain sickle cell hemoglobin.
Research involving ES cells could help answer questions
about how to turn on the epsilon globin gene in adult
blood cells and thereby halt the disease process. Stem cell
Exhibit 2-C: Potential Treatment for
Parkinson’s Disease
Parkinson’s disease is a degenerative brain disease
that affects 2 percent of the population over age 70.
Symptoms include slow and stiff movements, prob-
lems with balance and walking, and tremor. In more
advanced cases, the patient has a fixed, staring
expression, walks with a stooped posture and short,
shuffling pace, and has difficulty initiating voluntary
movements. Falls, difficulty swallowing, incontinence,
and dementia may occur in the late stages. Patients
often lose the ability to care for themselves and may
become bedridden.
The cause of this illness is a deficiency of the neu-
rotransmitter dopamine in specific areas of the brain.
Treatment with drugs such as levodopa often is
effective in relieving the symptoms. However, as the
disease progresses, treatment often becomes more
problematic, with irregular responses, difficulty
adjusting doses, and the development of side effects
such as involuntary writhing movements. Brain sur-
gery with transplantation of human fetal tissue has
shown promise as therapy.
Stem cell transplantation also may be a promising
therapy for Parkinson’s disease. The injection of
stem cells that can differentiate into brain cells may
offer a means of replenishing neurons that are capa-
ble of synthesizing the deficient neurotransmitter. It 
is possible that stem cell transplantation may be 
simpler and more readily available than fetal tissue
transplantation.
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research also may help produce transplantable cells that
would not contain the sickle cell mutation.
Toxicity and Drug Testing
Human stem cell research offers promise for use in
testing the beneficial and toxic effects of biologicals,
chemicals, and drugs in the most relevant species for
clinical validity—humans. Such studies could lead to
fewer, less costly, and better designed human clinical tri-
als yielding more specific diagnostic procedures and
more effective systemic therapies. Beyond the drug devel-
opment screening of pharmacological agents for toxicity
and/or efficacy, human stem cell research could define
new research approaches for clarifying the complex asso-
ciation of environmental agents with human disease
processes (NIEHS 1999). It also makes possible a new
means of conducting detailed investigations of the under-
lying mechanisms of the effects of environmental toxins
or mixtures of toxins, including their subtle effects on the
developing embryonic and fetal development tissue
systems.
Transplantable Organs
Several researchers are investigating ways to isolate
AS cells and create transplantable organs that may be
used to treat a multitude of diseases that do not rely upon
the use of embryonic or fetal tissue. Moreover, if it is
found to be possible to differentiate ES cells into specific
cell types, such stem cells could be an important source
of cells for organ growth. For example, recent develop-
ments in animals have shown that it may be possible to
create entire transplantable organs from a tissue base in a
manner that would overcome such problems as the lim-
ited supply of organs and tissue rejection. Such a devel-
opment—producing this tissue base by directing the
growth of human embryonic cells—could be a major
breakthrough in the field of whole organ transplantation. 
For example, using tissue engineering methods,
researchers have successfully grown bladders in the lab-
oratory, implanted them into dogs, and shown them to
be functional (Oberpenning et al. 1999). To create the
bladders, small biopsies of tissue were taken from dog
bladders. The biopsied tissue was then teased apart to
isolate the urothelial tissue and muscle tissue, which
were then grown separately in culture (Tanne 1999). The
tissue was then applied to a mold of biodegradable mate-
rial with the urothelial tissue on the inside and the mus-
cle tissue on the outside. The new organs were
transplanted within five weeks (Tanne 1999).
Dogs that received the tissue-engineered organs
regained 95 percent of their original bladder capacity,
were continent, and voided normally. When the new
organs were examined 11 months later, they were com-
pletely covered with urothelial and muscle tissue and had
both nerve and blood vessel growth. Dogs that did not
undergo reconstructive procedures or only received
implants of the biodegradable molds did not regain 
normal bladder function (Oberpenning et al. 1999). This
accomplishment marks the first time a mammalian organ
has been grown in a laboratory. The ability to create new
organs by seeding molds with cells of specific tissue
types would be extremely useful in treating children
with congenital malformations of organs and people who
have lost organs due to trauma or disease (Tanne 1999).
Summary
Currently, human ES cells can be derived from the inner
cell mass of a blastocyst (those cells within the conceptus
that form the embryo proper), and EG cells can be
derived from the primordial germ cells of fetuses. These
cells, present in the earliest stages of embryo and fetal
development, can generate all of the human cell types
and are capable, at least for some time, of self-renewal. A
relatively renewable tissue culture source of human cells
that can be used to generate a wide variety of cell types
would have broad applications in basic research, trans-
plantation, and other important therapies, and a major
step in realizing this goal was taken in 1998 with the
demonstration that human ES and EG cells can be grown
in culture. The clinical potential for these stem cells is
vast—they will be important for in vitro studies of normal
human embryogenesis, human gene discovery, and drug
and teratogen testing and as a renewable source of cells
for tissue transplantation, cell replacement, and gene
therapies.
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Notes
1 For a summary of scientific progress in this field see Eiseman, E.,
“Human Stem Cell Research,” RAND DRU-2171-NBAC, September
1999, a background paper prepared for the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission.
2 Thomson, J.A., Testimony before NBAC. January 19, 1999.
Washington, DC.
3 Consent to carry out this study was approved by the hospital
ethical committee based on the guidelines on Assisted
Reproductive Technology of the Ministry of Health, Singapore, 
that experimentation of human embryos up to day 14 of 
embryonic growth may be allowed (Bongso et al. 1994).
4 The details of this process are described in a European patent
application (PCT/U397/12919 1997) and in testimony before the
Commission by ACT President Michael West. November 17, 1998.
Miami, FL.
5 Hogan, B., Testimony before NBAC. February 3, 1999.
Princeton, NJ.
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Introduction
In the course of attempting to realize the promise ofhuman embryonic stem (ES) cell and embryonic germ
(EG) cell research to advance basic and applied science as
well as to develop new, life-saving therapies, biomedical
researchers encounter uncertainties in the law as well as
explicit restrictions (including bans on federal research
funding) that were created in response to earlier develop-
ments in biomedical science and public policy. At the
same time, provisions also exist in state and federal law
designed to facilitate this field of research and to
establish—or offer models for establishing—appropriate
safeguards to ensure that all efforts to obtain or use stem
cells are carried out in an ethically acceptable way. To
date, three sources of ES or EG cells—cadaveric fetal tis-
sue, embryos remaining after infertility treatments, and
embryos created solely for research purposes using either
in vitro fertilization (IVF) or, potentially, somatic cell
nuclear transfer (SCNT) techniques—have been identi-
fied. The goal of this chapter is to examine separately the
legal issues raised by research involving each source of
EG or ES cells, noting as appropriate when common
issues arise.
The Law Relating to Aborted Fetuses 
as Sources of EG Cells
Federal law permits funding of some research with cells
and tissues from the products of elective as well as spon-
taneous abortions, and state law facilitates the donation
and use of fetal tissue for research. Both state and federal
law set forth several requirements for the process of
retrieving and using material from this source, although
amendments may be needed to federal law in order to
make existing safeguards applicable to stem cell research.
Federal Law Regarding Research Using Cells
and Tissues from Aborted Fetuses
Since as early as the 1930s, American biomedical
research has utilized ex utero fetal tissue both as a medium
and, increasingly, as an object for experimentation
(Gelfand and Levin 1993; Zion 1996). “For many years,
the production and testing of vaccines, the study of viral
reagents, the propagation of human viruses, and the test-
ing of biological products have been dependent on the
unique growth properties of fetal tissue” (Duke 1988,
D112, D114). For example, the 1954 Nobel Prize for
Medicine was awarded to American immunologists who
used cell lines obtained from human fetal kidney cells to
grow polio virus in cell cultures, a key advance in the
development of polio vaccines (Driscoll 1985; Gelfand
and Levin 1993).
In 1972, allegations (some of them quite shocking)
about experiments with fetuses both in and ex utero cre-
ated an air of controversy (fueled by the greater societal
debate about elective abortion) over the use of fetal tissue
in research.1 When Congress established the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1974, it placed
the topic of research using the human fetus at the top of
the commission’s agenda. Within four months of assum-
ing office, the commissioners were mandated to report
on the subject, with the proviso that the presentation of
their report to the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (DHEW)—now the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS)—would lift the
moratorium that Congress had imposed on federal
29
The Legal Framework for Federal
Support of Research to Obtain
and Use Human Stem Cells
3Chapter Three
30
Chapter 3: The Legal Framework for Federal Support of Research to Obtain and Use Human Stem Cells
funding of research using live fetuses.2 On July 25, 1975,
the National Commission submitted its conclusions and
recommendations, which formed the basis for regula-
tions that the Department issued later that year on
research involving fetuses, pregnant women, and human
IVF (1975). 
General Regulation of Research with Human Beings
Including Fetuses
The 1975 provisions remain as elements of the cur-
rent federal regulations that aim to protect human sub-
jects participating in research conducted with federal
funds—rules that also are followed on a voluntary basis
by many institutions in the case of research performed
without federal support. The core regulations are set
forth in the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects, known as the Common Rule, because the same
regulatory provisions have been adopted by most federal
agencies and departments that conduct or sponsor
research in which human subjects are used. The DHHS
regulations appear in Volume 45, Part 46 of the Code of
Federal Regulations—45 CFR 46. The Common Rule makes
up Subpart A of the DHHS regulations, and additional
protections for special populations of research subjects
appear in three further subparts of 45 CFR 46.
The special provisions applicable to fetal material
appear in Subpart B, which covers research on “1) the
fetus, 2) pregnant women, and 3) human in vitro fertil-
ization” and applies to all DHHS “grants and contracts
supporting research, development, and related activities”
involving those subjects.3 The regulations primarily
address research that could affect living fetuses adversely.
They provide for stringent Institutional Review Board
(IRB) consideration, which is based upon the results of
preliminary studies on animals and nonpregnant women
and on assurances that living fetuses will be exposed only
to minimal risk except when the research is intended to
meet the health needs of the fetus or its mother.4 Specific
restrictions also are imposed on the inclusion of pregnant
women in research activities.
Section 46.210 of Subpart B states that the sole
explicit requirement for research involving “cells, tissues,
or organs excised from a dead fetus” is that such research
“shall be conducted only in accordance with any applica-
ble State or local laws regarding such activities.”5 Some
analysts have argued that this is the only component of
Subpart B applicable to research in which cells or tissues
from dead abortuses are used in research (Areen 1988).
It appears, however, that even prior to the adoption in
1993 of legislation establishing special rules for using
fetal tissue for transplantation, National Institutes of
Health (NIH) officials had regarded other, general
requirements of Subpart B as applicable to research with
tissue from dead fetuses.6 Specifically, these other provi-
sions exclude researchers from any involvement in the
decision to terminate a pregnancy or in an assessment of
fetal viability and forbid the payment of any inducements
to terminate a pregnancy.7 This dispute over the scope of
Subpart B produces one of the points of uncertainty that
may need to be resolved either through legislation or
official commentary from NIH’s Office for Protection
from Research Risks (OPRR), if investigators using cadav-
eric fetal tissue to generate human EG cells are to proceed
with confidence and in an ethical fashion.
The Conditions for Federal Support of 
Fetal Tissue Transplantation
In the 1980s, medical scientists began experimenting
with implanting brain tissue from aborted fetuses into
patients with Parkinson’s disease as well as patients with
other neurological disorders. NIH investigators were
among those working in this field, and their protocol to
use fetal tissue for transplantation was approved by an
internal NIH review body. Although the research complied
with Subpart B, then-NIH Director James B. Wyngaarden
decided to seek approval from Assistant Secretary for
Health Robert E. Windom before proceeding.8 In March
1988, Windom responded by declaring a temporary
moratorium on federally funded transplantation research
involving fetal tissue from induced abortions. He also
asked NIH to establish an advisory body to consider
whether such research should be conducted and under
what conditions (Windom 1988). The Human Fetal
Tissue Transplantation Research Panel—composed of
biomedical investigators, lawyers, ethicists, clergy, and
politicians—deliberated until the fall of 1988. Panel
members then voted 19-2 to recommend continued
funding for fetal tissue transplantation research under
guidelines designed to ensure the ethical integrity of any
experimental procedures (Adams 1988; Duguay 1992;
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Silva-Ruiz 1998). In November 1989, after the transition
had been made from the Reagan to the Bush administra-
tion, DHHS Secretary Louis Sullivan extended the mora-
torium indefinitely, based upon the position taken by
the minority-voting panel members that fetal tissue
transplantation research would increase the incidence
of elective abortion (Goddard 1996; Robertson 1993).9
Attempts by Congress to override the Secretary’s decision
were not enacted or were vetoed by President Bush.10
On January 22, 1993, immediately after President
Clinton took office, he instructed the incoming Secretary
of DHHS to lift the ban on federal funding for human
fetal tissue transplantation research.11 On February 5,
1993, DHHS Secretary Donna Shalala officially rescinded
the moratorium, and, in March 1993, NIH published
interim guidelines for research involving human fetal tis-
sue transplantation (OPRR 1994). Provisions to legislate
these safeguards were promptly proposed in Congress and
included in the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, which
President Clinton signed into law on June 10, 1993.12
The 1993 act mirrors most prior statutory and regu-
latory provisions on research involving tissue from dead
fetuses.13 In general, the Revitalization Act states that any
tissue from any type or category of abortion may be used
for research on transplantation, but only for “therapeutic
purposes.” Most agree that this means that research on
transplantation that has as its goal the treatment of dis-
ease is covered by the act, but that basic laboratory
research—which only tangentially can be described as
having a therapeutic purpose—would not be covered.
Under all conditions, the investigator’s research scope is
not, however, unfettered. First, research activities in this
area must be conducted in accordance with applicable
state and local law. The investigator also must obtain a
written statement from the donor verifying that a) she is
donating fetal tissue for therapeutic purposes, b) no
restrictions have been placed on who the recipient will
be, and c) the donor has not been informed of the iden-
tity of the recipient. Further, the attending physician
must sign a statement affirming five additional conditions
of the abortion, aimed at insulating a woman’s decision to
abort from her decision to provide tissue for fetal
research. Finally, the person principally responsible for
the experiment must also affirm his or her own knowledge
of the sources of tissue, that others involved in the research
are aware of the tissue status, and that the researcher had
no part in the abortion decision or its timing.
The statute provides significant criminal penalties for
violation of four prohibited acts: 1) purchase or sale of
fetal tissue “for valuable consideration” beyond “reason-
able payments [for] transportation, implantation, pro-
cessing, preservation, quality control, or storage…,” 
2) soliciting or acquiring fetal tissue through the promise
that a donor can designate a recipient, 3) soliciting or
acquiring fetal tissue through the promise that the recipi-
ent will be a relative of the donor, or 4) soliciting or
acquiring fetal tissue after providing “valuable considera-
tion” for the costs associated with the abortion itself.14
Research of the type conducted by Gearhart and his
colleagues at The Johns Hopkins University, in which pri-
mordial germ cells were obtained from the gonadal ridge
of human fetuses that had been aborted five to nine
weeks after fertilization, arguably is not covered by the
fetal tissue transplantation provisions of the 1993 NIH
Revitalization Act, because these fetal cells are intended
to be cultured and used in laboratory experiments, not
transplanted. Nevertheless, if such research were federally
supported, it could be subject to the requirements of
Subpart B of 45 CFR 46—both the general limitations of
§ 46.206 (separating the investigators from the abortion
process and forbidding payments for pregnancy termina-
tion) and the special requirements of § 46.210 for activ-
ities involving cells and tissues from dead fetuses.
Someday, with the advancement of knowledge about cell
differentiation and the like, EG cells derived from dead
fetuses may be linked more directly or indirectly with
transplantation, at which point the 1993 Act would
arguably become applicable.15 In anticipation of that day,
and in order to achieve simplicity in the meantime by
applying the same rules to all federally supported
research with fetal remains, whether or not for transplan-
tation, it would appear desirable to amend the law to
clarify that the safeguards of the 1993 Act apply to
research in which EG cells are obtained from dead
fetuses after a spontaneous or elective abortion.
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State Law Regarding Using Aborted Fetuses 
as Sources of Stem Cells
As recognized by federal statutes and regulations,
state law governs the manner in which cells and tissues
from dead fetuses become available for research, princi-
pally by statutes, regulations, and case law on organ
transplantation. The most basic legal provisions lie in the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), which was first
proposed in 1968 and rapidly became the most widely
adopted uniform statute. While the UAGA is largely con-
sistent with relevant federal statutes and regulations and
should facilitate researchers obtaining cadaveric fetal
tissue, a number of states have adopted other statutes
that limit or prohibit certain types of research with fetal
remains.
Laws Facilitating Donation of Fetal Material 
for EG Cell Research: The UAGA 
The UAGA is relevant not only because federal
statutes and regulations explicitly condition funding for
research with fetal tissue on compliance with state and
local laws, but also because the act applies when EG cell
research using fetal tissue does not receive federal fund-
ing. The original version of the UAGA was approved by
all 50 states and the District of Columbia; a 1987 revision
has been enacted by 22 states (Zion 1996).16 The act
establishes a system of voluntary donation of “anatomical
gifts” for transplantation, education, and research. It was
intended to make it easier for people to authorize gifts of
their own body (or parts thereof) through a simple
“donor card” executed before the occasion arose, as well
as to allow donations to be made with the permission of
the next-of-kin, following an order established by the
statute. The revised UAGA includes “a stillborn infant or
fetus” in the definition of “decedents,”17 for whom
parental consent is determinative.18 The UAGA also pro-
vides that “neither the physician or surgeon who attends
the donor at death nor the physician or surgeon who
determines the time of death” may be involved in the
team that will use the organs removed from the decedent.19
This section, although it may be waived, seems compara-
ble to the separation that the 1993 NIH Revitalization
Act and Subpart B of the DHHS regulations required
between the research team and any physicians involved
in terminating a pregnancy, determining fetal viability, or
assisting in the clinical procedure during which fetal
tissue is derived for research purposes.20
However, federal law restricts the procedures author-
ized by the UAGA in one area.21 The UAGA permits
donors to designate recipients—including individual
patients—of anatomical gifts. The stricter provisions of
the NIH Revitalization Act (which prohibits a donor from
having knowledge of an individual transplant recipient)
could override this state law in the case of federally sup-
ported fetal tissue transplantation, but the issue might
not arise regarding stem cell research for two reasons.
First, such research does not involve transplantation
(and hence at this time is not relevant to the NIH
Revitalization Act). Second, according to the Revitali-
zation Act, the only recipient who may be designated by
the parents of a dead fetus would be a stem cell
researcher or research institution.
Laws Restricting Use of Donated Fetal Material 
for EG Cell Research
At present, 24 states do not have on their books any
statutes “specifically addressing research on embryos or
fetuses,”22 and the restrictions in most of the remaining
states principally involve embryos remaining after infer-
tility treatments and limitations aimed at discouraging
therapeutic abortions. For example, in 12 states, the law
applies only to research with fetuses prior or subsequent
to an elective abortion.23 Six states ban research that
involves aborted fetuses or their organs, tissues, or
remains,24 which could cause difficulties for researchers
using stem cell lines derived from aborted fetuses “if cell
lines are considered ‘tissue.’”25 Six other states permit
fetal research when the fetus is deceased, but mandate
that the donor must provide consent,26 although none
“specifically address[es] the type of information that
must be provided to the progenitors before they are
asked for consent.”27 In Pennsylvania, investigators using
fetal tissue and recipients of the tissue are required to be
informed if the tissue was procured as a result of still-
birth, miscarriage, ectopic pregnancy, abortion, or some
other means.28
In order to diminish the impact that the potential use
of a fetus in research might have on the decision to abort,
states have enacted many restrictions on payment for
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fetal remains. The broadest prohibitions appear as part of
state statutes regulating or prohibiting fetal research.
Bans on sale vary in their terminology—an “aborted
product of conception,”29 an “aborted unborn child or the
remains thereof,”30 an “aborted fetus or any tissue or
organ thereof,”31 or an “unborn child”32 —and exist both
in states that permit research on a dead fetus with the
mother’s consent33 and in those where it is illegal to con-
duct research upon any aborted product of conception.34
The bans on commercialization have a number of
interesting twists. Rhode Island outlaws the selling of an
embryo or fetus for purposes that violate the statute
(such as research on living embryos or fetuses), but
apparently allows payment to the mother for allowing a
dead fetus to be used in research, because such research
is permissible.35 Minnesota prohibits the sale of living
fetuses or nonrenewable organs but explicitly permits
“the buying and selling of a cell culture line or lines taken
from a [dead fetus].”36
The most widely adopted prohibitions on commer-
cialization of fetal remains are those in Sections 10(a) and
(b) of the 1987 revision of the UAGA, which prohibit the
sale or purchase of any human body parts for any con-
sideration beyond that necessary to pay for expenses
incurred in the removal, processing, and transportation
of the tissue.37 On the federal level, what is in essence the
same proscription is included both in the 1993 NIH
Revitalization Act, which bars the acquisition or transfer
of fetal tissue for “valuable consideration” with the same
exceptions,38 and in the National Organ Transplant Act of
1984 (NOTA), which prohibits the sale of any human
organ for “valuable consideration for use in human trans-
plantation”39 if the sale involves interstate commerce.40
(In 1988, Congress amended NOTA to include fetal
organs within the definition of “human organ,” in order
to foreclose the sale of fetal tissue as well.41) Yet both fed-
eral statutes could be interpreted to apply only to sales
for transplant or therapeutic purposes, not laboratory
research. Moreover, the definition of reasonable process-
ing fees in the federal law (and by extension, the UAGA)42
is arguably too vague, “leav[ing]...room for unscrupulous
tissue processors to abuse the law” (Goddard 1996, 394).
If special provisions are adopted to govern federal
support of research with fetal material to create human
EG cell lines, it would seem advisable to ensure that the
provisions lay out more clearly what payments may be
made to whom and on what basis for fetal cells and tissues.
The state statutes regulating fetal research have been
challenged in several court cases. Generally, limitations
have been approved as they relate to live fetuses or to the
disposal of aborted fetuses.43 A few cases have dealt with
restrictions on research with dead fetuses or fetal
remains. In 1978, Louisiana adopted a statute forbidding
virtually all experimentation involving a living fetus (“a
live child or unborn child”) that was not “therapeutic” to
that child, a ban it expanded in 1981 to encompass
research with aborted fetal tissue as well.44 Plaintiffs who
argued that the prohibition on research burdened their
right of privacy challenged the law.45 Agreeing, the feder-
al district court concluded that the ban on research did
not further the state’s compelling interest in protecting
the health of the woman, nor did the state’s interest in the
potential life of the unborn continue past the death of the
fetus.46 Finally, the district court addressed the statute’s
vagueness, noting that it was not possible, ex utero, to
distinguish between fetal and maternal tissue and the
products of spontaneous and induced abortions.47 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit ignored the district court’s
analysis entirely, finding instead that the term “experi-
ment” as used in the statute’s prohibition against fetal
experimentation was unconstitutionally vague.48
The Law Relating to Embryos 
as Sources of ES Cells
Turning to the second source of human ES cells—
embryos created through IVF—one finds that in contrast
to the regulatory complexity of the federal and state laws
governing research using fetal tissue, the legal framework
for research using human embryos is relatively straight-
forward. With the exception of a few state statutes, no
viable regulatory system exists to guide or control the
practice of human embryo research in the United States.49
Regarding federally supported scientists, law prohibits
such experimentation, while research conducted in the
private sector takes place without any federal medical or
bioethical oversight specific to the human embryo.50 The
central issue raised by existing law is whether the recent
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scientific developments are important enough to justify
modifying, in part, the current blanket ban on federal
support by creating a limited exception for certain types
of human stem cell research.
Federal Law Regarding Research Using Cells
and Tissues from Human Embryos
Federal law regarding research using human embryos
by investigators employed or funded by the federal gov-
ernment may best be understood by reviewing Subpart B
of the DHHS policy on the protection of human subjects
and the rider that has been attached for several years to
the DHHS appropriation, most recently in the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (OCESAA).51
The former, which continues to provide a basic
framework for research, even though reasons exist to
question its applicability, originated in concerns about
research on the human fetus, but it also applies to “grants
and contracts supporting research, development, and
related activities involving...human in vitro fertilization.”52
At the time these provisions were first promulgated, IVF
was still an experimental technique: The birth in England
of Louise Brown, the first so-called test tube baby, did not
occur until 1978. Recognizing that NIH scientists and
others would wish to pursue research on IVF and the ear-
liest stages of human development, the regulations pro-
vided that “no application or proposal involving human
in vitro fertilization may be funded by the Department
[until it] has been reviewed by the Ethical Advisory
Board and the Board has rendered advice as to its accept-
ability from an ethical standpoint.”53 In 1977, NIH
received an application from an academic researcher for
support of a study involving IVF. After the application
had undergone scientific review within NIH, it was for-
warded to the Ethics Advisory Board (EAB) appointed by
Joseph Califano, then Secretary of DHEW. At its May
1978 meeting, the EAB agreed to review the research pro-
posal. With the increased public interest that followed
the birth of Louise Brown that summer, Secretary
Califano asked the EAB to study the broader social, legal,
and ethical issues raised by human IVF. On May 4, 1979,
in its report to the Secretary, the EAB concluded that
federal support for IVF research was “acceptable from an
ethical standpoint” provided that certain conditions were
met, such as informed consent for the use of gametes, an
important scientific goal “not reasonably attainable by
other means,” and not maintaining an embryo “in vitro
beyond the stage normally associated with the comple-
tion of implantation (14 days after fertilization)” (DHEW
EAB 1979, 106, 107). No action was ever taken by the
Secretary with respect to the board’s report; for other rea-
sons, the Department dissolved the EAB in 1980.
Because it failed to appoint another EAB to consider
additional research proposals, DHEW effectively fore-
stalled any attempts to support IVF, and no experimenta-
tion involving human embryos was ever funded pursuant
to the conditions set forth in the May 1979 report or
through any further EAB review.
Because the Revitalization Act of 1993 effectively
ended the de facto moratorium on IVF and other types of
research involving human embryos54 by nullifying the
regulatory provision that mandated EAB review,55 NIH
Director Harold Varmus convened the Human Embryo
Research Panel to set forth standards for determining
which projects could be funded ethically and which
should be considered “unacceptable for federal fund-
ing.”56 The panel identified several areas of potential
research activity that it considered ethically appropriate
for federal support, including studies involving the
development of ES cells, though only with embryos
resulting from IVF or clinical research that have been
donated with the consent of the progenitors. The most
controversial aspect of the report was its conclusion that
it might be ethical to allow researchers to create human
embryos for certain research purposes.57
In September 1994, the panel submitted its report to
the Advisory Committee to the Director (ACD) of NIH,
which formally approved the recommendations and
transmitted them to Varmus on December 1, 1994. The
following day, pre-empting NIH’s response, the President
declared that federal funds should not be used to support
the creation of human embryos for research purposes
and directed that NIH not allocate any resources for
such requests.58 Thereafter, Varmus decided to imple-
ment the panel’s recommendations not proscribed by the
President’s directive, concluding that NIH could begin to
fund research activities involving “surplus” embryos
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(Feiler 1998). Before any funding decisions could be
made, however, Congress attached a rider to that year’s
DHHS appropriations bill that stipulated that none of the
funds appropriated could be used to support any activi-
ty involving “1) the creation of a human embryo or
embryos for research purposes; or 2) research in which a
human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or
knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater
than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero under
45 CFR 46.208(a)(2) and section 498(b) of the Public
Health Service Act (42 USC 289g(b)).”59
When the question arose of whether to provide fed-
eral funding for human ES cell research using IVF
embryos remaining from infertility treatments, Varmus
sought the opinion of Harriet Rabb, DHHS General
Counsel, regarding the effect of the prohibition in the
current appropriations rider. Rabb reported to Varmus
that the OCESAA does not prevent NIH from supporting
research that uses ES cells derived from this source
because the cells themselves do not meet the statutory,
medical, or biological definition of a human embryo
(NIH OD 1999).60
Having concluded that NIH may fund internal and
external research that utilizes but does not create human
ES cells, NIH has delayed actual funding until an Ad Hoc
Working Group of the ACD develops guidelines for the
ethical research in this area.61 The working group began
its deliberations in early 1999 and completed draft guide-
lines on April 8, 1999, which are still undergoing inter-
nal review and public comment.62
In addition to these guidelines, ES cell research that
was supported by federal funds and directly involved
human embryos might arguably be subject to the
requirements of both Subpart A (the Common Rule)
and Subpart B of 45 CFR 46—that is, the research would
be required to meet general and specific substantive
requirements, would have to be approved by the IRB of
the investigator’s institution, and might have to undergo
further review at the national level. We use the word
“arguably” because OPRR has provided no definitive
guidance regarding such an interpretation. Indeed, in
response to the Commission’s inquiry of May 18, 1999,
OPRR acknowledged that “although Subpart B does not
apply to research involving a human embryo, per se, it
does apply to research that involves the process of in vitro
fertilization. An embryo formed by a means that does not
involve in vitro fertilization would not be subject to
Subpart B.”63 Because no other guidance is provided, we
are left to interpret whether embryos (which are not
defined in regulation) are human subjects and therefore
protected by Subpart B.
Subpart A, which contains the basic requirements for
IRB review, informed consent, privacy protection, and
the like, aims to protect a “human subject,” defined as “a
living individual about whom an investigator...obtains
(1) data through intervention or interaction....”64 This
definition creates uncertainties about whether the
Common Rule applies to embryo research, the derivation
of ES cells, and research involving successor stem cells
from embryonic sources that require resolution. This is
another point upon which a clearer, more accessible
interpretation is needed from OPRR if investigators and
IRBs are to proceed with confidence regarding a range of
stem cell research activities involving human embryos.
Assuming that the DHHS regulations apply, the special
requirements of Subpart B also would be applicable,
because (as previously described) NIH has long taken the
position that human IVF research, which is clearly
encompassed in Subpart B, encompasses any DHHS-
funded research involving human embryos not 
in utero. This would mean not only that another EAB
could be impaneled by the Secretary pursuant to 45 CFR
§ 46.204, but also that special responsibility would fall
on investigators and IRBs under 45 CFR § 46.205.65 In
addition, special standards would have to be met under
45 CFR § 46.206, including mandates for prior studies
involving animals and ensuring the least possible risk.
The newly revised 45 CFR 46, Subpart B (not yet final-
ized) makes no substantive changes that would affect
these requirements.66
State Law Regarding Research Using Cells 
and Tissues from Human Embryos 
State legislatures have apparently been more con-
cerned about regulating and restricting research using
human fetuses or their remains instead of addressing
research involving laboratory manipulation of human
gametes and early stage embryos. Nonetheless, although
36
Chapter 3: The Legal Framework for Federal Support of Research to Obtain and Use Human Stem Cells
the statutes usually ignore issues (other than commer-
cialization) specific to IVF (Robertson 1990), some
could be construed broadly enough to encompass a
range of experimental activities involving IVF, including
cryopreservation, pre-implantation screening, gene ther-
apy, twinning, cell line development, and basic research
(Coleman 1996). The latter two are of obvious relevance
to creating stem cell cultures from embryonic sources.
States that regulate cell line development from human
embryos either prohibit the practice entirely or restrict it
substantially (Coleman 1996). “All ten states that prohibit
embryological research have vaguely worded statutes
which could encompass cell line development if the
statutes were interpreted broadly...[although] some
[activity] could be characterized as non-experimental,
thus removing it from the scope of experimentation
bans” (Coleman 1996, 1358). Issues inherent in cell line
development will include the potential for restrictions on
downstream commercialization and uncertainty over the
extent to which gamete donors must be informed about
the nature of and potential commercial uses of the bio-
logical materials they donate (Coleman 1996).
Basic research typically involves precommercial scien-
tific activity designed to explore biological processes or to
understand genetic and cellular control mechanisms. As
noted previously, 24 states and the District of Columbia
do not restrict research involving fetuses or embryos.67 Of
the remaining 26 states that regulate embryo or fetal
research in one form or another, basic embryological
research is prohibited or restricted in 10 (Feiler 1998).
Although the degree of regulation of experimental use of
embryos under the New Hampshire statute is unlikely to
impair ES cell research in that state,68 the remaining nine
states have legislated more broadly, effectively banning 
all research involving in vitro embryos, with penalties
mandated in some states, including civil fines and
imprisonment.69
The subject of commercialization is a potentially
important one, affecting both researchers who must
acquire embryos from for-profit IVF clinics or other
sources and downstream users who may develop deriva-
tive, commercial applications from basic embryological
and stem cell research. Currently, five states prohibit pay-
ment for IVF embryos for research purposes.70 Eight
additional states prohibit payment for human embryos
for any purpose.71 Five states apply ambiguous restric-
tions that may or may not prohibit sale of embryos,
depending upon interpretation or, in some cases, action
by state officials.72 More troubling, some statutes could be
interpreted to prevent payment for ES cell lines derived
from human embryos (Coleman 1996), although “it is
possible that because a cell line is new tissue produced
from the genetic material of, but not originally a part of,
the embryo, laws proscribing the sale of embryonic
tissue may not apply.”73 In line with NOTA and the
1987 revisions of the UAGA, state statutes on organ
transplantation now typically prohibit sale of human
organs or parts, but none include language likely to
impede research involving human embryos.
The Law Relating to Deriving 
Stem Cells from Organisms Created
Through Cloning
The third potential source of human ES cells would
involve the use of cloning—that is, SCNT. One possible
use of SCNT would be to derive ES cells themselves, thus
avoiding the need for embryos. If such a transfer direct-
ly into an enucleated stem cell were to be successful,
the therapeutic potential of creating cells and tissues
for autologous transplantation might be realized with-
out any of the ethical and regulatory problems associ-
ated with the creation of embryos.
At present, however, the method for creating human
ES cells through SCNT, which has been announced by
one scientific team (although not yet published in a sci-
entific journal), involves inserting a somatic cell nucleus
into an enucleated oocyte, which, if it then developed,
would become a blastocyst from which ES cells would be
derived. This approach creates two problems. First, if the
blastocyst were characterized as a human embryo (albeit
one created asexually rather than by uniting egg and
sperm in vitro), then the prohibition on federal funding
(as well as the restrictions on embryo research in several
states) would come into play. Second, the process of car-
rying out SCNT using human cells has been outlawed by
at least two states and may or may not be eligible for
federal funding. On March 4, 1997, shortly after the 
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initial announcement that the Roslin Institute had 
succeeded in creating Dolly, the cloned sheep, the Office
of the White House Press Secretary released a
“Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies,” in which the President stated that
Federal funds should not be used for cloning of
human beings. The current restrictions on the use of
Federal funds for research involving human embryos
do not fully assure this result. In December 1994, I
directed the National Institutes of Health not to fund
the creation of human embryos for research pur-
poses. The Congress extended this prohibition in FY
1996 and FY 1997 appropriations bills, barring the
Department of Health and Human Services from sup-
porting certain human embryo research. However,
these restrictions do not explicitly cover human
embryos created for implantation and do not cover all
Federal agencies. I want to make it absolutely clear
that no Federal funds will be used for human cloning.
Therefore, I hereby direct that no Federal funds shall
be allocated for cloning of human beings.74
On June 9, 1997, the President received NBAC’s
report entitled Cloning Human Beings and announced his
acceptance of its recommendations, which included a
moratorium on publicly or privately funded research to
create a child through SCNT but not on laboratory
research using the technique. A number of bills have
been introduced in Congress to achieve this result—as
have other bills that would enact a broader prohibition—
but no federal legislation has been adopted. On February
9, 1998, responding to one of those bills (S. 1601, The
Human Cloning Prohibition Act), the Executive Office of
the President released a Statement of Administration
Policy, which provides in part that
the Administration supports amendments to S. 1601
that would...permit somatic cell nuclear transfer
using human cells for the purpose of developing stem
cell (unspecified cells capable of giving rise to spe-
cific cells and tissues) technology to prevent and
treat serious and life-threatening diseases and other
medical conditions, including the treatment of can-
cer, diabetes, genetic disorders, and spinal cord
injuries and for basic research that could lead to
such treatments.75
This statement does not, however, have the force or
effect of a Presidential Directive or Executive Order and
does not modify the March 1997 Presidential Directive
prohibiting funding for human cloning by federal agen-
cies. The resulting uncertainty must be resolved, taking
into account the ethical analysis presented in the next
chapter.
Summary
As described in Chapter 2, the development of human 
ES and EG cell lines represents an important advance in
biomedicine that promises not only to expand basic sci-
entific understanding but also to improve health and
extend life for millions of patients. Even the greatest sup-
porters of this new field recognize, however, that current
methods of deriving EG and ES cells from cadaveric fetal
tissue and embryos remaining after infertility treatments
raise significant ethical issues. Further ethical analysis,
which appears in the next chapter of this report, is needed
before conclusions can be reached about the goals and
principles that should guide policymaking in this field.
Federal law permits the funding of some research that
uses tissue from dead fetuses following spontaneous or
elective abortion, provided the researchers follow safe-
guards that aim to separate the decision to abort from the
decision to donate material for research, to ensure appro-
priate consent, and to avoid commercialization of fetal
material. The UAGA, which in every state facilitates the
process of donating bodies and organs for research as
well as transplantation, treats fetuses like other cadavers;
the latest version of the statute imposes special condi-
tions on the donation of fetal remains and reinforces the
prohibition in federal law against paying for organ
donation. The legal framework identified by these
statutes is thus favorable to research in which EG cells
would be derived from fetal tissue. Some questions
remain, however, about the applicability of some of the
statutes—for example, the principal set of federal safe-
guards appears in a statute dealing with fetal tissue trans-
plantation, and EG cell research does not now, and may
never, involve directly the transplantation of tissue or
cells from a fetus to a patient. Therefore, to overcome the
uncertainties and ensure that ethical safeguards are
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understood to be applicable to fetal stem cell research,
statutory modification and regulatory clarification are
desirable. 
Confusion also is caused by restrictions and bans in
several states on research use of the products of induced
abortions; although these statutes seem aimed princi-
pally at research with living fetuses, some have—or may
be read to have—broader reach. The common theme of
these statutes—as in the law on federally funded
research—is to erect a significant barrier between a
woman’s decision to abort a fetus and the separate ques-
tion of whether fetal remains will be donated for
research. To support that barrier, many states employ
consent requirements and prohibit payment for fetal
remains, so that such material does not become commer-
cialized and thus inappropriately influence the abortion
decision. 
The picture is clearer but less favorable to research in
the area of embryos remaining after infertility treatments.
In addition to restrictions and even outright prohibitions
in the law of a number of states, riders to DHHS appro-
priation statutes in recent years rule out the use of these
funds in any process in which human embryos are
created for research or are destroyed or subject to a risk
of injury. Once it has developed special guidelines to
ensure that investigators will safeguard the ethics of the
process, NIH will fund suitable research projects using
human ES cells derived from IVF embryos, although it
will not fund the derivation process itself. This position
has been denounced by many members of Congress who
supported the ban on federal funding of research with
embryos and who believe that however the statutory
language may be read, its intent clearly is to prohibit
research that depends upon the prohibited acts.
The questions raised by this disagreement go beyond
interpretation of the language and intent of the DHHS
appropriations rider. First, is the justification for research
using human ES cells compelling enough to permit an
exception to the ban on federal funding for embryo
research? Second, can an exception be crafted in a way
that continues to give appropriate weight to the values
that underlie the ban in the first place? And third, is the
justification for using ES cells strong enough to permit
funding of the process of deriving these cells from IVF
embryos remaining after infertility treatments? Answers
to these questions will require evaluation of the scientific
and medical aspects of human ES cell research that are
described in Chapter 2 in the context of the ethical con-
siderations that are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:121–122 (West 1991). Eight other states
restrict embryo research indirectly, banning all research on “live”
embryos or fetuses. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.0111(6); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112, 
§ 12j(a)(I) (Law. Co-op. 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§§ 333.2685, 333.2686, 333.2692 (West 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 145.422 Subd. 1,2 (West 1989); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-02.2-
01, 14-02.2-02 (1991); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3216(a) (Supp.
1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-54-1(a)-(c) (1994) (Andrews 1999).
70 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 1593; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112 
§ 12(j)(A)(Iv); Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2609; N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 14-02.2-02(4); and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-54-1(f).
71 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 873.05; Georgia Code Ann. § 16-12-160 (A)
(Except for Health Services Education); Ill. Stat. Ann. Ch 1101/2
Para. 308.1; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:122; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.422(3)
(Live); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3216(b)(3) (forbids payment for
the procurement of fetal tissue or organs); Texas Penal Code 
§ 48.02; Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-311. But see Feiler (1998):
“Although some state laws prohibit the sale of fertilized embryos,
they do nothing to prevent the sale of gametes (sperm and eggs),
which can easily be converted into research embryos through
deliberate fertilization. Payment for sperm and eggs is widespread
among American infertility clinics” [citations omitted] (2455).
72 nn. 66; 75; 76; 80. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-208 (199_) and
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-311 (199_) prohibit sale of an “unborn
child”; D.C. Code § 6-2601 (199_) and Va. Code § 32.1-289.1
(199_) prohibit sale of all or a portion of the “human body” (D.C.)
or a “natural body part” (Va.); two state statutes prohibit sale of
specified organs (not including embryos), but permit state health
officials to expand the list under prescribed conditions. N.Y. Public
Health Law § 4307 (199_); W. Va. Code § 68.50.610(2) (199_)
(Andrews 1999). 
73 At least one state “prohibits the sale of living [embryos] or non-
renewable organs but does allow ‘the buying and selling of a cell
culture line or lines taken from a non-living human [embryo],’”
ibid., citing Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.422(3) (Andrews 1999, citing
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.422(3)).
74 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Memorandum for
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,” March 4,
1997.
75 Executive Office of the President of the United States, 1998,
Statement of Administration Policy [on] S.1601 (Human Cloning
Prohibition Act) (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the
President).
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Ethical Issues Relating to the 
Sources of Human Embryonic Stem 
or Embryonic Germ Cells
R esearch involving human embryonic stem (ES) cellsand embryonic germ (EG) cells raises several
important ethical issues, principally related to the current
sources and/or methods of deriving these cells. If, for
example, ES and EG cells could be derived from sources
other than human embryos or cadaveric fetal material,
fewer ethical concerns would be involved in determining
a policy for their use for scientific research or clinical
therapies. At present, however, the only methods avail-
able to isolate and culture human ES and EG cells involve
the use of human embryos or cadaveric fetal tissue.
Therefore, careful consideration of the ethical issues
involved in the use of these sources is an unavoidable
component of the advancement of this type of research.
This chapter first considers the ethical issues arising
from research involving the derivation and/or use of ES
or EG cells from three potential sources: cadaveric fetal
tissue, embryos resulting from and remaining after infer-
tility treatments, and embryos created solely for research
purposes either by in vitro fertilization (IVF) or somatic
cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) techniques. The chapter
then reviews separately the specific arguments for and
against federal funding of this research. Finally, the chap-
ter discusses relevant ethical issues in federal oversight
and review of research involving the derivation and/or
use of ES or EG cells.1
Research with EG Cells Derived from
Cadaveric Fetal Tissue
Many of the ethical questions regarding research
involving the use of cadaveric fetal tissue were analyzed
in depth by the 1988 National Institutes of Health (NIH)
Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel.
What is new in the present context is that, in the near
term at least, the materials derived from this tissue would
not be transplanted; rather, gonadal tissue (both male
and female) would be used as a source for human EG
cells. Initially, these cell lines would be used in basic
research to determine their nature, to understand their
relationship to human development, and to identify dif-
ferentiation factors that enable such cells to develop into
particular tissue types. Later, such cell lines also might be
used for the development of transplantation for particu-
lar tissue types. The value of cadaveric fetal tissue already
has been demonstrated; a broad variety of research mate-
rials and reagents derived from cadaveric fetal tissue cur-
rently are used in federally funded research.2
The ethical acceptability of deriving EG cells from the
tissue of aborted fetuses is, for some, closely connected to
the ethical acceptability of abortion. Those who believe
that elective abortions are morally acceptable are less
likely to identify insurmountable ethical barriers to
research that involves the derivation and use of EG cells
derived from cadaveric fetal tissue. This group might
agree that it is necessary to restrict such research by
requiring that the decision to donate fetal tissue be sepa-
rate from the decision to terminate the pregnancy. The
purpose of such a requirement would be to protect the
pregnant woman against coercion and exploitation rather
than to protect the fetus. In addition, even those who
find it acceptable to use cadaveric fetal tissue in research
might hold that certain uses of such tissue—for example,
uses that treat it as nothing more than any other bodily
tissue—should be ruled out as disrespectful.
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Those who view elective abortions as morally unjus-
tified often—but not always—oppose the research use of
tissue derived from aborted fetuses. They usually have no
moral difficulty with the use of tissue from spontaneously
aborted fetuses or—if they recognize exceptions to the
moral prohibition on abortion—from fetuses in cases
that they believe are morally justifiable abortions (e.g., to
save the pregnant woman’s life). However, in general they
do not believe that it is possible to derive and use tissue
from what they believe are unjustifiably aborted fetuses
without inevitable and unacceptable association with
those abortions. This association, they believe, usually
taints the actions of all those involved in using these
materials or in financing research protocols that rely on
such tissue. Nevertheless, some opponents of elective
abortions believe that it is still possible to support such
research as long as effective safeguards are in place to sep-
arate abortion decisions from the procurement and use 
of fetal tissue in research. For them, when appropriate
safeguards are in place, using cadaveric fetal tissue from
elective abortions for research is relevantly similar to
using nonfetal cadavers donated for scientific and 
medical purposes.
Association with Abortion
Opponents of the research use of fetal materials
obtained from elective abortions dispute the claim that it
is possible to separate the moral issues surrounding the
abortion from those involved in obtaining and using fetal
material. They argue that those who obtain and use fetal
material from elective abortion inevitably become associ-
ated, in ethically unacceptable ways, with the abortions
that are the source of the material.3 They identify two
major types of unacceptable association or cooperation
with abortion: 1) causal responsibility for abortions and
2) symbolic association with abortions.
1. Causal Responsibility
Some believe that those who provide cadaveric fetal tis-
sue in research are indirectly, if not directly, responsible
for the choice of some women to have an abortion. Direct
causal responsibility exists where, in this case, someone’s
actions directly lead a pregnant woman to have an
abortion—for example, the researcher offers financial
compensation for cadaveric fetal tissue and this compen-
sation leads the pregnant woman to have an abortion
she would not otherwise have had. In part because of
concerns about direct causal responsibility, the Human
Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel (1988) rec-
ommended the following safeguards to separate the
pregnant woman’s decision to abort from her decision to
donate fetal tissue:
n The consent of women for abortions must be
obtained prior to requesting or obtaining consent for
the donation of fetal tissue.
n Those who seek a woman’s consent to donate should
not discuss fetal tissue donation prior to her deci-
sion to abort, unless she specifically requests such
information. 
n Women should not be paid for providing fetal tissue.
n A separation must be maintained between abortion
clinic personnel and those involved in using fetal
tissue.
n There should be a prohibition against any alteration
of the timing of or procedures used in an abortion
solely for the purpose of obtaining tissue. 
n Donors of cadaveric fetal tissue should not be allowed
to designate a specific recipient of transplanted tissue.
As noted in Chapter 3, several of these safeguards
were later adopted in federal legislation regarding the use
of aborted fetal tissue in transplantation research, and
they appear to be sufficient to avoid direct causal respon-
sibility for abortions in human EG research as well as in
transplantation research.
Those involved in research uses of EG cells derived
from fetal tissue could be indirectly responsible for abor-
tions if the perceived potential benefits of the research
contributed to an increase in the number of abortions.
Opponents of fetal tissue research argue that it is unreal-
istic to suppose that a woman’s decision to abort can be
kept separate from considerations of donating fetal tis-
sue, as many women facing the abortion decision are
likely to have gained knowledge about fetal tissue
research through the media or other sources. The knowl-
edge that having an elective abortion might have benefits
for future patients through the donation of fetal tissue for
research may tip the balance in favor of going through
with an abortion for some women who are ambivalent
about it. Some argue that the benefits achieved through
the routine use of fetal tissue will further legitimize abor-
tion and result in more permissive societal attitudes and
policies concerning elective abortion.
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It is impossible to eliminate the possibility completely,
however slight it may be, that knowledge of the promise
of research on EG cells derived from fetal tissue will play
a role in some elective abortion decisions, even if only
rarely. However, it is not clear how much moral weight
ultimately attaches to this possibility. One might be justi-
fied in some instances in asserting that if it were not for
the research use of fetal tissue following an abortion, a
woman might not have chosen to terminate her pregnancy.
But one could assign this kind of causal responsibili-
ty to a number of factors that figure into abortion deci-
sions without making ascriptions of indirect causal
responsibility, or what is sometimes called moral com-
plicity. For example, a woman might choose to have an
abortion principally because she does not want to slow
the advancement of her education and career. She might
not have had an abortion in the absence of expectations
that encourage women to develop their careers. Yet, we
would not think it appropriate to charge those who pro-
mote such expectations and/or policies as complicit in
her abortion. In both this case and that of research, the
opportunity to choose abortion is a consequence of a
legitimate social policy. The burden on those seeking to
end such policies is to show that the risks of harm—both
the probability and the magnitude of harm—resulting
from the policies outweigh the expected benefits
(Childress 1991). This criterion minimally requires evi-
dence of a high probability of a large number of elective
abortions that would not have occurred in the absence of
those policies. There is, however, no such evidence at
present. If compelling evidence did emerge that elective
abortions did, or probably would, increase as a result of
the research use of cadaveric fetal tissue, this would
require a re-examination of the balance of benefits and
harms as well as the safeguards that had been put into
place to eliminate the potential for direct causal respon-
sibility and reduce the likelihood of indirect causal
responsibility for abortions.
2. Symbolic Association
People can become inappropriately associated with what
they believe are wrongful acts for which they are not
causally responsible. Particularly problematic for many is
an association that appears to symbolize approval of the
wrongdoing. For example, James Burtchaell maintains
that those involved in research on fetal tissue enter a
symbolic alliance with the practice of abortion in pro-
ducing or deriving benefits from it (1988).
A common response is that persons can benefit from
what they might consider immoral acts without tacitly
approving of those acts. For example, transplant sur-
geons and transplant recipients may benefit (the latter
more directly than the former) from donated organs from
victims of murder or drunken driving but nevertheless
condemn those wrongful acts (Robertson 1988; Vawter et
al. 1991). A researcher who uses cadaveric fetal material
in studies to answer important research questions or to
study its potential therapeutic effects or the patient who
receives the donated tissue need not sanction the act of
abortion any more than the transplant surgeon who uses
the organs of a murder victim approves of the homicidal act.
Some opponents of fetal tissue research maintain that
it implicates those involved in a kind of wrongdoing that
cannot be attributed to the transplant surgeon in the
example above. Unlike drunken driving and murder,
abortion is an institutionalized practice in which certain
categories of human life (the members of which are con-
sidered by some to have the same moral status as human
adults) are allowed to be killed. In this respect, some
opponents of abortion go so far as to suggest that fetal tis-
sue research is more analogous to research that benefits
from experiments conducted by Nazi doctors during
World War II (Bopp 1994).
But whatever one thinks of comparisons between the
victims of Nazi crimes and aborted fetuses—and many
are outraged by these comparisons—it is possible to con-
cede the comparisons without concluding that human
stem cell research involving cadaveric fetal tissue is
morally problematic. Of course, some believe that those
who use data derived from Nazi experiments are morally
complicit with those crimes. For example, William
Seidelman writes: 
By giving value to (Nazi) research we are, by impli-
cation, supporting Himmler’s philosophy that the
subjects’ lives were ‘useless.’ This is to argue that, by
accepting data derived from their misery we are,
post mortem, deriving utility from otherwise ‘use-
less’ life. Science could thus stand accused of giving
greater value to knowledge than to human life itself
(1988, 232). 
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But one need not adopt this stance. Instead, one can
reasonably believe that a scientist’s actions must be
understood and judged not by their consequences or
uses but rather by several other factors, including the
scientist’s intentions, the social practices of which his
or her actions are a part, and the social context in
which those practices are embedded. As philosopher
Benjamin Freedman wrote:
A moral universe such as our own must, I think, rely
on the authors of their own actions to be primarily
responsible for attaching symbolic significance to
those actions...[I]n using the Nazi data, physicians
and scientists are acting pursuant to their own moral
commitment to aid patients and to advance science in
the interest of humankind. The use of data is predi-
cated upon that duty, and it is in seeking to fulfill that
duty that the symbolic significance of the action must
be found (1992, 151).
It is likewise reasonable to maintain that the symbolic
significance of support for research using EG cells
derived from aborted fetal tissue lies in the commitment
and desire to gain knowledge, promote health, and save
lives. This research is allied with a worthy cause, and any
taint that might attach from the source of the cells
appears to be outweighed by the potential good that the
research may yield.
Consent and Donation 
In previous debates about the use of fetal tissue in
research, questions have been raised about who has the
moral authority to donate the material. Some assert that,
from an ethical standpoint, a woman who chooses abor-
tion forfeits her rights to determine the disposition of the
dead fetus. Burtchaell, for instance, argues that “the deci-
sion to abort, made by the mother, is an act of such vio-
lent abandonment of the maternal trusteeship that no
further exercise of such responsibility is admissible”
(1988, 9). By contrast, John Robertson argues that this
position mistakenly assumes that the persons disposing
of cadaveric remains act only as the guardians or proxies
of the deceased. Instead, “a more accurate account of
their role is to guard their own feelings and interests in
assuring that the remains of kin are treated respectfully”
(1988, 6).
In our view, obtaining consent to donate fetal tissue is
an ethical prerequisite for using such material to derive
EG cells, even though the woman or couple are not
research subjects per se, and even though the cadaveric
fetus is not a human subject. This view is consistent with
the conclusion of the Human Fetal Tissue Transplan-
tation Research Panel, which held that “[e]xpress dona-
tion by the pregnant woman after the abortion decision
is the most appropriate mode of transfer of fetal tissues
because it is the most congruent with our society’s tradi-
tions, laws, policies, and practices, including the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and current Federal
research regulations” (1988, 6). According to this panel,
a woman’s choice of a legal abortion does not disqualify
her legally and should not disqualify her morally from
serving “as the primary decisionmaker about the disposi-
tion of fetal remains, including the donation of fetal tis-
sue for research.” She “has a special connection with the
fetus and she has a legitimate interest in its disposition
and use.” In addition, her decision to donate fetal tissue
would not violate the dead fetus’s interests. The panel
concluded that “in the final analysis, any mode of
transfer other than maternal donation appears to raise
more serious ethical problems” (6). Fetal tissue should
not be used without the woman’s consent. Not only should
her consent be necessary, it should also be sufficient to
donate the tissue, except where the father’s objection 
is known.
We concur with the Human Fetal Tissue Transplan-
tation Research Panel that a woman undergoing an elec-
tive abortion should be authorized to donate fetal tissue,
unless the father is known to object. We further agree
with the panel and with subsequent federal legislation
that it is important to establish safeguards to separate the
pregnant woman’s decision to abort from the decision to
donate cadaveric fetal tissue. The guidelines already in
place for fetal tissue transplantation research generally
are appropriate and appear to be sufficient if they also
apply to research involving human EG cells.
As already noted, some opponents of elective abor-
tion can support fetal tissue research as long as there are
safeguards to avoid direct causal responsibility and to
reduce the likelihood of indirect causal responsibility.
Many who view elective abortion as morally problematic,
even if not always morally unjustified, also may endorse
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these safeguards as a way to avoid certain forms of asso-
ciation with morally problematic actions and at the same
time as a way to prevent the exploitation and coercion of
pregnant women. Even those who do not find elective
abortions morally problematic may accept these safe-
guards in order to protect pregnant women from
exploitation and coercion as well as to sustain social prac-
tices that reflect important social and cultural values and
to respect the moral concerns of opponents of elective
abortion. We believe, therefore, that there can be wide
agreement on appropriate safeguards for the process of
donating cadaveric fetal tissue.
At a minimum, these safeguards should separate the
decision to have an abortion from the decision to donate
by ensuring, as much as possible, that the former occurs
before the latter by not providing before the abortion
decision is made information about the possibility of
using fetal materials in research and by prohibiting the
provision of financial compensation for the fetal tissue to
the woman (or to the couple) having the abortion. If
these and other requirements that already have been
adopted in regulations governing federally funded
human fetal tissue transplantation research do not clear-
ly extend to research to generate EG cells from cadaveric
fetal tissue, the regulations should be modified to do so.
Research with ES Cells Derived from Embryos
Remaining After Infertility Treatments
Ethical issues arising from research involving the use
of human embryos have generated a sustained public
policy discussion and a valuable body of literature that
spans at least 20 years. Some of these issues were con-
sidered in depth by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (DHEW) Ethics Advisory Board (EAB) in
1978 and in 1979 (DHEW Ethics Advisory Board 1979).
The ethical debate was continued here and abroad by
other national advisory bodies, including the British
Warnock Committee (Committee of Inquiry 1984) and
the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies (1993). In 1994, the NIH Human Embryo
Research Panel considered multiple types of present and
future human embryo research and discussed both ethi-
cal and public policy issues (NIH 1994). In contrast, for
example, SCNT has been seriously debated in the United
States and elsewhere only for about two years, and the
research use of SCNT has been debated for an even
shorter period.
One source of embryos for ES cells is those remaining
after infertility treatments. Couples who provide such
embryos have decided that they no longer need them to
achieve their reproductive goals. If the couple prefers to
discontinue storing the remaining embryos and does not
wish to donate them to other couples, the only alterna-
tives are to direct that the embryos be discarded (that is,
to destroy them through the thawing process) or to
donate them for research. When only these latter two
alternatives remain, the situation is somewhat similar to
that in which a woman is deciding whether to donate
fetal tissue for research following elective abortion and
the situation in which families are deciding whether to
donate the organs or tissues of a loved one who has
recently died. However, whether this similarity is decisive
depends upon one’s perception of the moral status of
embryos. Derivation of ES cells involves destroying the
embryos, whereas abortion precedes the donation of the
fetal tissue and death precedes the donation of whole
organs for transplantation.
The Moral Status of Embryos
To say that an entity has “moral status” is to say some-
thing both about how one should act towards that thing
or person and about whether that thing or person can
expect certain treatment from others. The debate about
the moral status of embryos traditionally has revolved
around the question of whether the embryo has the same
moral status as children and adult humans do—with a
right to life that may not be sacrificed by others for the
benefit of society. At one end of the spectrum of attitudes
is the view that the embryo is a mere cluster of cells that
has no more moral status than any other collection of
human cells. From this perspective, one might conclude
that there are few, if any, ethical limitations on the
research uses of embryos.
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that
embryos should be considered in the same moral category
as children or adults. According to this view, research
involving the destruction of embryos is absolutely pro-
hibited. Edmund D. Pellegrino, a professor of bioethics 
at Georgetown University, described this perspective
in testimony given before the Commission:
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The Roman Catholic perspective…rejects the idea
that full moral status is conferred by degrees or at
some arbitrary point in development. Such arbitrari-
ness is liable to definition more in accord with exper-
imental need than ontological or biological reality.4
In contrast, scholars representing other religious tradi-
tions testified that moral status varies according to the
stage of development.5 For example, Margaret Farley, a
professor of Christian ethics at Yale University, pointed
out that
There are clear disagreements among Catholics—
whether moral theologians, church leaders, ordinary
members of the Catholic community—on particular
issues of fetal and embryo research….A growing
number of Catholic moral theologians, for example,
do not consider the human embryo in its earliest
stages…to constitute an individualized human entity.6
Other scholars from Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic 
traditions noted that major strands of those traditions
support a view of fetal development that does not assign
full moral status to the early embryo.7 For example,
Jewish scholars testified that the issue of the moral status
of extra-corporeal embryos is not central to an assess-
ment of the ethical acceptability of research involving 
ES cells. Rabbi Elliot Dorff noted that
Genetic materials outside the uterus have no legal sta-
tus in Jewish law, for they are not even a part of a
human being until implanted in a woman’s womb
and even then, during the first 40 days of gestation,
their status is ‘as if they were water.’ As a result, frozen
embryos may be discarded or used for reasonable
purposes, and so may stem cells be procured from
them.8
As a result, for some Jewish thinkers, the derivation and
use of ES cells from embryos remaining after infertility
treatments may be less problematic than the use of
aborted fetal tissue, at least following morally unjustified
abortions.
On this issue, the Commission adopted what some
have described as an intermediate position, one with
which many likely would agree: that the embryo merits
respect as a form of human life, but not the same level of
respect accorded persons. We recognize that, on such a
morally contested issue, there will be strong differences
of opinion. Moreover, it is unlikely that, by sheer force of
argument, those with particularly strong beliefs on either
side will be persuaded to change their opinions (Murray
1996). However, there is, in our judgment, considerable
value in describing some of these positions, not only to
reveal some of the difficulties of resolving the issue, but
to seek an appropriate set of recommendations that can
reflect the many values we share as well as the moral
views of those with diverse ethical commitments.
A standard approach taken by those who deny that
embryos are persons with the same moral status as chil-
dren and adults is to identify one or more psychological
or cognitive capacities that are considered essential to
personhood (and a concomitant right to life) but that
embryos lack. Most commonly cited are consciousness,
self-consciousness, and the ability to reason (Feinberg
1986; Tooley 1983; Warren 1973). The problem with
such accounts is that they appear to be either under- or
over-inclusive, depending on which capacities are
invoked. For example, if one requires self-consciousness
or the ability to reason as an essential condition for
personhood, most very young infants will not be able
to satisfy this condition. On the other hand, if sentience
is regarded as the touchstone of the right to life, then
nonhuman animals also possess this right. 
Those who deny that embryos have the same moral
status as persons might maintain that the embryo is sim-
ply too nascent a form of human life to merit the kind of
respect accorded more developed humans. However,
some would argue that, in the absence of an event that
decisively (i.e., to everyone’s satisfaction) identifies the
first stage of human development—a stage at which
destroying human life is morally wrong—it is not per-
missible to destroy embryos.
The fundamental argument of those who oppose the
destruction of human embryos is that these embryos are
human beings and, as such, have a right to life. The very
humanness of the embryo is thus thought to confer the
moral status of a person. The problem is that, for some,
the premise that all human lives at any stage of their
development are persons in the moral sense is not self-
evident. Indeed, some believe that the premise conflates
two categories of human beings: namely, beings that
belong to the species homo sapiens, and beings that
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belong to a particular moral community (Warren 1973).
According to this view, the fact that an individual is a
member of the species homo sapiens is not sufficient to
confer upon it membership in the moral community of
persons. Although it is not clear that those who advance
this view are able to establish the point at which, if ever,
embryos first acquire the moral status of persons, those
who oppose the destruction of embryos likewise fail to
establish, in a convincing manner, why society should
ascribe the status of persons to human embryos.
It is not surprising that these different views on the
moral status of the embryo appear difficult to resolve,
given their relationship to the issues surrounding the
abortion debate, a debate the philosopher Alastair
MacIntyre describes as interminable: “I do not mean by
this just that such debates go on and on and on—
although they do—but also that they can apparently find
no terminus. There seems to be no rational way of secur-
ing moral agreement in our culture” (1984, 6). This
difficulty has led most concerned observers to search for
a position that respects the moral integrity of different
perspectives, but to the extent possible, focuses public
policy on ethical values that may be broadly shared.
The Importance of Shared Views
Once again, we are aware that the issue of the moral
status of the embryo has occupied the thoughtful atten-
tion of previous bodies deliberating about fetal tissue and
embryo research.9 Further, as already noted, we do not
presume to be in a position to settle this debate, but
instead have aimed to develop public policy recommen-
dations regarding research involving the derivation and
use of ES cells that are formulated in terms that people
who hold differing views on the status of the embryo can
accept. As Thomas Nagel argues, “In a democracy, the
aim of procedures of decision should be to secure results
that can be acknowledged as legitimate by as wide a por-
tion of the citizenry as possible” (1995, 212). In this vein,
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that the
construction of public policy on morally controversial
matters should involve a “search for significant points of
convergence between one’s own understandings and
those of citizens whose positions, taken in their more
comprehensive forms, one must reject” (1996, 85).
R. Alta Charo suggests an approach for informing pol-
icy in this area that seeks to accommodate the interests of
individuals who hold conflicting views on the status of
the embryo. Charo argues that the issue of moral status
can be avoided altogether by addressing the proper lim-
its of embryo research in terms of political philosophy
rather than moral philosophy:
The political analysis entails a change in focus, away
from the embryo and the research and toward an
ethical balance between the interests of those who
oppose destroying embryos in research and those
who stand to benefit from the research findings.
Thus, the deeper the degree of offense to opponents
and the weaker the opportunity for resorting to the
political system to impose their vision, the more
compelling the benefits must be to justify the funding
(1995, 20).
In Charo’s view, once one recognizes that the substantive
conflict among fundamental values surrounding embryo
research cannot be resolved in a manner that will satisfy
all sides, the most promising approach is to seek to
balance all the relevant considerations in determining
whether to proceed with the research. Thus, although it
is clear that embryo research would offend some people
deeply, she would argue that the potential health bene-
fits for this and future generations outweigh the pain
experienced by opponents of the research.
It is, however, questionable whether Charo’s analysis
successfully avoids the issue of moral status. It might be
argued, for example, that placing the lives of embryos in
this kind of utilitarian calculus will seem appropriate
only to those who presuppose that embryos do not have
the status of persons. Those who believe—or who gen-
uinely allow for the possibility—that embryos have the
status of persons will regard such consequentialist
grounds for destroying embryos as extremely problematic. 
In our view, an appropriate approach to public policy
in this arena is to develop policies that demonstrate
respect for all reasonable alternative points of view and
that focus, when possible, on the shared fundamental
values that these divergent opinions, in their own ways,
seek to affirm. This particular perspective was recom-
mended by Patricia King in her testimony before the
Commission and elsewhere (1997).10 As long as the
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disagreement is cast strictly as one between those who
think the embryo is a person with a right to life and those
who think it has little or no moral status, the quest for
convergence will be an elusive one. But there are grounds
for supposing that this may be a misleading depiction of
the conflict. Indeed, there may be a sufficiently broad
consensus regarding the respect to be accorded to
embryos to justify, under certain conditions, not only the
research use of stem cells but also the use of embryos
remaining after infertility treatments to generate ES cells.
The abortion debate offers an illustration of the com-
plex middle ground that might be found in ethically and
politically contentious areas of public policy. Philosopher
Ronald Dworkin maintains that, despite their rhetoric,
many who oppose abortion do not actually believe that
the fetus is a person with a right to life. This is revealed,
he claims, through a consideration of the exceptions
that they often permit to their proposed prohibitions
on abortion.
For example, some hold that abortion is morally per-
missible when a pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.
Yet, as Dworkin comments, “[i]t would be contradictory
to insist that a fetus has a right to live that is strong
enough to justify prohibiting abortion even when child-
birth would ruin a mother’s or a family’s life, but that
ceases to exist when the pregnancy is the result of a
sexual crime of which the fetus is, of course, wholly
innocent” (1994, 32).
The importance of reflecting on the meaning of such
exceptions in the context of the research uses of embryos
is that they suggest that even in an area of great moral
controversy it may be possible to identify some common
ground. If it is possible to find common ground in the
case of elective abortions, we might be able to identify
when it would be permissible in the case of destroying
embryos. For example, conservatives allow such excep-
tions implicitly hold with liberals that very early forms of
human life may sometimes be sacrificed to promote the
interests of other humans.11 Although liberals and con-
servatives disagree about the range of ends for which
embryonic or fetal life may ethically be sacrificed, they
may be able to reach some consensus. Conservatives who
accept that destroying a fetus is permissible when neces-
sary to save a pregnant woman or spare a rape victim
additional trauma might agree with liberals that it also is
permissible to destroy embryos when it is necessary to
save lives or prevent extreme suffering. We recognize, of
course, that these cases are different, as the existence of
the fetus may directly conflict with the pregnant
woman’s interests, while a particular ex utero embryo
does not threaten anyone’s interests. But this distinction
obscures the fact that these two cases share an implicit
attribution of greater value to the interests of children
and adults.
We believe that the following would seem to be a
reasonable statement of the kind of agreement that could
be possible on this issue:
Research that involves the destruction of embryos
remaining after infertility treatments is permissible
when there is good reason to believe that this destruc-
tion is necessary to develop cures for life-threatening
or severely debilitating diseases and when appropriate
protections and oversight are in place in order to
prevent abuse.
Given the great promise of ES cell research for saving
lives and alleviating suffering, such a statement would
appear to be sufficient to permit, at least in certain cases,
not only the use of ES cells in research, but also the use
of certain embryos to generate ES cells. Some might
object, however, that the benefits of the research are too
uncertain to justify a comparison with the conditions
under which one might make an exception to permit
abortion. But the lower probability of benefits from
research uses of embryos is balanced by a much higher
ratio of potential lives saved relative to embryonic lives
lost and by two other characteristics of the embryos used
to derive ES cells: first, that they are at a much earlier
stage of development than is usually true of aborted
fetuses, and second, that they are about to be discarded
after infertility treatment and thus have no prospect for
survival even if they are not used in deriving ES cells. In
our view, the potential benefits of the research outweigh
the harms to embryos that are destroyed in the research
process.
Another objection is that the availability of alternative
means of obtaining (and sources of) stem cells makes it
unnecessary to use embryos to obtain ES cells for
research. Richard Doerflinger of the National Conference
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of Catholic Bishops testified before the Commission that
“it is now clearer than ever that new research involving
adult stem cells…offers the promise that embryonic stem
cells may simply be irrelevant to future medical
progress.”12 In our judgment, the derivation of stem cells
from embryos remaining following infertility treatments
is justifiable only if no less morally problematic alterna-
tives are available for advancing the research. But as we
have noted, ES cells from embryos appear to be different
in scientifically important ways from AS cells and also
appear to offer greater promise of therapeutic break-
throughs. The claim that there are alternatives to using
stem cells derived from embryos is not, at the present
time, supported scientifically. We recognize, however,
that this is a matter that must be revisited continually as
science advances.
Nevertheless, if research is to proceed with the
derivation and use of ES cells from embryos that remain
following infertility treatments, we must consider what
kinds of conditions and constraints should apply to this
work. Many of these conditions, discussed below, also are
reflected in our recommendations that are provided in
the next chapter.
First, ideally, those who have the authority to decide
about the disposition of the remaining embryos should
make the decision about whether to donate them to
another couple, to continue to store them, or to destroy
them before they are asked about donating them for
research. This will reduce the likelihood that a desire to
benefit research will lead to a choice to destroy the
embryos. If the decision to destroy the embryos precedes
the decision to donate them for research purposes, then
the research use of such embryos affects only how, not
whether, the destruction occurs. Obviously, this separa-
tion may not be possible, particularly because the couple
may be given several options simultaneously, either at the
outset of treatment for infertility or after its completion.
Indeed, some infertility programs provide patients with
multiple consent forms at the outset of treatment, forms
that include options to donate to research, discard, or
transfer any embryos that remain. But even then, it may
be appropriate to view the options as consisting of dona-
tion of the embryos to another couple, their continued
storage, or their destruction, with destruction of the
embryos taking one of two forms—discarding them
through thawing or through the process of research. If
embryo destruction is permissible, then it certainly
should be permissible to destroy them in a way that
would generate stem cells for bona fide research.
Second, the couple’s or the individual’s decision to
donate any remaining embryos for research should be a
voluntary one, free from coercion and undue pressure.
Third, donors of embryos for research should not be
allowed to designate or restrict the recipients of deriva-
tive tissues or cell lines for research or therapy. Fourth,
even though it is legal to sell sperm and ova, it should
remain illegal to sell embryos; the demonstration of
respect for embryos requires this prohibition. Fifth, only
the minimum number of embryos that are needed to
derive sufficient stem cells for important research should
be used in this way.
Sixth, it is important to develop and widely dissemi-
nate additional professional standards of practice in
reproductive medicine that will reduce the likelihood
that infertility clinics will increase the numbers of
embryos remaining after infertility treatments in order to
increase the supply for possible research purposes. These
standards could address issues such as the production of
embryos, the number of embryos implanted and allowed
to develop to term, and the care and handling of gametes
and embryos.
Seventh, any research use of embryos or embryonic
cell lines imported from outside of the country must sat-
isfy all the regulations for the use of such materials when
they are produced in the United States. Eighth, if possi-
ble, institutions, researchers, and potential recipients of
therapies should be informed in some way about the
source of the stem cells—perhaps by tagging the cells—
so that all concerned can avoid using any cells that are
believed to have been derived unethically. This last con-
dition is intended to enable institutions, researchers, and
patients to make their own conscientious choices about
the acceptability of using stem cells that have been
derived from ethically controversial sources.
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Ethical Distinctions and Relationships Between the
Derivation and Use of ES Cells Derived from
Embryos Remaining After Infertility Treatments
There is significant debate regarding whether the use
of cultures of ES cells should be regarded or treated
differently from the derivation of such cells, given that the
derivation arises from the destruction of an intact
embryo. For purposes of this report, three questions will
help frame this issue: First, are derivation and use ethi-
cally distinct? Second, is the use of ES cells, their deriva-
tion, or both ethically justifiable? Third, should use,
derivation, or both be eligible for public funding? Here
we discuss our views on the first two questions. Later in
this chapter, we discuss the third question in more detail.
Even though many individuals would want to avoid
the use of ES cells because of their source, the processes
of derivation and use are sufficiently different to warrant
being regarded as morally distinct from one another. The
NIH Human Embryo Research Panel reached this con-
clusion as well (1994). Moreover, we heard testimony
that would support this distinction.13 However, there is
vigorous debate regarding whether this distinction, even
if morally relevant, is morally decisive or determinative
for judgments about particular actions and public
policies.
As previously discussed, most moral concerns about
the derivation of ES cells from embryos that remain after
infertility treatments focus on the fact that derivation
involves destruction. If embryos could be destroyed 
by allowing them to thaw—the standard approach to dis-
carding them—and researchers could then derive ES
cells, the moral issues would be parallel to those that
arise in the derivation of germ cells from aborted fetuses.
Destruction and derivation could be separated in princi-
ple as well as through various practical measures.
However, in practice, destruction and derivation cannot
be separated; therefore, this option is not available. The
question, then, is whether the use of ES cells derived in 
a process that destroys the embryos can be morally 
separated from that of derivation.
There are several possible responses. One position
holds that such use is morally unacceptable because it
necessarily involves association with the wrongful act of
embryo destruction. Another position is that the problem
of associating the use of the cells and the destruction of
the embryo disappears if the destruction of the embryo is
not viewed as problematic, as some traditions hold.
There is no association with wrongdoing if the initial act
is not on balance wrong. A third position holds that even
if embryo destruction is viewed as morally wrong, there
still may be ways to separate at least some uses from der-
ivation. John Robertson suggests that there may be some
circumstances in which researchers using ES cells would
not be considered complicit with the destruction of
embryos. He indicates, for example, that there would be
no meaningful association where an investigator’s
“research plans or actions had no effect on whether the
original immoral derivation occurred” (1999, 113). 
Some commentators hold that it would be ethically
justifiable, though regrettable, to use existing cell lines
that were derived through unethical embryo destruction.
A version of this position was suggested by Father
Demetrios Demopulos, who explained his views from the
perspective of Eastern Orthodoxy in testimony before the
Commission:
…I cannot condone any procedure that threatens 
viability, dignity, and sanctity of that life. In my view
the establishment of embryonic stem cell lines…was
done at the cost of human lives. Even though not yet
a human person, an embryo should not be used for
or sacrificed in experimentation, no matter how noble
the goal may seem.14
Yet, in response to a Commissioner’s inquiry about
whether it might still be permissible to use existing ES
cell lines, Demopulos stated:
In my opinion, yes, since the lines exist and they have
some benefit. I wish they had not been derived in the
way that they were but since they are there….I do not
think it would be a good thing to not take advantage
of [their availability].15 
In our reflections on both the distinction and rela-
tionship between derivation and use, especially for pur-
poses of determining ethically acceptable public policy,
we were influenced by testimony that stressed how
important it is for public policy to be clear and to be jus-
tified in terms that are widely understood. Individuals
representing widely differing views about the moral
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status of the embryo and the moral justifiability of
embryo destruction offered similar testimony. For exam-
ple, Gilbert Meilaender called for the Commission to
avoid misleading and even deceptive language in its
statement and justification of public policies, whatever
those policies turned out to be, on the grounds that mis-
leading language would be a disservice to public dis-
course.16 While affirming a different view regarding the
moral status of embryos and embryo destruction, Dena
Davis made a similar point by stressing that public poli-
cy and its rationale should pass the “straight-face test,” a
test failed, in her judgment, by an interpretation of fed-
eral law that permits federal funding of research using
stem cells while denying federal funding of research that
involves deriving the cells themselves. According to
Davis, “it is disrespectful to suggest that those who
believe that human embryos are persons look the other
way when embryos are destroyed to obtain stem cells as
long as public funding only kicks in once the stem cells
are derived.” Moreover, she argued that it is “more
respectful, both of individuals opposed to the research
and the public discourse generally, to be explicit about
what is going on here and to acknowledge the ethical if
not legal linkage between embryo destruction and the
deriving of stem cells.”17
The legal opinion rendered by the Department of
Health and Human Services distinguishes the current
legality of providing federal funds for the downstream
use of ES cells from the legality of providing funds for the
derivation of these cells. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 3,
our own independent legal analysis reached a similar
conclusion.18 However, because our report focuses on the
ethical issues involved in human ES and EG cell research,
we find that there is no inconsistency between accepting
this legal analysis and, at the same time, concluding that
research involving both the derivation and use of these
cells can under certain circumstances be justified ethically
and that federal funds should be provided for both. We
examine the ethical arguments for and against funding
both derivation and use after we consider another possi-
ble source of stem cells–embryos that are created solely
for research.
Research with ES Cells Derived from Embryos
Created Solely for Research
Ever since the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel
recommended that under certain conditions embryos
could be created solely for research purposes (1994),
there has been an ongoing discussion about the ethical
and scientific merit of such a practice. Following is a dis-
cussion of this issue as it relates to two sources of ES cells
derived from embryos that are created solely for research
purposes.
Embryos Created Using IVF Procedures
There are two significant arguments in favor of creat-
ing human embryos using IVF technologies solely for
stem cell research: The first is that there may be an inad-
equate supply of embryos remaining after infertility treat-
ments. The second is that important research that could
be of great medical benefit cannot be undertaken except
with well-defined embryos that are created specifically
for research and/or medical purposes. However, recom-
mending federal funding for research using or deriving
ES cells from embryos expressly created for research pur-
poses presents two ethical problems. First, unlike in the
case of embryos that remain following infertility treat-
ments, there does not appear to be sufficient societal
agreement on the moral acceptability of this practice at
this time. Second, it is unclear whether an adequate sup-
ply of ES cells from embryos is available to meet scientific
need or whether specialized cells are needed. We do not,
at this time, support the federal sponsorship of research
involving the creation of embryos solely for research
purposes. However, we recognize that, in the future, sci-
entific evidence and public support for this type of stem
cell research may be sufficient in order to proceed.
Therefore, to promote ongoing dialogue on this topic, we
offer the following discussion.19
The “Discarded-Created” Distinction: On the
Importance of Intentions 
Various parties have discussed whether there is a
moral difference between conducting research on
embryos created with the intention of using them for
reproduction and conducting research on embryos creat-
ed with the intention of using them for research (Annas,
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Caplan, and Elias 1996; Capron 1999; Davis 1995;
Edwards 1990). Embryos created with the intention of
using them for reproduction become available for
research only when it is known that they are no longer
intended to be used for infertility treatments; only then
are they considered discarded, and only then do they
become potentially available for research. The second
group of embryos—research embryos—are those that are
created without the intention that they will be used for
procreative purposes. Rather, they are developed solely
for research purposes or to generate research and medical
materials such as stem cells or other cell lines, clones,
DNA sequences, or proteins.
For some observers, it is difficult to defend an ethical
distinction between what one can do with an embryo
that has been created solely for research purposes and
what one can do with an embryo remaining from infer-
tility treatments (Davis 1995). For others, conducting
research on embryos that were originally created for
reproduction but which were then discarded is far easier
to justify than is research conducted on embryos that
were originally created for research (Harris 1998).
An ethical intuition that seems to motivate the “dis-
carded-created” distinction is that the act of creating an
embryo for reproduction is respectful in a way that is
commensurate with the moral status of embryos, while
the act of creating an embryo for research is not. Embryos
that are discarded following the completion of IVF treat-
ments were presumably created by individuals who had
the primary intention of implanting them for reproduc-
tive purposes. These individuals did not consider the
destruction of these embryos until it was determined that
they were no longer needed. By contrast, research
embryos are created for use in research and, in the case
of stem cell research, their destruction in the process of
research. Hence, one motivation that encourages serious
consideration of the “discarded-created” distinction is a
concern about instrumentalization—treating the embryo
as a mere object—a practice that may increasingly lead us
to think of embryos generally as means to our ends rather
than as ends in themselves. 
The Use of SCNT to Produce ES Cells
Somatic cell nuclear transfer of a diploid nucleus into
an oocyte also has been suggested as a method to generate
embryos from which ES cells could be derived. If suc-
cessful, tissues derived from such cells could be useful in
avoiding graft rejection if the donor nucleus were taken
from the eventual transplant recipient. Although fertiliza-
tion of an egg with sperm in vitro clearly results in a
human zygote that will divide to become an embryo and
has the potential to develop into a human if implanted, it
is less clear whether the embryo created through SCNT
has that potential. Nevertheless, the fact that this tech-
nique can produce living animals such as sheep and cows
strongly suggests that it is likely that the cell that results
from insertion of an adult nucleus into an oocyte is a
zygote and can become an embryo. 
Some have argued, however, that it is not clear that a
zygote produced in this manner is similar to an embryo
created by fertilization, because there are significant dif-
ferences in the ability to generate different animals using
these techniques, and we do not understand the poten-
tial of the human cell in this context. Because it is unclear
whether SCNT works equally well in all species, we do
not yet know whether this technique works in humans.
Currently, therefore, we are uncertain whether cells cre-
ated using SCNT have the full potential to become
human. Because of previous work showing the potential
of SCNT to create an animal in some situations, many
would argue that similar concerns about the creation of
embryos for research purposes apply to embryos created
by SCNT. Thus, because of moral concerns outlined
above regarding the creation of life only for research pur-
poses, this category of research is disturbing to some. In
the future, however, research may define conditions
under which SCNT can be carried out while culturing the
cells in such a manner that the resulting cell is directed 
to immediately differentiate into a specific tissue, pre-
cluding further development into an embryo. Perhaps in
the future, then, it will be possible to use SCNT without
the creation of an embryo.
One major distinction between IVF and SCNT
embryos is that while creation of embryos by IVF would
only generate more embryos, generation of embryos by
SCNT would generate a specific kind of cell that might be
useful in treating disease by allowing autologous trans-
plant of a specific tissue type. Thus, in balancing the
moral concern over the creation of an embryo and the
value to society of the SCNT embryo, the potential ther-
apeutic uses of the resulting ES cells from SCNT embryos
must be evaluated carefully. At the present time, insuffi-
cient scientific evidence exists to evaluate this potential;
however, within the next several years, such information
should become more abundant. We recognize that if our
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recommendations are accepted, the most likely way that
this information will accumulate is through research
carried out in the private sector.
We are aware, however, that if the use of SCNT to cre-
ate embryos for research purposes were deemed to be
both scientifically and medically necessary, other ethical
issues still would need to be addressed. For example, we
would need to revisit the current prohibition on desig-
nating a recipient of fetal or embryonic tissue, in light of
the likelihood that this would be an important motivator
for producing such embryos.
The Arguments Relating to Federal
Funding of Research Involving the
Derivation and/or Use of ES and EG Cells
This chapter has described several issues that arise when
considering the ethical acceptability of stem cell research,
depending on the source of the ES or EG cells. These
issues are not unique to the source of funding, however,
as they could apply equally to stem cell research con-
ducted in either the private or public sector. Because our
main interest is in providing advice and guidance regard-
ing the federal government’s role in funding research that
involves the derivation and/or use of ES and EG cells, we
now turn to an examination of arguments both for and
against such funding. 
Arguments Against Federal Funding of Certain
Types of Human Stem Cell Research
In our deliberations, we considered three major argu-
ments against federal funding of certain types of stem cell
research: its association with abortion and embryo
destruction, objections by some citizens to having federal
funds used for research they consider to be objectionable,
and the possibility that federal funds could be used for
research using AS cells rather than ES or EG cells. Each
argument is briefly considered below.
Association with Abortion and Embryo Destruction
As discussed earlier, research in this area is contro-
versial in part because of the belief, held by some, that
there is a direct or indirect association with abortion. For
those who hold this belief, federal funding of research
that derives EG cells from cadaveric fetal tissue after elec-
tive abortion also would involve moral association with
the act of abortion.20 Similarly, federal funding for the use
of embryos remaining after infertility treatments to obtain
ES cells would involve the federal government in delib-
erately destroying biologically human entities.
Federal Funding for ES and/or EG Cell Research
Violates the Deeply Held Moral Beliefs of Some
Citizens
By funding research of this kind, opponents argue
that the federal government is violating the beliefs of
some citizens, including the belief that they should not
be required to subsidize a practice they consider to be
morally objectionable. If it is possible to achieve essen-
tially the same legitimate public goals with a policy that
does not offend some citizens’ sincere moral sensibilities,
it would be better to do so. Sometimes, the federal gov-
ernment decides not to support an activity because it
would be offensive to many people and because the ben-
efits lost from this support are minimal, either because
the activity is of only marginal value or because other
sponsors will ensure that a worthwhile activity receives
the support it needs. Not infrequently, however, activities
that produce valuable results and that are legitimate
objects of government funding receive such support
despite the objections raised by some taxpayers.
Providing such support does not violate democratic prin-
ciples or infringe on the rights of dissent of those in the
minority. Of course, the existence of such strongly held
dissenting views makes more necessary a careful assess-
ment of the arguments in favor of government support of
the activity.
Funding Alternative Sources of Stem Cell Research
Is Morally Preferable
The Commission has considered the argument that a
targeted and vigorous program that aims to develop alter-
native sources of human stem cells could discover ways
to achieve the same therapeutic goals with the use of
ethically less controversial means. As noted above and in
Chapter 2, research on AS cells is still developing and
should be encouraged, but on scientific grounds there is
good reason to believe that ES cells will provide a more
reliable source of cells that can differentiate into a variety
of tissues. It also should be noted that the harvesting of
AS cells is technically difficult and risky to human beings.
For some types of adult cells, such as bone marrow cells,
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a certain amount of pain and discomfort is involved. For
other types of stem cells, such as neuronal cells from the
brain, there are significant risks to the donor from the
brain biopsy procedure.
Although these objections to federal funding are
important, they are not decisive. Regarding the objection
based on association with wrongdoing, this report joins
others in supporting various safeguards in the context of
abortion in order to avoid any direct causal responsibility,
to reduce the likelihood of any indirect causal responsi-
bility, and to blunt symbolic association. Our report also
proposes safeguards to prevent inappropriate and unnec-
essary use of embryos that remain following IVF.
Regarding the second objection—avoiding offense to
those who are morally opposed to using embryos for this
purpose—we believe that public policy should avoid
such offense in cases where the costs are not great, and
we propose ways in which to reduce such offense.
However, in this area of moral controversy, we believe
that the arguments in favor of federal funding outweigh
the offense that federal funding would create for some.
Finally, we agree that alternative sources of stem cells
should be sought when possible and that federal funds
should be allocated to finding those sources. However, at
the same time, we believe that on balance the ethical
and scientific arguments support pursuing important
research with EG cells obtained from cadaveric fetal
tissue, with ES cells from embryos remaining after infer-
tility treatments, and with other promising alternative
sources. We now turn to additional arguments that lead
us to support federal funding for certain types of ES and
EG cell research.
Arguments in Favor of Federal Funding for
Certain Types of Stem Cell Research
One of the principal ethical justifications for public
sponsorship of research with human ES and EG cells is
the same as for all biomedical and behavioral research in
this country: Such research has the potential to produce
health benefits for individuals suffering from disease.
Many of the potential benefits of research using human
ES or EG cells are discussed in Chapter 2.
The appeal to the potential benefits of stem cell
research provides strong moral grounds for federal sup-
port of such research, but these potential benefits are not
necessarily sufficient to justify this support. The pursuit
of social benefit is always subject to moral constraint.
Concerns for justice and respect for the rights of individ-
uals can trump the morally laudable pursuit of potential
benefits. Such concerns also may justify additional
constraints on public funding of research. 
The Enhancement of Scientific Progress Through
Federal Support of the Derivation of ES Cells
Although ES cell lines already exist from studies con-
ducted in the past year, relying upon these lines or upon
the few other cell lines that might be derived by private
companies for basic research on human stem cells could
severely limit progress in this area of science. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, the potential to realize the possible
medical benefits of ES cells depends on additional
research into the nature and properties of ES cells. There
are three main scientific reasons why it is beneficial for a
broader segment of the scientific community to conduct
research that involves both the derivation and use of
ES cells.
First, there is great scientific value in understanding
the process of ES cell derivation. Basic scientists who are
interested in fundamental cellular processes are likely to
make important discoveries about the nature of ES cells
as they derive them in the laboratory. Moreover, by fund-
ing both derivation and use, under appropriate circum-
stances, federally funded researchers will be able to take
advantage of the knowledge that arises from a detailed
understanding of the source of the materials and the
methods of derivation. Experience with animal studies
indicates that research that involves both the derivation
and use of particular cell lines has the greatest probability
of generating promising new results.
Second, the properties of ES cells differ depending
upon the conditions that were used to derive them.
Moreover, the conditions for derivation of human ES
cells that will differentiate into all tissue types are not yet
fully understood by researchers. It is clear that the con-
ditions used for mouse ES cells do not translate directly
when using cells from other mammals. There is a signif-
icant amount of basic research that needs to be done
regarding the process of ES cell derivation before the ben-
efits from cell-based therapies can be realized.
Third, ES cells in culture are not stable indefinitely. As
the cells are grown in culture, irreversible changes occur
in their genetic makeup. Thus, especially in the first few
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years of human ES cell research, it is important to repeat-
edly derive ES cells to be sure that the properties of the
cells that are being studied have not changed.
The Benefits of Encouraging Both Public and
Private Support for ES and EG Cell Research
We anticipate that in order for stem cell research to
proceed most effectively, it will require an environment in
which both public and private funding will be available.
Indeed, in his testimony before the Commission, David
Blumenthal suggested that “since prohibition of federal
funding of stem cell research will result in reliance on pri-
vate companies to support almost all the investigation
utilizing stem cells, the differences between industrially
funded and publicly funded university investigation are
pertinent to your [deliberations].”21 Increasingly, research
is being supported and conducted by industry. Support
for biomedical research and development from private
sector pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
now outstrips the funding from all federal sources for this
research, and it is likely that the field will continue to
develop even if no federal funding is forthcoming. The
drug industry recently estimated that $24 billion will be
spent on drug research and development in 1999, up
from $2 billion in 1980 (PhRMA 1998). In light of this,
some might question whether federal funding for the
derivation and use of ES cells from embryos remaining
from infertility treatments is necessary for future progress
in this field.
We believe that a combination of federal and private
sector funding is more likely to produce rapid progress in
this field than would private sector funding alone. An
entire cadre of researchers is likely to be drawn into this
field of research through the establishment of a federal
funding program. Perhaps an analogy with the field of
higher education is useful. It would be possible for all
college and university education in the United States to
be offered solely by privately funded colleges or universi-
ties. However, the combination of publicly and privately
funded schools allows the higher education system as a
whole to capitalize on the unique strengths of each type
of institution. Competing, yet often working together, the
two types of institutions may be able to achieve levels of
excellence that neither type could achieve by itself.
Synergy from a Combined Federal Effort for
Research Involving Use and Derivation
Federal funding provides the opportunity for collab-
oration and coordination among a much larger group of
researchers. Moreover, the availability of federal funding
would likely increase greatly the number of scientists car-
rying out ES and EG cell research and thus increase the
chance of important findings. Federal support for
research will encourage basic research on the biology of
stem cells, in addition to the product-oriented research
typically supported by biotechnology firms that are
focused on developing marketable products. However, in
the long run, advances in the basic biology of stem
cells—for example, increased understanding of the con-
ditions and signals that lead stem cells to differentiate or
of the detailed mechanisms of differentiation—are essen-
tial for therapeutic advances. Such basic research will
require long-term efforts, which traditionally have been
supported by NIH.*
*Commissioner Capron makes the following observations: “As described in Chapter 3 and mentioned earlier in this chapter, NIH, relying on the opinion of the
General Counsel of DHHS, has concluded that the present rider to the Department’s appropriation allows the funding of research using but not deriving ES cells
from embryos because the latter would involve destroying embryos for research purposes. The alternative policy urged in this report would, in addition to its 
scientific benefits, also enable the federal government to play a stronger role in ensuring that ethically acceptable processes are used in deriving the ES cells that
federally supported scientists use in their research. Specifically, adopting a limited exception to the funding ban solely to allow support of ES cell line derivation
from embryos donated from fertility programs provides a stronger platform for the federal government to enforce the distinction between research using this
group of embryos and that which would use embryos created solely for research purposes.
Of course, even if NIH funds only ‘use’ research, it could still try to require that the ES cells used not be derived from embryos created for research purposes.
But its moral leverage is undermined by its own rationale: By insisting that federal funding of research using human ES cells does not implicate federal sponsors in
the process by which the ES cells have been derived, it limits its ability to mandate that one process rather than another be used. Plainly, federal law could restrict
federal support to activities that do not, for example, cause unlawful pollution; by extension, the limitation could extend to activities that do not purchase materials
that were produced in processes that pollute. In the present case, however, the appropriations rider bans federal support for research that creates or destroys
human embryos, which means that a federal agency cannot claim to be implementing federal policy were it to limit funding to research that uses only those 
ES cells that were derived from discarded embryos but not from embryos created for the purpose of deriving ES cells. Thus, NIH may be hard pressed to justify
differentiation based on the type of embryos from which ES cells are derived, thereby losing an opportunity to oversee the derivation process directly and to
enforce an important ethical distinction.
Adopting a limited exception to the embryo research ban solely for research to derive ES cells from embryos remaining from fertility programs would also
avoid relying on the theoretical line between derivation and use research that underlies the NIH policy. Such a line is difficult to defend in practical terms when
the question is not whether an activity is inherently licit or illicit but whether it ought to be paid for with federal research dollars. Any such line is merely
theoretical because the funding provided for research using ES cells would of course flow directly to researchers deriving those cells, perhaps even in an adjacent
laboratory. The only difference would be that the federal funds would not go directly as salary and laboratory expenses for the derivation process but indirectly in
the form of funds to purchase the ES cells (which funds would then pay salaries, laboratory expenses, and so forth).”
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Requiring That Recipients Conduct Their Research
in Accordance with the Federal Regulations 
As with all federally sponsored research, conditions
attached to funding provide the federal government with
the authority to require compliance with relevant regula-
tions, policies, and guidelines. Among these regulations
are those pertaining to human subjects research, tissue
donation and transplantation, oversight, and review. In
addition, federal funding agencies can stipulate that
recipients of federal funding for human stem cell research
must share both research results and research materials
(including cell lines) with other recipients of federal
funds or with all other researchers. Thus, federal funding
may lead to more widespread dissemination of findings
and sharing of materials, which ultimately may enhance
scientific discoveries.
In contrast, many privately funded studies require
that the scientists not distribute their findings until after
a review by the company and that materials can be
shared only after the institution receiving the materials
has signed a material transfer agreement. Some of these
agreements make it difficult for scientists to share or
secure the reagents necessary for their research, even if
they wish to do so. As the Institute of Medicine noted in
its report, Resource Sharing in Biomedical Research, “The
perception that scientific data and research materials
(e.g., animals, reagents, etc.) have potential commercial
value frequently causes universities to be even more
reluctant than individual scientists with respect to
sharing” (1996, 81). 
Sustaining U.S. Leadership in Science 
and Technology
In supporting federal funding for certain types of
stem cell research, we are not opposing research in the
private sector. On the contrary, we recognize the value for
the nation’s investment in science and technology for
research sponsored and conducted by both the public
and the private sectors and the quality of private sector
research. Indeed, stem cell research is receiving, and
probably will continue to receive, increasing support
from industry. There are, however, certain specific advan-
tages that arise from the federal investment in science
that should be acknowledged. An observation made by
the Office of Technology Assessment, in its 1986 report,
Research Funding as an Investment, is relevant in this
context.
The goal of federally funded research is not prof-
itability, but a means of achieving social objectives,
whether they are health, national security, or the
enhancement of knowledge and education. The
Federal research infrastructure is designed to provide
a stable environment for these goals, despite a chang-
ing political environment….In addition, Federal
research programs must be responsive to many more
groups than industrial research efforts, and this affects
the manner in which the research agenda is shaped.
(1986, 61)
Federal funding is probably required in order for the
United States to sustain a leadership position in this
increasingly important area of research. By funding
research, the federal government conveys the clear mes-
sage that, under particular conditions and constraints,
certain types of human stem cell research can be morally
legitimate research that is worthy of public support.
Just Distribution of Potential Benefits from
Stem Cell Research 
Much of the testimony we heard indicated that the
just distribution of the benefits of stem cell research,
including both the knowledge gained and any potential
therapeutic benefits, should be taken into account in any
recommendation that would permit the federal govern-
ment to support ES and EG cell research. For example,
there was widespread agreement among the religious
scholars who testified before us that in order for this
research to be morally acceptable, several “background
factors” must be in place, including equitable access to
the benefits of the research and appropriate prioritization
of this research relative to other social needs, both of
which involve procedural and substantive justice. (See
Appendix E.)
Issues of procedural and substantive justice are not
unique to stem cell research but rather arise in various
societal decisions about the use of funds for research,
medical care, and other goods. Although we can note
these issues here, we cannot resolve them. In addition,
federal funding of stem cell research does not guarantee
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that greater numbers of the American public will have
access to the fruits of basic or applied research or that this
will occur more quickly than it would if federal funding
were not available. However, by recommending federal
funding for certain types of human stem cell research, we
acknowledge that there is a basis for an argument for
broader access to any therapies developed from that
research.
Ethical Issues in Adopting Federal
Oversight and Review Policies for 
ES and EG Cell Research
Concerns have been expressed regarding the likelihood
of accountability depending on whether ES and EG cell
research is sponsored and/or conducted by the public or
private sector. Arthur Caplan, a bioethicist at the
University of Pennsylvania, in testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education and Related Agencies, said that
…it is better to do things in this area that are account-
able and public, than it is to ask them to become pri-
vate and commercial. And if we continue the policies
we have, we’re not going to be able to bring the
nuanced supervision and oversight that this area of
stem cell research requires from us….That’s why we
need public funding, public accountability, to make
the right tradeoffs.22
One of the principal benefits of federal funding of
biomedical and behavioral research is that it is relatively
easy to put in place an effective system of public over-
sight and review. By oversight, we are referring to the
mechanism of monitoring categories of research or other
activities to determine compliance with policies, proce-
dures, rules, guidelines, and regulations and to prevent
abuses. It is a policy strategy designed to provide the
appropriate checks and balances and ensure ethically
acceptable research protocols. The existing federal sys-
tem of oversight has its origins both in the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government: Congress,
through its appropriations authority, may (and often
does) direct that certain research be undertaken or avoided.
Seen in this way, federal oversight can provide the public
with two assurances: first, that stem cell research will
receive national attention and scrutiny through the
appropriations process undertaken by Congress; and
second, that stem cell research would be conducted in
accordance with relevant federal regulations. These over-
sight components are necessary but not sufficient for pro-
viding the public with confidence that research,
especially research involving human subjects, is being
undertaken appropriately. There also are mechanisms
maintained by individual agencies such as the Food and
Drug Administration.
In contrast, review usually refers to the evaluation of
individual research protocols involving human subjects
to assess their scientific merit and ethical acceptability—
the activity usually carried out by Institutional Review
Boards. As noted above, however, some research involv-
ing human stem cells may not be considered research
involving human subjects, as defined by the Common
Rule. In our view, the considerable sensitivity and public
concern regarding stem cell research merits both national
and local approaches to oversight and review, the details
of which are described in the following chapter. We are
persuaded that federal oversight and review of some
types of stem cell research is required in order to make
federal funding available to support such research. The
types of questions about ES and EG cell research that we
consider important for such an oversight and review
body to ask are enumerated in Appendix F.
Summary
We were asked by the President to thoroughly review the
issues associated with stem cell research, “balancing all
ethical and medical considerations.” In this chapter, we
have endeavored to do just that. Specifically, we recog-
nized that there are many different views on the ethical
appropriateness of this type of research and also on the
appropriateness of providing federal funding for such
research. We believe that the ethical arguments that sup-
port the use of federal funds for stem cell research using
cadaveric fetal tissue and for both deriving and using ES
cells from embryos remaining after infertility treatments
have considerable merit. However, such research should
be conducted only within the context of a framework of
national oversight and review. At the same time, we were
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not persuaded that we should recommend that federal
funds be available at this time for the creation of embryos
solely for research purposes. We arrived at these conclu-
sions with full awareness of the strongly held views (from
both religious and secular ethical perspectives) on all
sides of the main issues regarding the morality of stem
cell research.
Notes
1 The arguments presented here were helpfully informed by two
papers prepared for the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC) by Fletcher, J.C., 1999, “Deliberating Incrementally on
Human Pluripotential Stem Cell Research,” and Siegel, A.W., 1999,
“Locating Convergence: Ethics, Public Policy and Human Stem
Cell Research.” Both of these papers are available in Volume II of
this report.
2 Eiseman, E., 1999, “Quick Response: Use of Human Fetal Tissue
in Federally Funded Research.” This paper was prepared for NBAC
and is available in Volume II of this report.
3 Several terms have been used to refer to inappropriate connec-
tions between one agent’s actions and another agent’s wrongdoing.
We have mainly used the term association, but other terms include
cooperation, collaboration, and complicity. See, for example,
Childress (1990). For a discussion of cooperation and complicity
with evil in Roman Catholic moral theology, see Maguire (1986).
4 Pellegrino, E.D., Testimony before NBAC. May 7, 1999.
Washington, DC. Meeting transcript, 10.
5 For a summary of these positions, see Appendix E. 
6 Farley, M., Testimony before NBAC. May 7, 1999. Washington,
DC. Meeting transcript, 18.
7 Dorff, E., M. Tendler, L. Zoloth, A. Sachedina. Testimony before
NBAC. May 7, 1999. Washington, DC.
8 Dorff, E., Testimony before NBAC. May 7, 1999. Washington,
DC. Meeting transcript, 48. 
9 For a discussion of these issues see the paper prepared for NBAC
by Knowles, L.P., 1999, “International Perspectives on Human
Embryo and Fetal Tissue Research,” available in Volume II of this
report. 
10 King, P.A., Testimony before NBAC. January 19, 1999.
Washington, DC.
11 The terms liberal and conservative used here are used in the 
context intended by Dworkin (1994), Life’s Dominion.
12 Doerflinger, R., Written testimony before NBAC. April 16,
1999. Charlottesville, VA. Meeting transcript, 1.
13 Pellegrino, E.D., Testimony before NBAC. May 7, 1999.
Washington, DC. 
14 Demopulos, D., Testimony before NBAC. May 7, 1999.
Washington, DC. Meeting transcript, 89.
15 Ibid.
16 Meilaender, G., Testimony before NBAC. May 7, 1999,
Washington, DC.
17 Davis, D., Testimony before NBAC. May 7, 1999. Washington,
DC. Meeting transcript, 164. 
18 This opinion was provided by Flannery, E., 1999, in “Analysis
of Federal Laws Pertaining to Funding of Human Pluripotent Stem
Cell Research,” available in Volume II of this report. 
19 For a discussion of these issues see the paper prepared for
NBAC by Parens, E., 1999, “What Has the President Asked of
NBAC? On the Ethics and Politics of Embryonic Stem Cell
Research,” available in Volume II of this report.
20 It is important to note, however, that the abortion exceptions,
which serve as the basis for the type of shared views identified
above, are exceptions to the law banning federal funding for 
abortions (Title V, Labor, HHS, and Education Appropriations, 
112 Stat. 3681-385, Sec. 509 (a) (1)&(2)). Thus, federal funding
for research use of cadaveric fetal tissue, within appropriate limits,
might be viewed as consistent with current federal funding 
practices in the abortion context. 
21 Blumenthal, D., Written testimony before NBAC. February 2,
1999. Princeton, NJ. Meeting transcript, 1.
22 Caplan, A.L., Testimony before the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Labor, Health, and Human Services, Education
and Related Agencies. December 2, 1998.
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Introduction
In November 1998, President Clinton charged theNational Bioethics Advisory Commission with the
task of conducting a thorough review of the issues
associated with human stem cell research, balancing all
ethical and medical considerations. The President’s request
was made in response to three separate reports that
brought to the fore the exciting scientific and clinical
prospects of stem cell research while also raising a series
of ethical controversies regarding federal sponsorship of
scientific inquiry in this area. Such research raises ethical
issues because it involves the derivation of human embryonic
germ (EG) cells from aborted fetuses or the derivation of
human embryonic stem (ES) cells from early stage
embryos remaining after infertility treatments. A number
of these important ethical concerns previously have been
identified in public debate, both here and abroad. The
Commission reviewed these concerns in light of both the
medical and scientific promise in this significant new
field and the existing statutes and regulations that affect
research in this area. Our task, however, was neither to
engage in moral analysis for its own sake nor to address
all the regulatory issues that might be raised, but rather
to offer advice on how the balance of ethical, scientific,
and medical considerations should shape policies on
the use of federal funds to support research that involves
deriving or using human ES or EG cells.
Scientific and Medical Considerations 
The stem cell is a unique and essential cell type found in
animals. Many kinds of stem cells are found in the human
body, with some more differentiated, or committed, to a
particular function than others. In other words, when
stem cells divide, some of the progeny mature into cells
of a specific type (heart, muscle, blood, or brain cells),
while others remain stem cells, ready to repair some of
the everyday wear and tear undergone by our bodies.
These stem cells are capable of continually reproducing
themselves and serve to renew tissue throughout an indi-
vidual’s life. For example, they continually regenerate the
lining of the gut, revitalize skin, and produce a whole
range of blood cells. Although the term stem cell com-
monly is used to refer to those cells within the adult
organism that renew tissue (e.g., hematopoietic stem
cells, a type of cell found in the blood), the most funda-
mental and extraordinary of the stem cells are found in
the early stage embryo. These ES cells, unlike the more
differentiated adult stem (AS) cells or other cell types,
retain the special ability to develop into nearly any cell
type. EG cells, which originate from the primordial repro-
ductive cells of the developing fetus, have properties similar
to ES cells.
It is the potentially unique versatility of the ES and EG
cells derived, respectively, from the early stage embryo
and cadaveric fetal tissue that presents such unusual
scientific and therapeutic promise. Indeed, scientists have
long recognized the possibility of using such cells to gen-
erate more specialized cells or tissue, which could allow
the newly generated cells to be used to treat injuries or
diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease,
heart disease, and kidney failure. In addition, scientists
regard these cells as important—perhaps essential—in
understanding the earliest stages of human development
and in developing life-saving drugs and cell-replacement
therapies to treat disorders caused by early cell death or
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impairment. At the same time, the techniques for deriving
these cells have not been fully developed as standardized
and readily available research tools, and the development
of any therapeutic application remains some years away. 
Research also is under way to determine whether
human stem cells could be obtained from the differentiated
stem cells of fully developed organisms. Thus far, how-
ever, studies in animals indicate that this approach faces
substantial scientific and technical limitations; indeed,
the anatomic source of certain cells might preclude easy
or safe access in human beings. In addition, important
biological differences apparently exist between ES cells,
EG cells, and AS cells. Furthermore, differences among
species mean that for full scientific and clinical benefits to
be realized, some research will need to be conducted
with human ES and EG cells, even as the emphasis
remains on laboratory and animal research. In summary,
research using stem cells from animals or from human
adults is not a substitute for human ES and EG cell
research, and it is toward the latter that we direct our
ethical and policy analyses.
Ethical and Policy Considerations 
The longstanding controversy about the ethics of
research involving human embryos and cadaveric fetal
material arises from fundamental and sharply differing
moral views regarding elective abortion or the use of
embryos for research. Indeed, an earnest national and
international debate continues over the ethical, legal, and
medical issues that arise in this arena. This debate repre-
sents both a challenge and an opportunity: a challenge
because it concerns important and morally contested
questions regarding the beginning of life, and an oppor-
tunity because it provides another occasion for serious
public discussion about important ethical issues. We are
hopeful that this dialogue will foster public under-
standing about the relationships between the opportunities
that biomedical science offers to improve human welfare
and the limits set by important ethical obligations. 
Although we believe most would agree that human
embryos deserve respect as a form of human life, disagree-
ments arise regarding both what form such respect
should take and what level of protection is required at
different stages of embryonic development. Therefore,
embryo research that is not therapeutic to the embryo is
bound to raise serious concerns for some about how to
resolve the tensions between two important ethical com-
mitments: to cure disease and to protect human life. For
those who believe that from the moment of conception
the embryo has the moral status of a person, research (or
any other activity) that would destroy the embryo is
considered wrong and should be prohibited. For those
who believe otherwise, arriving at an ethically acceptable
policy in this arena involves a complex balancing of
many important ethical concerns. Although many of the
issues remain contested on moral grounds, they can exist
within a broad area of consensus upon which public policy
can, at least in part, be constructed. 
For most observers, the resolution of these ethical and
scientific issues depends to some degree upon the source
of the stem cells. The use of cadaveric fetal tissue to
derive EG cell lines—like other uses of tissues or organs
from dead bodies—is generally the most acceptable of
these sources, provided that the research complies with
the system of public safeguards and oversight already in
place for such scientific inquiry. With respect to embryos
and the ES cells from which they can be derived, some
draw an ethical distinction among three potential types
of embryos. One is referred to as the research embryo, an
embryo created through in vitro fertilization (IVF), with
gametes provided solely for research purposes. Many
people, including the President, have expressed the view
that the federal government should not fund research
that involves creating such embryos. The second type of
embryo is that which was created for treatment of infer-
tility, but is now intended to be discarded because it is
unsuitable or no longer needed for such treatment. The
use of these embryos raises fewer ethical questions
because it does not alter their final disposition. Finally,
the recent demonstration of cloning techniques (somatic
cell nuclear transfer [SCNT]) in nonhuman animals sug-
gests that the transfer of a human somatic cell nucleus
into an oocyte might create an embryo that could be used
as a source of ES cells. The creation of a human organism
using this technique raises questions similar to those
raised by the creation of research embryos through IVF,
and at this time federal funds may not be used for such
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research. In addition, if the enucleated oocyte that was to
be combined with a human somatic cell nucleus came
from a nonhuman animal, other issues would arise about
the nature of the embryo produced. Thus, each source of
material raises distinct ethical questions as well as
scientific, medical, and legal ones.
Conscientious individuals have reached different con-
clusions regarding both public policy and private actions
in the area of stem cell research. Their differing perspec-
tives by their very nature cannot easily be bridged by any
single public policy. But the development of such policy
in a morally contested area is not a novel challenge for a
pluralistic democracy such as that which exists in the
United States. We are profoundly aware of the diverse
and strongly held views on the subject of this report and
has wrestled with the implications of these different
views at each of our meetings devoted to this topic. Our
aim throughout these deliberations has been to formulate
a set of recommendations that fully reflects widely shared
views and that, in our view, would serve the best interests
of society.
Most states place no legal restrictions on any of the
means of creating ES and EG cells that are described in
this report. In addition, current Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulations do not apply to this
type of early stage research. (See Appendix D.) Therefore,
because the public controversy surrounding such activi-
ties in the United States has revolved around whether it
is appropriate for the federal government to sponsor such
research, this report focuses on the question of whether
the scientific merit and the substantive clinical promise of
this research justify federal support, and, if so, with what
restrictions and safeguards.
Views about the status of embryos and fetuses vary
widely. Some believe that what matters is the potential for
a new human life that arises at the moment of conception,
while others identify the relevant concept as personhood,
which they say begins only at some postembryonic stage.
We heard from many members of the public, including
those who are eager for this area of research to move for-
ward as rapidly as possible, as well as those who oppose
the research if it is built upon any activity that is con-
nected to abortion or to the destruction of fertilized
human eggs. In addition, our deliberations have been
informed by testimony from scientists and physicians,
lawyers and other experts in governmental regulation,
philosophers, and Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Islamic,
and Eastern Orthodox theologians. As a result of these
discussions, it has become clear that the question of
whether federal policy should sponsor human ES or EG
cell research is characterized by a tension between the
desire to realize the great therapeutic benefits that may be
derived from such work and the need to recognize that
the materials involved must be treated with respect. We
concluded that sufficient safeguards can be put in place
in order to prevent abuse and to ensure that any use of
embryos that remain after infertility treatments—like any
use of fetal remains following elective abortion—is based
upon and embodies the kind of respect for the embryos
that most Americans would expect and demand of any
activity that is carried out with the support of the federal
government. Beyond the regulatory effects of the rules
adopted to govern federal support for research in this
area—with which we hope private sponsors of research
involving ES and EG cells will comply voluntarily—the
states also can influence research in this field through
statutes and regulations on abortion, embryo research, and
the donation of human body parts, embryos, and gametes.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The conclusions and recommendations presented in this
chapter are grouped into several categories: 
n the ethical acceptability of federal funding for
research that either derives or uses ES or EG cells,
n the requirements for the donation of cadaveric fetal
tissue and embryos for research, 
n restrictions on the sale of these materials and 
designation of those who may benefit from their use,
n the need—and the means—for national oversight and
institutional review,
n the need for local review of derivation protocols, 
n the responsibilities of federal research agencies,
n the issues that must be considered regarding the 
private sector, and 
n the need for ongoing review and assessment. 
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The Ethical Acceptability of Federal Funding of
ES Cell and EG Cell Research 
Despite the enormous scientific and clinical potential
offered by research use of ES or EG cells derived from
various sources, many find that certain sources are more
ethically problematic than others. Our recommendations
reflect respect for these diverse views, which varied even
among the Commissioners, regarding the ethical accept-
ability of the derivation and use of ES and EG cells from
various sources. 
As described in Chapter 2, human ES and EG cells
can be derived from the following sources:
n human fetal tissue following elective abortion (EG cells),
n human embryos that are created by IVF and that are
no longer needed by couples being treated for infer-
tility (ES cells),
n human embryos that are created by IVF with gametes
donated for the sole purpose of providing research
material (ES cells), and
n potentially, human (or hybrid) embryos generated
asexually by SCNT or similar cloning techniques in
which the nucleus of an adult human cell is intro-
duced into an enucleated human or animal ovum
(ES cells).
A principal ethical justification for public sponsorship
of research with human ES or EG cells is that this
research has the potential to produce health benefits for
those who are suffering from serious and often fatal
diseases. We recognize that it is possible that all the 
various sources of human ES or EG cells eventually could
be important to research and clinical application because
of, for example, their differing proliferation potential, 
differing availability and accessibility, and differing ability
to be manipulated, as well as possibly significant differ-
ences in their cell biology.
Although each source of stem cells poses its own
scientific, ethical, and legal challenges and opportunities,
much of the ethical analysis leading to public policy
recommendations depends upon the scientific and/or
clinical necessity of using a specific source of the cells.
In our judgment, the immediate scientific uses of ES or
EG cells can be satisfied by the derivation and use of
cell lines derived from fetal tissues (i.e., EG cells) and
from embryos (i.e., ES cells) remaining after infertility
treatments have ended. 
The potential use of matched tissue for autologous
cell-replacement therapy from ES cells may in the future
require the use of cell lines developed by SCNT tech-
niques. In addition, embryos created through IVF
specifically as a source of ES cells might be essential for
creating banks of multiple cell lines representing a spec-
trum of alleles for the major histocompatibility complex.
This goal might require that ova and sperm of persons
with specific genotypes be selected to make embryos
from which to derive particular classes of ES cells.
Finally, although much promising research currently
is being conducted with stem cells obtained from adult
organisms, studies in animals suggest that this approach
will be scientifically and technically limited, and, in some
cases, the anatomic source of the cells might preclude
easy or safe access. Important research can and should 
go forward in this area, although important biological
differences exist between ES and AS cells, and the use of
AS cells should not be considered an alternative to ES
and EG cell research.
Much research into the generation of specific tissue
types from stem cells can be conducted using EG cells
derived from fetal material and ES cells derived from
embryos remaining after infertility treatments. In the
future, adequate scientific evidence and increased
prospect for medical benefits may be available to generate
public support for using human ES cells derived from
embryos produced through IVF for research purposes or
by SCNT for autologous transplant. We note, however,
that a responsible federal science policy does not neces-
sarily require public funding for access to all sources of
ES or EG cells at once. At this time, therefore, the
Commission believes that federal funding for the use
and derivation of ES and EG cells should be limited
to two sources of such material: cadaveric fetal tissue
and embryos remaining after infertility treatments.
Specific recommendations and their justifications are
provided below.
Recommendation 1: 
Research involving the derivation and use of
human EG cells from cadaveric fetal tissue should
continue to be eligible for federal funding.
Relevant statutes and regulations should be
amended to make clear that the ethical safeguards
that exist for fetal tissue transplantation also
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apply to the derivation and use of human EG cells
for research purposes.
Considerable agreement exists, both in the United
States and throughout the world, that the use of fetal 
tissue in therapy for those with serious disorders, such as
Parkinson’s disease, is acceptable.1 Research that uses
cadaveric tissue from aborted fetuses is analogous to the
use of fetal tissue in transplantation. The rationales for
conducting EG research are equally strong, and the argu-
ments against it are not persuasive. The removal of fetal
germ cells does not occasion the destruction of a live
fetus, nor is fetal tissue intentionally or purposefully 
created for human stem cell research. Although abortion
itself doubtless will remain a contentious issue in our
society, the procedures that have been developed to pre-
vent fetal tissue donation for therapeutic transplantation
from influencing the abortion decision offer a model for
creating such separation in research to derive human EG
cells. Because the existing statutes are written in terms of
tissue transplantation, which is not a current feature of
EG cell research, changes are needed to make explicit
that the relevant safeguards will apply to research to
derive EG cells from aborted fetuses. 
Due to the contentious and polarizing nature of the
abortion debate in the United States, restrictions were
enacted over a decade ago to block the use of federal
funding of fetal tissue transplantation therapy research.
Until 1993, the only permissible source of tissue for such
research was tissue from spontaneously aborted fetuses
or ectopic pregnancies—sources that were largely unsuit-
able for research. In 1993, President Clinton lifted the
ban on the use of fetal tissue from elective abortions for
fetal tissue transplantation research. 
Previous moral opposition to fetal tissue transplant
research, because of its association with abortion, helped
shape a system of safeguards to prevent the encourage-
ment of the practice. These rules require that the consent
process for women making abortion decisions must
precede separately from the consent process for donation
of fetal tissue for transplant research. Although some
disagree, sufficient consensus exists that society should
respect the autonomous choices of women who have
chosen to have legal abortions to donate fetal tissue for
research. If women have a right to choose to have an
abortion, it follows that the self-determination or
autonomy expressed in that right extends to the choice 
to donate fetal tissue for research purposes.
Research using fetal tissue obtained after legal elective
abortions will greatly benefit biomedical science and also
will provide enormous therapeutic benefits to those
suffering from various diseases and other conditions. In
our view, there is no overriding reason for society to
discourage or prohibit this research and thus forgo an
important opportunity to benefit science and those who
are suffering from illness and disease—especially in light
of the legality of elective abortions that provide access to
fetal tissue and of the risks involved in losing these
valuable opportunities. Indeed, the consequences of for-
going the benefits of the use of fetal tissue may well be
harmful. Moreover, if not used in research, this tissue will
be discarded.
The Acceptability of Federal Support for
Research Using Embryos Remaining After
Infertility Treatments to Derive ES Cells
The current congressional ban on embryo research
prohibits federal support of any research “in which a
human embryo…[is] destroyed, discarded, or knowingly
subjected to risk of injury greater than that allowed for
research on fetuses in utero.” 2 The term human embryo in
the statute is defined as “any organism, that is derived by
fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means
from one or more human gametes or human diploid cells.” 
The ban, which concerns only federally sponsored
research, reflects a moral stance either that embryos
deserve some measure of protection from society because
of their moral status as persons, or that sufficient public
controversy exists such that federal funds should not be
used for this type of research. However, some effects of
the embryo research ban raise serious moral and public
policy concerns for those who hold differing views of the
ethics of embryo research. In our view, the ban conflicts
with several of the ethical goals of medicine, especially
healing, prevention, and research—goals that are rightly
characterized by the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence, jointly encouraging the pursuit of each
social benefit and avoiding or ameliorating potential harm.
In the United States, moral disputes—especially those
concerning certain practices in the area of human repro-
duction—are sometimes resolved by denying federal
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funding for those practices (e.g., elective abortion), while
not interfering with the practice in the private sector. In
this case, investigative embryo research guided only by
self-regulation is a widespread practice in the private
sector, and the ban on embryo research has served to
discourage the development of a coherent public policy,
not only regarding embryo research but also regarding
health research more generally. The ban also may have
more profound effects on other areas of federally sup-
ported research that are dedicated to the relief of human
suffering, raising concerns about the distribution and
allocation of federal research resources. For example, by
limiting the federal government’s ability to fund promising
areas of basic research, a complete ban on embryo
research could prevent promising, collaborative studies
in other areas, such as cancer and genetics. We recognize
that many factors affect how federal research priorities
are set in this country. However, in our view, the inten-
tional withholding of federal funds for research that may
lead to promising treatments may be considered unjust
or unfair.
Although no consensus has been reached regarding
the moral status of the embryo, there is agreement that if
embryo research is permissible, some limitations and/or
regulations are necessary and appropriate. Such regulation
reflects an appreciation of the disparate views regarding
the acceptability and unacceptability of this area of
scientific investigation and serves as a way of providing
accountability, allaying public anxiety, promoting
beneficial research, and demonstrating respect for human
embryos. 
Recommendation 2: 
Research involving the derivation and use of
human ES cells from embryos remaining after
infertility treatments should be eligible for federal
funding. An exception should be made to the pres-
ent statutory ban on federal funding of embryo
research to permit federal agencies to fund
research involving the derivation of human ES
cells from this source under appropriate regula-
tions that include public oversight and review.
(See Recommendations 5 through 9.)
Based on advice from the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) General Counsel, the Director
of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) announced in
January 1999 that NIH will apply the ban only to
research involving the derivation of ES cells from human
embryos but not to research involving only the use of ES
cells. NIH has indicated that research proposals that
involve the use of ES cells will be considered for funding
once NIH has established a set of special guidelines that
are currently under development. The DHHS General
Counsel concluded that ES cells are not, in themselves,
organisms and hence cannot be embryos as defined by
the statute. Thus, it could be surmised from this inter-
pretation that the only activity that could amount to
“research in which a human embryo or embryos are
destroyed” would be an attempt to derive ES cells from
living embryos. This, in fact, is the interpretation adopted
by DHHS and NIH. More than 70 members of Congress
have protested this interpretation, claiming that whatever
the language of the statute, Congress clearly intended to
prohibit not just research in which human embryos are
destroyed but also research that depends on the prior
destruction of a human embryo. Yet the plain meaning of
the statutory wording differs from this interpretation, and
nothing in its legislative history indicates that either pro-
ponents or opponents of the rider anticipated a situation
in which research that destroyed the embryo would be
conducted separately from research that used the cells
derived from the embryo. Thus, in legal terms, the
General Counsel’s interpretation appears to be reason-
able, even though it does not address any of the ethical
concerns involved.
Although some may view the derivation and use of ES
cells as ethically distinct activities, we believe that it is
ethically acceptable for the federal government to finance
research that both derives cell lines from embryos
remaining after infertility treatments and that uses those
cell lines. Although one might argue that some important
research could proceed in the absence of federal funding
for research that derives stem cells from embryos remain-
ing after infertility treatments (i.e., federally funded
scientists merely using cells derived with private funds),
we believe that it is important that federal funding be
made available for protocols that also derive such cells.
Relying on cell lines that might be derived exclusively
by a subset of privately funded researchers who are
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interested in this area could severely limit scientific and
clinical progress.
An ethical problem is presented in trying to separate
research in which human ES cells are used from the
process of deriving those cells, because doing so dimin-
ishes the scientific value of the activities receiving federal
support. This division—under which neither biomedical
researchers at NIH nor scientists at universities and other
research institutions who rely on federal support could
participate in some aspects of this research—rests on the
mistaken notion that derivation and use can be neatly
separated without affecting the expansion of scientific
knowledge. We believe that this misrepresentation of 
the new field of human stem cell research has several
implications.
First, researchers using human ES cell lines will
derive substantial scientific benefits from a detailed
understanding of the process of ES cell derivation,
because the properties of ES cells and the methods for
sustaining the cell lines may differ depending upon the
conditions and methods used to derive them. Thus,
scientists who conduct basic research and who are inter-
ested in fundamental cellular processes are likely to make
elemental discoveries about the nature of ES cells as they
derive them in the laboratory. Second, significant basic
research must be conducted regarding the process of ES
cell derivation before cell-based therapies can be fully
realized, and this work must be pursued in a wide
variety of settings, including those exclusively devoted to
basic academic research. Third, ES cells are not indefi-
nitely stable in culture. As these cells are grown, irre-
versible changes occur in their genetic makeup. Thus,
especially in the first few years of human ES cell research,
it is important to be able to repeatedly derive ES cells in
order to ensure that the properties of the cells that are
being studied have not changed.
Thus, anyone who believes that federal support of
this important new field of research should maximize its
scientific and clinical value within a system of appropriate
ethical oversight should be dissatisfied with a position
that allows federal agencies to fund research using
human ES cells but not research through which the cells
are derived from embryos. Instead, recognizing the close
connection in practical terms between the derivation and
the use of these cells, it would be preferable to enact
provisions that apply to funding by all federal agencies,
provisions that would carve out a narrow exception for
funding of research to use or to derive human ES cells
from embryos that would otherwise be discarded by
infertility treatment programs.
The Ethical Acceptability of Creating 
Embryos Through IVF Specifically as a 
Source of ES Cells
ES cells can be obtained from human research
embryos created from donor gametes through IVF for the
sole purpose of deriving such cells for research. The pri-
mary objection to creating embryos specifically for
research is that many believe that there is a morally rele-
vant difference between producing an embryo for the
sole purpose of creating a child and producing an
embryo with no such goal. Those who object to creating
embryos for research often appeal to arguments that
speak to respecting human dignity by avoiding the
instrumental use of human embryos (i.e., using embryos
merely as a means to some other goal does not treat them
with appropriate respect or concern as a form of human
life). Currently, we believe that cadaveric fetal tissue and
embryos remaining after infertility treatments provide an
adequate supply of research resources for federal research
projects involving human embryos. Therefore, embryos
created specifically for research purposes are not needed
at the current time in order to conduct important
research in this area.
Recommendation 3: 
Federal agencies should not fund research
involving the derivation or use of human ES cells
from embryos made solely for research purposes
using IVF.
In 1994, the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel
argued in support of federal funding of the creation of
embryos for research purposes in exceptional cases, such
as the need to create banks of cell lines with different
genetic make-ups that encoded various transplantation
antigens—the better to respond, for example, to the
transplant needs of groups with different genetic profiles.
Such a project would require the recruitment of embryos
from genetically diverse donors.
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A number of points are worth considering in deter-
mining how to deal with this issue. First, it is possible
that the creation of research embryos will provide the
only opportunity to conduct certain kinds of research—
such as research into the process of human fertilization.
Second, as IVF techniques improve, it is possible that the
supply of embryos for research from this source will
dwindle. Nevertheless, we have concluded that, either
from a scientific or a clinical perspective, there is no
compelling reason to provide federal funds for the
creation of embryos for research at this time.
The Use of SCNT to Obtain ES Cells
The use of SCNT to transfer the nucleus of an adult
somatic cell into an enucleated human egg likely has the
potential of creating a human embryo. To date, although
little is known about these embryos as potential sources
of human ES cells, there is significant reason to believe
that their use may have therapeutic potential. For example,
the possible use of matched tissue for autologous cell-
replacement therapy from ES cells may require the use of
SCNT. Arguably, the use of this technique to create an
embryo is different from the other cases we have consid-
ered—because of the asexual origin of the source of the
ES cells—although oocyte donation is necessarily
involved. We conclude that at this time, because other
sources are likely to provide the cells needed for the
preliminary stages of research, federal funding should
not be provided to derive ES cells from SCNT.
Nevertheless, the medical utility and scientific progress of
this line of research should be monitored closely.
Recommendation 4: 
Federal agencies should not fund research involv-
ing the derivation or use of human ES cells from
embryos made using SCNT into oocytes.
Requirements for the Donation of Cadaveric
Fetal Tissue and Embryos for Research 
Potential donors of embryos for ES cell research must
be able to make voluntary and informed choices about
whether and how to dispose of their embryos. Because of
concerns about coercion and exploitation of potential
donors, as well as controversy regarding the moral status
of embryos, it is important, whenever possible, to sepa-
rate donors’ decisions to dispose of their embryos from
their decisions to donate them for research. Potential
donors should be asked to provide embryos for research
only if they have decided to have those embryos 
discarded instead of donating them to another couple 
or storing them. If the decision to discard the embryos
precedes the decision to donate them for research 
purposes, then the research determines only how their
destruction occurs, not whether it occurs.
Recommendation 5: 
Prospective donors of embryos remaining after
infertility treatments should receive timely, rele-
vant, and appropriate information to make
informed and voluntary choices regarding disposi-
tion of the embryos. Prior to considering the
potential research use of the embryos, a prospec-
tive donor should have been presented with the
option of storing the embryos, donating them to
another woman, or discarding them. If a prospec-
tive donor chooses to discard embryos remaining
after infertility treatment, the option of donating
to research may then be presented. (At any point,
the prospective donors’ questions—including
inquiries about possible research use of any
embryos remaining after infertility treatment—
should be answered truthfully, with all informa-
tion that is relevant to the questions presented.) 
During the presentation about potential research
use of embryos that would otherwise be discarded,
the person seeking the donation should
a) disclose that the ES cell research is not intended
to provide medical benefit to embryo donors,
b) make clear that consenting or refusing to donate
embryos to research will not affect the quality of
any future care provided to prospective donors,
c) describe the general area of the research to be
carried out with the embryos and the specific
research protocol, if known,
d) disclose the source of funding and expected
commercial benefits of the research with the
embryos, if known,
e) make clear that embryos used in research will
not be transferred to any woman’s uterus, and
f) make clear that the research will involve the
destruction of the embryos.
This proposal also stresses the separation that 
existing laws and policies seek between the pregnant
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woman’s decision to abort and her decision to donate
cadaveric fetal tissue for transplantation research.
Recommendation 1 proposes to extend that separation to
the donation of cadaveric fetal tissue for stem cell
research. It may be difficult to achieve this separation in
making decisions about embryos that remain after infer-
tility treatments, in part because potential donors at the
outset of treatment may have chosen to donate them to
research. But, however difficult it may be to achieve, this
separation will reduce the chance that potential donors
could be pressured or coerced into donating their
embryos for stem cell research.
The parts of this recommendation that deal with pro-
viding information to donors are designed to ensure that
potential donors understand the range of available
options and that their decisions are not influenced by
anticipated personal medical benefits or by concerns
about the quality of subsequent care; that they under-
stand that the research will involve the destruction of 
the embryos; and that they understand the nature of the
proposed research, its source of funding, and its antici-
pated commercial benefits, if known. Several additional
suggested information items are proposed in a document
entitled “Points to Consider in Evaluating Basic Research
Involving Human Embryonic Stem Cells and Embryonic
Germ Cells,” presented in Appendix F.
Although the ethical considerations that support the
prohibition of the designated donation of human fetal
tissue are less acute for EG cell research than they are
for transplantation, cause for concern remains. Potential
donors of cadaveric fetal tissue for EG cell derivation
would not have a direct therapeutic incentive to create or
abort tissue for research purposes, as might occur in a
transplant context. However, we agree that the prohibi-
tion remains a prudent and appropriate way to assure
that no incentive—however remote—is introduced into
a woman’s decision to have an abortion. Any suggestion
of personal benefit to the donor or to an individual
known to the donor would be untenable and potentially
coercive. Thus, the potential donor should be informed
both before and after the decision to donate that there 
is no obligation to make such a gift, that no personal
benefit will accrue as a result of the decision to donate,
and that no penalty or sanction will result from a decision
to refuse to donate.
Recommendation 6: 
In federally funded research involving embryos
remaining after infertility treatments, researchers
may not promise donors that ES cells derived from
their embryos will be used to treat patient-subjects
specified by the donors.
Current provisions regulating fetal tissue research (42
USC § 289g-1 and g-2) have been narrowly interpreted
by NIH and DHHS to apply only where fetal cellular
material is intended for transfer into a living human
recipient for therapeutic or clinical purposes. No compa-
rable rules exist for human embryos. We believe that this
statute should be applied more broadly to include any
research involving human fetal or embryonic tissue,
regardless of its immediate or eventual therapeutic bene-
fit or intended method of intervention. Advances in EG
cell research have demonstrated that bioethical concerns
are not limited to fetal tissue transplantation.
As noted in Chapter 3, the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act (UAGA), currently enacted in some form in all 50
states and the District of Columbia, also may require clar-
ification. Current versions of the UAGA explicitly permit
donors to make an anatomical gift of the human body or
body parts. Because a fetus is included within the UAGA’s
definition of decedent, either directly or by implication
depending upon the statutory language enacted, the
statute’s anatomical gift provision undermines any federal
prohibition of designated donation of human fetal tissue.
What would otherwise qualify for federal statutory 
preemption is clouded by provisions of the NIH
Revitalization Act of 1993 and the federal Common Rule,
which direct that fetal tissue transplant researchers must
abide by local and state laws, including (by implication)
the UAGA.
Finally, if and when sufficient scientific evidence
becomes available, clinical benefits are clearly anticipated,
and agreement is reached among the various elements in
society that the creation of embryos specifically for
research or therapeutic purposes is justified (specifically
through the use of SCNT), prohibitions on directed
donation should be revisited. For obvious reasons, the
use of SCNT to develop ES cells for autologous trans-
plantation might require that the recipient be specified.
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Prohibitions Against the Sale 
of Embryonic and Fetal Material
Existing rules prohibit the practice of designated
donation, the provision of monetary inducements to
women undergoing abortion, and the purchase or sale of
fetal tissue. We concur in these restrictions and in the
recommendation of the 1988 Human Fetal Tissue
Transplantation Research Panel that the sale of fetal tissue
for research purposes should not be permitted under any
circumstances. The potential for coercion is greatest
when financial incentives are present, and the treatment
of the developing human embryo or fetus as an entity
deserving of respect may be greatly undermined by the
introduction of any commercial motive into the donation
or solicitation of fetal or embryonic tissue for research
purposes.
Recommendation 7: 
Embryos and cadaveric fetal tissue should not be
bought or sold.
Policies already in place state that no for-profit trade
in fetal tissue should be permitted, and some recommend
that the “prohibition on commercial exchange of fetuses
and fetal tissue extend to tissues imported from other
countries” (Canadian Royal Commission 1993). This pro-
hibition is intended to prevent the exploitation of poor
women—especially those in developing countries—who
might be persuaded to begin and end pregnancies for
money. An important distinction must be made between
the possible exploitation of persons that occurs when
they are coerced or inappropriately induced to sell parts
of their bodies and the exchanges that occur when com-
panies, research institutions, or other groups provide
reasonable compensation. This is a familiar issue in dis-
cussions about remuneration for participation in research
and about which federal regulations defer to Institutional
Review Boards (IRBs) for their judgment.
Current regulations (42 USC §§ 289g-2(a), 289g-
2(b)(3), 274e, and 42 CFR § 46.206(b)) attempt to codify
this recommendation. Further, depending upon whether
a state has enacted the most recent revision of the UAGA
(and not all states have enacted the UAGA restriction)
and has included the fetus within its definition of
decedent, the sale of fetal remains may or may not be
prohibited by individual state statutes. Many states appear
to rely on federal statutes and regulations to prohibit fetal
tissue sale, and none address human embryos, except by
implication.
We strongly encourage those who will draft modified
legislation to frame their language in clear terms that are
specifically defined. In particular, terms such as valuable
consideration, processing, and reasonable payments require
precise definitions.
We believe that, with respect to these regulations,
different categories of research intermediaries should be
treated differently. One approach would be to establish
three intermediary categories: 1) entities responsible for
tissue harvest or embryo collection, 2) entities responsible
for stem cell derivation or other preresearch preparation
and postderivation investigators; and 3) de minimis inter-
mediaries (including courier or supply services, off-site
specimen evaluation, pathological or chemical analysis
for research suitability, and other insignificant non- or
preresearch patient or specimen interactions). We believe
that the first category warrants the greatest degree of
regulation. An abortion provider, IVF clinic, or other
third party responsible for obtaining consent and/or col-
lecting biological materials should not be able to commer-
cially solicit, pay for, or be paid for the fetal or embryonic
material it obtains (permitting only a specifically defined,
cost-based reimbursement exception for entities in that
category). By placing such prohibitions against paying
those who obtain the embryos, it is our intention to
discourage the creation of excess embryos during routine
infertility procedures, which would later be used for
research purposes. 
The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) prohibi-
tion on tissue sale (42 USC § 274e(a)) has been criticized
for a statutory construction that focuses exclusively on
the sale of human organs. Although we agree that fetal
organ sale (as well as the sale of embryonic material)
should be prohibited, we believe that NOTA’s terms are
unacceptably narrow and that pre-organ tissues charac-
teristic of early fetal and embryonic development should
be included in the tissue sale prohibition.
The Need for National Oversight and Review
The need for national oversight and review of ES and
EG cell research is crucial. At present, no such system
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exists in the United States. A national mechanism to
review protocols for deriving human ES and EG cells and
to monitor research using such cells would ensure strict
adherence to guidelines and standards across the country.
Thus, federal oversight can provide the public with the
assurance that research involving stem cells is being
undertaken appropriately. Given the ethical issues
involved in ES and EG cell research—an area in which
heightened sensitivity about the very research itself led
the President to request that the Commission study the
issue—the public and the Congress must be assured that
oversight can be accomplished efficiently, constructively,
in a timely fashion, and with sufficient attention to the
relevant ethical considerations.
Several countries, such as the United Kingdom, have
recommended the establishment of regulatory boards or
national commissions to license and regulate assisted
reproductive treatments and embryo research. The use of
a national oversight mechanism of this kind has certain
advantages, particularly because the use of law to regulate
(rather than to set limits) in this area would be burden-
some, given the rapid development of biomedical science
and technology. On the other hand, some kind of national
commission or authority could provide the necessary
flexibility and adaptability, and, in addition, such an entity
could ensure more consistent ongoing application of
safeguards as well as greater public accountability.3
In 1994, the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel
considered and then explicitly rejected reconstituting the
Ethics Advisory Board (EAB) for the purpose of reviewing
proposals involving embryos or fertilized eggs: 
Although revisiting the EAB experience offers the
potential for public consensus development and a
consistent application of the new guidelines, it
nonetheless has significant disadvantages. These
include the creation of an additional standing govern-
ment board, the likelihood of significant delay before
embryo research could be funded in order to meet
legal requirements for new rulemaking prior to the
official creation of the government body, and possible
further delay if all proposals for embryo research were
required to be considered individually by an EAB-
type board, despite appearing to be consistent with a
developed consensus at NIH about acceptability for
funding (1994, 72).
Instead, the NIH panel recommended that 
national review of all protocols by a diverse group of
experts is warranted for a time. It is the hope of the
Panel that this ad hoc group will develop additional
guidance gained from experience with actual protocols
that can be communicated to IRBs through existing
mechanisms at NIH (1994, 73).
These recommendations envisioned a time when, fol-
lowing sufficient experience by the ad hoc panel, guide-
lines for embryo research review could be decentralized
to the local IRBs. (It was recommended that the ad hoc
panel function for at least three years.) We used similar
reasoning in a previous report when recommending that
the Secretary of Health and Human Services convene a
Special Standing Panel to review certain categories of
research involving persons with mental disorders (NBAC
1998). Like the NIH panel, we did not specify when such
guidelines could be decentralized; but unlike the NIH
panel, we did recommend that the panel be a standing
rather than an ad hoc body.
The NIH panel’s recommendations must be viewed in
the context of its reporting relationship: the panel was
charged with advising the NIH Director about research
that could be sponsored or conducted by that agency. We
note that NIH is not the only federal agency that might
be interested in sponsoring or conducting research
involving human stem cells; thus, some accommodation
must be made for the review of proposals that are not
funded by NIH. 
Other elements of the NIH panel’s recommendation
also require additional assessment. For example, the
panel recommended that “all such research proposals
continue to be specially monitored by the councils and
the NIH Office for Protection from Research Risks
[OPRR]” (1994, 74). We are less sanguine than the NIH
panel about the ability of OPRR to provide the needed
oversight and monitoring for ES and EG cell research at
this time, particularly given the recent decision to move
this office from NIH to DHHS. Although OPRR’s role in
the oversight of human subjects research, like that of the
FDA, remains central to the structure of human subjects
protections in this country, we believe that at this time,
an additional mechanism is needed for the review and
oversight of federally sponsored research involving
human ES and EG cells.
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We do, however, share the concern of the 1994 NIH
panel, investigators, and IRBs that the process of protocol
review should not be viewed as simply a bureaucratic
hurdle that researchers must successfully leap solely to
satisfy a procedural or regulatory requirement. Done
well, protocol review often improves the quality of studies
by identifying concerns in the areas of study design,
selection of subjects, recruitment, informed consent, and
dissemination of results.
Recommendation 8: 
DHHS should establish a National Stem Cell
Oversight and Review Panel to ensure that all 
federally funded research involving the derivation
and/or use of human ES or EG cells is conducted
in conformance with the ethical principles and
recommendations contained in this report. The
panel should have a broad, multidisciplinary
membership, including members of the general
public, and should
a) review protocols for the derivation of ES and
EG cells and approve those that meet the
requirements described in this report,
b) certify ES and EG cells lines that result from
approved protocols,
c) maintain a public registry of approved protocols
and certified ES and EG cell lines,
d) establish a database—linked to the public 
registry—consisting of information submitted
by federal research sponsors (and, on a volun-
tary basis, by private sponsors, whose propri-
etary information shall be appropriately
protected) that includes all protocols that
derive or use ES or EG cells (including any
available data on research outcomes, including
published papers),
e) use the database and other appropriate sources
to track the history and ultimate use of certi-
fied cell lines as an aid to policy assessment
and formulation,
f) establish requirements for and provide guid-
ance to sponsoring agencies on the social and
ethical issues that should be considered in the
review of research protocols that derive or use
ES or EG cells, and
g) report at least annually to the DHHS Secretary
with an assessment of the current state of the
science for both the derivation and use of
human ES and EG cells, a review of recent
developments in the broad category of stem
cell research, a summary of any emerging 
ethical or social concerns associated with this
research, and an analysis of the adequacy and
continued appropriateness of the recommenda-
tions contained in this report.
We recommend several functions that the panel
should carry out. In order to accomplish its purposes, the
panel should maintain a public registry of federally fund-
ed protocols that employ or derive human ES and EG
cells and, to the degree possible, a comprehensive listing
of privately funded protocols. The purpose of the registry
is to make it possible to track not only the protocols
themselves and their adherence to the principles
described above, but also their outcomes and the out-
comes of all research based on their results. The panel
should be able to describe the history and trajectory of
research that uses these cells and to guard against the
promiscuous use of the cells. As they are submitted, new
federally funded protocols involving the derivation of ES
cells must include a statement that only certified cell lines
will be used.
Knowledge about the history and ultimate outcome
and use of research using human ES and EG cells should
be open to the public. Thus, the information accumulated
by the panel through the registry should be used not only
for ethical review, but also for public education. This is
an important educational and informational function 
that may encourage the active participation of the private
sector in the registry—even in the absence of any federal
regulatory requirement to do so. In addition, within five
years, the panel and the registry should be independ-
ently reviewed. This review, which should include an
evaluation of the processes of the oversight and review
mechanisms, will help to determine whether the level 
of limitations on this area of research is appropriate as
well as to determine whether case-by-case review of 
derivation protocols is still warranted.
There are several benefits to a national review process
for all federally funded research on ES and EG cells.
These include preventing ethically problematic research,
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assuring the public that the research is scientifically
meritorious and ethically acceptable; providing informa-
tion by which to evaluate issues of social justice in the
use of the knowledge or other products of the research;
providing public oversight of controversial research prac-
tices; assuring consistency in the review of protocols;
evaluating this type of research; and educating the public. 
Although we are aware that NIH will likely conduct
and/or fund the majority of federally sponsored stem cell
research in the country and will be developing its own set
of guidelines for the conduct of ES and EG cell research,
we are persuaded that it is important to distance to some
degree the review and oversight of stem cell research from
what is the principal source of funding in this country. 
The proximity of NIH within DHHS (our recommended
location for the panel) makes it possible for a number of
beneficial arrangements to develop. These include devel-
oping requirements for data sharing as a condition for
receiving grants; developing guidelines for sharing cell
lines; and providing a common review mechanism for
other federal agencies that are conducting/funding
research involving ES and EG cells (e.g., through a
Memorandum of Understanding).
The Need for Local Review 
of Derivation Protocols
For more than two decades, prospective review by an
IRB has been the principal method for assuring that 
federally sponsored research involving human subjects
will be conducted in compliance with guidelines, policies,
and regulations designed to protect human beings from
harm. This system of local review has been subject to
criticism, and, indeed, in previous analyses we have
identified a number of concerns regarding this system of
review. In preparing this report, we considered a number
of proposals that would allow for the local review of
research protocols involving human ES and EG cell
research, bearing in mind that a decision by the
Commission to recommend a role for IRBs might be
incorrectly interpreted as endorsing the view that human
ES or EG cells or human embryos are human subjects.
We adopted the principle, reflected in these recom-
mendations, that for research involving the derivation of
ES and EG cells, a system of national oversight and
review would be needed to ensure that important federal
sponsorship of stem cell research could proceed—but
only under specific conditions. We recognized that for
such research proposals, many of the ethical issues could
be considered at the local level—that is, at the institu-
tions where the research would be conducted. In general,
the IRB is an appropriate body for reviewing protocols
that aim to derive ES or EG cells. Although few review
bodies (including IRBs) have extensive experience in the
review of such protocols, IRBs remain the most visible
and expert entities available. It is for this reason, for
example, that a number of recommendations presented
in this report (8, 9, 10, 11, and 12) discuss the impor-
tance of developing additional guidance for the review of
protocols that involve human stem cell research.
Recommendation 9: 
Protocols involving the derivation of human ES
and EG cells should be reviewed and approved by
an IRB or by another appropriately constituted
and convened institutional review body prior to
consideration by the National Stem Cell Oversight
and Review Panel. (See Recommendation 8.) This
review should ensure compliance with any
requirements established by the panel, including
confirming that individuals or organizations (in
the United States or abroad) that supply embryos
or cadaveric fetal tissue have obtained them in
accordance with the requirements established by
the panel.
As noted earlier, for research proposals that involve
the derivation of human ES or EG cells, particular ethical
issues require attention through a national review
process. However, this process should begin at the local
level, because institutions that intend to conduct research
involving the derivation of human ES cells or EG cells
should continue to take responsibility for ensuring the
ethical conduct of that research. More important, however,
IRBs can play an important role—particularly by reviewing
consent documents and by assuring that collaborative
research undertaken by investigators at foreign institu-
tions has satisfied any regulatory requirements for the
sharing of research materials.
We noted in Chapter 3 that currently there is no
definitive answer to the question of whether the
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Common Rule, 45 CFR 46, and/or Subpart B apply to
research involving fetal tissue transplantation, to human
embryo research, and by extension to EG and ES cell
research. If the regulations do apply, then IRBs would be
expected to review protocols, consistent with the regula-
tory requirements. We have indicated, however, that
even if these regulations do not apply, we believe that
IRBs should be expected to review derivation protocols to
assess their ethical acceptability without having to com-
mit to a position that the activities are human subjects
research as defined by the regulations. If, as a matter 
of public policy, ES and EG cell research were found to
be human subjects research, certain clarifying changes 
in the regulations might be needed. For example,
Subpart B would need to provide clearly that any living
donor of human biological material constitutes a human
subject for purposes of research protection, and IRB
review and informed consent under all subparts of the
DHHS version of the Common Rule would need to apply.
Similarly, we have made clear that the authorization a
woman may give to donate fetal tissue following an elec-
tive abortion may better be understood as consent to
donate—analogous to donating organs—rather than as
providing informed consent for research participation.
Even if these models differ, the principle we adopt
remains the same: opportunity for consent should rest
exclusively with the individual or individuals legally
empowered to assume a donative role.4
Responsibilities of Federal Research Agencies
We have recommended that protocols involving the
derivation of ES or EG cells should be reviewed by both a
local review group and the national panel described in
Recommendation 8. For protocols that involve only the
use but not the derivation of ES or EG cells, oversight
and review are still necessary, but these protocols do not
require reliance on such a system. In our judgment, these
protocols can be appropriately reviewed using the
existing system for the submission, review, and approval
of research proposals that is in place at federal research
agencies, which includes the use of a peer review
group—sometimes called a study section or initial review
group—that is established to assess the scientific merit of
the proposals. In addition, in some agencies, such as
NIH, staff members review protocols before they are
transmitted to a national advisory council for final
approval. These levels of review all provide an opportu-
nity to consider ethical issues that arise in the proposals.
When research proposals involve human subjects, in order
to assure that it is ethically acceptable, federal agencies
rely on local IRBs for review and approval. (See
Recommendation 9.) At every point in this continuum—
from the first discussions that a prospective applicant
may have with program staff within a particular institute
to the final decision by the relevant national advisory
council—ethical and scientific issues can be addressed 
by the sponsoring agency. But even if—based on a par-
ticular interpretation of the federal regulation—these
research proposals do not involve human subjects, we
believe the system of oversight and review can adequately
address the relevant ethical issues. 
Recommendation 10:
All federal agencies should ensure that their
review processes for protocols using human ES or
EG cells comply with any requirements estab-
lished by the National Stem Cell Oversight and
Review Panel (see Recommendation 8), paying
particular attention to the adequacy of the justifi-
cation for using such cell lines.
Research involving human ES and EG cells raises 
critical ethical issues, particularly when the proposals
involve the derivation of ES cells from embryos that
remain after infertility treatments. We recognize that
these research proposals may not follow the paradigm
that is usually associated with human subjects research.
Nevertheless, research proposals that are being consid-
ered for funding by federal agencies must, in our view,
meet the highest standards of scientific merit and ethical
acceptability. To that end, the recommendations made in
this report, including a proposed set of points to consider
in evaluating basic research involving human ES cells and
EG cells (see Appendix F), constitute a set of ethical and
policy considerations that should be reflected in the
respective policies of federal agencies conducting or
sponsoring human ES or EG cell research. 
Attention to Issues for the Private Sector
Although this report primarily addresses the ethical
issues associated with the use of federal funds for
research involving the derivation and/or use of ES and
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EG cells, we recognize that considerable work in both of
these areas will be conducted under private sponsorship.
Thus, our recommendations may have implications for
those working in the private sector. First, for cell lines to
be eligible for use in federally funded research, they 
must be certified by the National Stem Cell Oversight
and Review Panel described in Recommendation 8.
Therefore, if a private company aims to make its cell lines
available to publicly funded researchers, it must submit
its derivation protocol(s) to the same oversight and
review process recommended for the public sector, (i.e.,
local review; see Recommendation 9) and for certification
by the proposed national panel that the cells have
been derived from embryos remaining after infertility
treatments or from cadaveric fetal tissue.
Second, we hope that nonproprietary aspects of proto-
cols developed under private sponsorship will be made
available in the public registry, as described in
Recommendation 8. The greater the participation of the
private sector in providing information on human ES and
EG cell research, the more comprehensive the develop-
ment of the science and related public policies in this area.
Third, and perhaps most relevant in an ethically 
sensitive area of emerging biomedical research, it is
important that all members of the research community,
whether in the public or private sector, conduct the
research in a manner that is open to appropriate public
scrutiny. During the last two decades, we have witnessed
an unprecedented level of cooperation between the public
and private sectors in biomedical research, which has
resulted in the international leadership position of the
United States in this area. Public bodies and other
authorities, such as the Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee, have played a crucial role in enabling impor-
tant medical advances in fields such as gene therapy by
providing oversight of both publicly and privately funded
research efforts. We believe that voluntary participation
by the private sector in the review and certification pro-
cedures of the proposed national panel, as well as in its
deliberations, can contribute equally to the socially
responsible development of ES and EG cell technologies
and accelerate their translation into biomedically impor-
tant therapies that will benefit patients.
Recommendation 11:
For privately funded research projects that involve
ES or EG cells that would be eligible for federal
funding, private sponsors and researchers are
encouraged to adopt voluntarily the applicable
recommendations of this report. This includes
submitting protocols for the derivation of ES or
EG cells to the National Stem Cell Oversight and
Review Panel for review and cell line certification.
(See Recommendations 8 and 9.)
In this report, we recommend that federally funded
research that involves the derivation of ES cells should be
limited to those efforts that use embryos that remain after
infertility treatments. Some of the recommendations
made in this context—such as the requirement for sepa-
rating the decision by a woman to cease infertility treat-
ment when embryos still remain from her decision to
donate those embryos to research—simply do not apply
to efforts to derive ES cells from embryos created
(whether by IVF or by SCNT) solely for research 
purposes—activities that might be pursued in the private
sector. Nevertheless, other ethical standards and safe-
guards embodied in the recommendations, such as pro-
visions to prevent the coercion of women and the
promotion of commerce in human reproduction, remain
vitally important, even when embryos are created solely
for research purposes.
Recommendation 12: 
For privately funded research projects that involve
deriving ES cells from embryos created solely for
research purposes and that are therefore not eligi-
ble for federal funding (see Recommendations 3
and 4)
a) professional societies and trade associations
should develop and promulgate ethical safe-
guards and standards consistent with the prin-
ciples underlying this report, and
b) private sponsors and researchers involved in
such research should voluntarily comply with
these safeguards and standards.
Professional societies and trade associations dedicated
to reproductive medicine and technology play a central
role in establishing policy and standards for clinical care,
research, and education. We believe that these organizations
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can and should play a salutary role in ensuring that all
embryo research conducted in the United States, includ-
ing that which is privately funded, conforms to the ethi-
cal principles underlying this report. Many of these
organizations already have developed policy statements,
ethics guidelines, or other directives addressing issues in
this report, and we have benefited from a careful review
of these materials. These organizations are encouraged to
review their professional standards to ensure not only
that they keep pace with the evolving science of human
ES and EG cell research, but also that their members are
knowledgeable about and in compliance with them. For
those organizations that conduct research in this area but
that lack statements or guidelines addressing the topics of
this report, we recommend strongly that they develop
such statements or guidelines. No single institution or
organization, whether in the public or the private sector,
can provide all the necessary protections and safeguards.
The Need for Ongoing Review and Assessment
No system of federal oversight and review of such a
sensitive and important area of investigation should be
established without at the same time providing an evalu-
ation of its effectiveness, value, and ongoing need. The
pace of scientific development in human ES and EG cell
research likely will increase. Although one cannot predict
the direction of the science of human stem cell research,
in order for the American public to realize the promise of
this research and to be assured that it is being conducted
responsibly, close attention to and monitoring of all the
mechanisms established for oversight and review are
required.
Recommendation 13: 
The National Stem Cell Oversight and Review
Panel described in Recommendation 8 should be
chartered for a fixed period of time, not to exceed
five years. Prior to the expiration of this period,
DHHS should commission an independent evalua-
tion of the panel’s activities to determine whether
it has adequately fulfilled its functions and
whether it should be continued.
There are several reasons for allowing the national
panel to function for a fixed period of time and for eval-
uating its activities before it continues its work. First,
some of the hoped-for results will be available from
research projects that are using the two sources we con-
sider to be ethically acceptable for federal funding. Five
years is a reasonable period in which to allow some of this
information to amass, offering the panel, researchers, mem-
bers of Congress, and the public sufficient time to deter-
mine whether any of the knowledge or potential health
benefits are being realized. The growing body of informa-
tion in the public registry and database described above
(particularly if privately funded researchers and sponsors
voluntarily participate) will aid these considerations.
Second, within this period the panel may be able to
determine whether additional sources of ES cells are 
necessary in order for important research to continue.
Two arguments have been offered for supporting research
using embryos created specifically for research purposes:
One is the concern that not enough embryos remain for
this purpose from infertility treatments, and the other is
the recognition that some research requires embryos that
are generated for specific research and/or medical pur-
poses. The panel should assess whether additional
sources of ES cells that we have judged to be ineligible for
federal funding at this time (i.e., embryos created solely
for research purposes) are legitimately needed.
Third, an opportunity to assess the relationship
between local review of protocols using human ES and EG
cells and the panel’s review of protocols for the derivation
of ES cells will be offered. It will, of course, take time for
this national oversight and review mechanism to develop
experience with the processes of review, certification, and
approval described in this report.
Fourth, we hope that the panel will contribute to the
broad and ongoing national dialogue on the ethical issues
regarding research involving human embryos. A recurring
theme of our deliberations, and in the testimony we
heard, was the importance of encouraging this national
conversation.
The criteria for determining whether the panel has
adequately fulfilled its functions should be set forth by an
independent body established by DHHS. However, it
would be reasonable to expect that the evaluation would
rely generally on the seven functions described above in
Recommendation 8 and that this evaluation would be
conducted by a group with the requisite expertise. In
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addition, some of the following questions might be con-
sidered when conducting this evaluation: Is there reason
to believe that the private sector is voluntarily submitting
descriptions of protocols involving the derivation of
human ES cells to the panel for review? Is the panel
reviewing projects in a timely manner? Do researchers
find that the review process is substantively helpful? Is
the public being provided with the assurance that social
and ethical issues are being considered?
Summary
Recent developments in human ES and EG cell research
have raised the prospect that new therapies will become
available that will serve to relieve human suffering. These
developments also have served to remind society of the
deep moral concerns that are related to research involv-
ing human embryos and cadaveric fetal tissue. Serious
ethical discussion will (and should) continue on these
issues. However, in light of public testimony, expert
advice, and published writings, we have found substan-
tial agreement among individuals with diverse perspec-
tives that although the human embryo and fetus deserve
respect as forms of human life, the scientific and clinical
benefits of stem cell research should not be foregone. We
were persuaded that carrying out human ES cell research
under federal sponsorship is important, but only if it is
conducted in an ethically responsible manner. After
extensive deliberation, the Commission believes that
acceptable public policy can be forged, in part, based
upon these widely shared views. Through this report, we
not only offer recommendations regarding federal fund-
ing and oversight of stem cell research, but also hope to
further stimulate the important public debate about 
the profound ethical issues regarding this potentially
beneficial research.
Notes
1 Use of fetal tissue in research is also permitted in Canada, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and in most countries in the European
Union. Germany, for example, does not permit embryo research
but does permit the use of fetal tissue for the derivation of EG
cells. The German statement concerning human ES cells upholds
the ban on destructive embryo research, effectively banning the
derivation of ES cells, because the option of deriving EG cells
exists in that country. See the German statement concerning the
question of human ES cells, March 1999, 8–10 (DFG 1999).
2 Public Law No. 105-78, 513(a) (1997).
3 EGE Opinion (1998) at Art. 2.11. See also the Australian NHMRC
Guidelines (1996) advocating that complementary national assisted
reproductive technology standards or legislation be adopted in the
Australian States.
4 See Fed. Reg. 27804, proposed rule 45 CFR § 46.204(d)-(e) and
Table 1, “Current and Proposed 45 CFR 46, Subpart B,” 27798,
explanatory text (“consent of the father is not required”; rather,
“consent of the mother or her legally authorized representative is
required” [after she is]...“informed of the reasonably foreseeable
impact of the research on the fetus”).
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a February 1999 request from the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission for input on the scientific, med-
ical, and ethical issues involved in human stem cell
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religious, and health organizations were asked to provide
their perspectives on these complex issues. The
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We are also grateful to Michelle Myer, a graduate
student at the University of Virginia, for preparing a
summary of the presentations that were provided to the
Commission on May 7, 1999, on religious perspectives
relating to research involving human stem cells. The
summary appears as Appendix E of this report.
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adult stem (AS) cells – stem cells found in the adult
organism (e.g., in bone marrow, skin, and intestine) that
replenish tissues in which cells often have limited life
spans. They are more differentiated than embryonic stem
(ES) cells or embryonic germ (EG) cells.
ART (assisted reproductive technology) – all treatments
or procedures that involve the handling of human eggs
and sperm for the purpose of helping a woman become
pregnant. Types of ART include in vitro fertilization,
gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian trans-
fer, embryo cryopreservation, egg or embryo donation,
and surrogate birth.
blastocyst – a mammalian embryo in the stage of devel-
opment that follows the morula. It consists of an outer
layer of trophoblast to which is attached an inner cell
mass.
blastomere – one of the cells into which the egg divides
after its fertilization; one of the cells resulting from the
division of a fertilized ovum.
chimera – an organism composed of two genetically
distinct types of cells.
cloning – the production of a precise genetic copy of a
molecule (including DNA), cell, tissue, plant, or animal.
differentiation – the specialization of characteristics or
functions of cell types.
diploid cell – the cell containing two complete sets of
genes derived from the father and the mother respectively;
the normal chromosome complement of somatic cells (in
humans, 46 chromosomes).
ectoderm – the outer layer of cells in the embryo; the
origin of skin, the pituitary gland, mammary glands, and
all parts of the nervous system.
embryo – 1) the beginning of any organism in the early
stages of development, 2) a stage (between the ovum and
the fetus) in the prenatal development of a mammal, 
3) in humans, the stage of development between the sec-
ond and eighth weeks following fertilization, inclusive.
embryonic stem (ES) cells – cells that are derived from
the inner cell mass of a blastocyst embryo.
embryonic germ (EG) cells – cells that are derived from
precursors of germ cells from a fetus.
endoderm – the innermost of the three primary layers of
the embryo; the origin of the digestive tract, the liver, the
pancreas, and the lining of the lungs.
ex utero – outside of the uterus.
fibroblast – a cell present in connective tissue, capable of
forming collagen fibers.
gamete – 1) any germ cell, whether ovum or spermato-
zoon, 2) a mature male or female reproductive cell.
gastrulation – the process of transformation of the
blastula into the gastrula, at which point the embryonic
germ layers or structures begin to be laid out.
germ cells – gametes (ova and sperm) or the cells that
give rise directly to gametes.
haploid cell – a cell with half the number of chromosomes
as the somatic diploid cell, such as the ova or sperm. In
humans, the haploid cell contains 23 chromosomes. 
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in vivo – in the natural environment (i.e., within the body).
in vitro – in an artificial environment, such as a test tube
or culture medium.
in vitro fertilization (IVF) – a process by which a
woman’s eggs are extracted and fertilized in the laborato-
ry and then transferred after they reach the embryonic
stage into the woman’s uterus through the cervix.
Roughly 70 percent of assisted reproduction attempts
involve IVF, using fresh embryos developed from a
woman’s own eggs.
karyotype – the chromosome characteristics of an
individual cell or of a cell line, usually presented as a
systematic array of metaphase chromosomes from a
photograph of a single cell nucleus arranged in pairs in
descending order of size.
mesoderm – the middle of the three primary germ lay-
ers of the embryo; the origin of all connective tissues, all
body musculature, blood, cardiovascular and lymphatic
systems, most of the urogenital system, and the lining of
the pericardial, pleural, and peritoneal cavities.
morula – 1) the mass of blastomeres resulting from the
early cleavage divisions of the zygote, 2) solid mass of
cells resembling a mulberry, resulting from the cleavage
of an ovum.
oocyte – 1) a diploid cell that will undergo meiosis (a
type of cell division of germ cells) to form an egg, 2) an
immature ovum.
ovum – female reproductive or germ cell.
pluripotent cells – cells, present in the early stages of
embryo development, that can generate all of the cell
types in a fetus and in the adult and that are capable of
self-renewal. Pluripotent cells are not capable of develop-
ing into an entire organism. 
pre-implantation embryo – 1) the embryo before it has
implanted in the uterus, 2) commonly used to refer to 
in vitro fertilized embryos before they are transferred to a
woman’s uterus.
somatic cells – [from soma - the body] 1) cells of the
body which in mammals and flowering plants normally
are made up of two sets of chromosomes, one derived
from each parent, 2) all cells of an organism with the
exception of germ cells.
stem cells – cells that have the ability to divide indefi-
nitely and to give rise to specialized cells as well as to new
stem cells with identical potential.
totipotent – having unlimited capacity. Totipotent cells
have the capacity to differentiate into the embryo and
into extra-embryonic membranes and tissues. Totipotent
cells contribute to every cell type of the adult organism. 
trophoblast – the outermost layer of the developing blas-
tocyst of a mammal. It differentiates into two layers, the
cytotrophoblast and syntrophoblast, the latter coming
into intimate relationship with the uterine endometrium
with which it establishes nutrient relationships.
zygote – 1) the cell resulting from the fusion of two
gametes in sexual reproduction, 2) a fertilized egg
(ovum), 3) the diploid cell resulting from the union of a
sperm and an ovum, 4) the developing organism during
the first week after fertilization.
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An Overview of Food and Drug
Administration Regulations Pertinent to
Human Cellular Materials and Tissues
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has had inplace a regulatory framework for cellular and tissue
materials that has evolved over time as the development
and use of such biological materials for therapeutic pur-
poses has increased. The Public Health Service Act (PHS
Act), 42 USC 262 and 264, the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), 21 USC 201 et seq., and
implementing regulations of the FDA provide the agency
with broad authority to regulate both the research into
and the use of human stem cells that are intended to be
used as biological products, drugs, or medical devices in
order to prevent, treat, cure, or diagnose a disease or con-
dition.2 Scientific research not intended for use in the
development of any FDA-regulated product is not under
the oversight and control of the FDA.
In order for the FDA to assert its regulatory authority
over stem cell-related research and products, such
research and products must fall within one of the prod-
uct categories over which the FDA exercises jurisdiction
and must move in interstate commerce. To the extent that
the FDA determines that a particular product falls within
the definition of a biological product, a drug, or a med-
ical device, it will assert its jurisdiction. Whether a par-
ticular product falls within the definition of any of the
FDA-regulated product categories will depend, in part,
upon the intended use of the product. 
The manufacturer’s objective intent—as evidenced by
labeling, promotional, and other relevant materials for
the product—has long been regarded as the primary
source for establishing a product’s intended use and thus
its status for purposes of FDA regulation.3 Although this
approach would seem to grant manufacturers unlimited
control over the regulatory status of their products,
courts in fact have recognized the FDA’s right to look
beyond the express claims of manufacturers in order to
consider more subjective indicia of intent—such as the
foreseeable and actual use of a product—to prove that its
intended use subjects it to agency jurisdiction.4
Regardless of whether the FDA or the manufacturer 
is characterizing the intended use of a product for pur-
poses of evaluating FDA jurisdiction, it is clear that FDA
regulatory authority will not extend automatically to all
scientific research on stem cells. Indeed, to the extent
that such nonhuman research is preliminary in nature
and/or is undertaken without intent to develop a thera-
peutic product, stem cell research is not subject to FDA
jurisdiction. Thus, for example, basic research to develop
stem cell models to evaluate the safety and efficacy of
therapeutic products would not be regulated directly.
Instead, the FDA would review any scientific data gener-
ated from such a model and submitted as part of a mar-
keting application. It is only at the juncture when the
science of stem cell research has progressed to the point
that development of a particular therapeutic product and
its use in humans is envisioned that FDA regulatory
authority will apply, and further research then must be
conducted in compliance with FDA requirements.
Even if a product falls within one of the defined cate-
gories over which the FDA asserts its jurisdiction, no
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statutory authority over the product exists unless it moves
in interstate commerce. The FDA takes an expansive view
of what constitutes interstate commerce; in regard to bio-
logical products, the FDA has been particularly aggres-
sive. For example, in its 1993 policy statement regarding
somatic cell therapy products, the FDA concluded that
[t]he interstate commerce nexus needed to require
premarket approval under the statutory provisions
governing biological products and drugs may be cre-
ated in various ways in addition to shipment of the
finished product by the manufacturer. For example,
even if a biological drug product is manufactured
entirely with materials that have not crossed State
lines, transport of the product into another State by
an individual patient creates the interstate commerce
nexus. If a component used in the manufacture of the
product moves interstate, the interstate commerce
prerequisite for the prohibition against drug mis-
branding is also satisfied even when the finished
product stays within the State. Products that do not
carry labeling approved in a PLA (or NDA) are mis-
branded under section 502(f)(1) of the [FD&C]
Act....Moreover, falsely labeling a biological product
is prohibited under section 351(b) of the PHS Act
without regard to any interstate commerce nexus (42
U.S.C. 262(b)) (58 Fed. Reg. at 53250). 
It can be expected that the FDA would apply the same
logic to all cellular and tissue materials that are used in
the prevention, treatment, cure, or diagnosis of a disease
or condition.
Application to Stem Cells
In recent congressional testimony, National Institutes
of Health Director Harold Varmus described three poten-
tial applications of research using human “pluripotent
stem cells” that illustrate the inconsistencies of FDA reg-
ulation. He noted that the FDA does not regulate two of
the examples, but will regulate one. First, stem cell
research could include basic research such as “the identi-
fication of the factors involved in the cellular decision-
making process that determines cell specialization.”5
Second, “[h]uman pluripotent stem cell research could
also dramatically change the way we develop drugs and
test them for safety and efficacy. Rather than evaluating
safety and efficacy of a candidate drug in an animal
model of a human disease, these drugs could be tested
against a human cell line that had been developed to
mimic the disease process.”6 It is unlikely that the FDA
would regulate either of these potential applications
directly. Varmus also made the following comments:
Perhaps the most far-reaching potential application of
human pluripotent stem cells is the generation of cells
and tissue that could be used for transplantation, so-
called cell therapies. Pluripotent stem cells stimulated
to develop into specialized cells offer the possibility of
a renewable source of replacement cells and tissue to
treat a myriad of diseases, conditions and disabilities
including Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease, spinal
cord injury, stroke, burn, heart disease, diabetes,
osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis.7
These stem cell products, based on their intended use,
would be subject to FDA regulation.
Case-by-Case Regulation
The FDA has been cautious in exercising its regulatory
discretion regarding cellular and tissue materials and in
fact never has overseen a single regulatory program for
human cellular and tissue-based products. Instead, the
FDA has regulated these products on a case-by-case
basis, responding as it deemed appropriate to the partic-
ular characteristics of and concerns raised by each type of
product.8
One example has been the FDA’s approach to regu-
lating bone marrow. Although for years the FDA has
licensed blood and blood components pursuant to sec-
tion 351 of the PHS Act (42 USC 262), it voluntarily has
refrained from regulating minimally manipulated bone
marrow, the earliest source of stem cells used for trans-
plantation, despite its status as a blood component.
Indeed, not until the early 1990s did the FDA announce
that to the extent that bone marrow was subject to exten-
sive manipulation prior to transplantation, it would be
treated the same as somatic cell therapy and gene therapy
products subject to the investigational new drug (IND)
regulations and would require PHS Act licensure (58 Fed.
Reg. 53248, 53249 (Oct. 14, 1993)). 
Also in 1993, in response to concerns regarding the
transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) and other infectious diseases, the FDA published an
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emergency final rule that mandated certain processing,
testing, and recordkeeping procedures for specific types
of tissue products.9 This rule, however, did not mandate
premarket approval or notification for all tissues, but
rather provided, among other things, for donor screen-
ing, documentation of testing, and FDA inspection of
tissue facilities.10
Another example of the FDA’s case-by-case approach
is the publication in 1996 of a guidance that stated that
manipulated autologous structural cells (autologous
cells manipulated and then returned to the body for
structural repair or reconstruction) would be subject to
PHS licensure.11 In addition, until recently, the FDA
carefully chose not to regulate reproductive tissues.
Then, in 1997, it proposed that, in the future, certain
reproductive tissues (i.e., semen, ova, and embryos)
should be regulated in some form.
Traditional tissue products (including but not limited
to bone, skin, corneas, and tendons) also have been sub-
ject to the FDA’s piecemeal regulatory approach.
Historically, the FDA regulated these products on an ad
hoc basis as medical devices under section 201 of the
FD&C Act. However, with the advent of HIV and the
potential for its transmission, the FDA concluded in the
early 1990s that a more comprehensive program for 
regulating the use of traditional tissues was necessary. In
1991, the FDA concluded that human heart valves were
medical devices subject to premarket approval require-
ments.12 Following litigation, the FDA decided that while
these products were indeed medical devices, they would
not be subject to premarket approval requirements.13 In
defining tissue subject to this rule, the FDA exempted
a number of products, including vascularized organs,
dura mater, allografts, and umbilical cord vein grafts.
A New Approach to Regulating Human
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products
In February 1997 the FDA proposed a new approach to the
regulation of human cellular and tissue-based products.
This framework is intended to “protect the public health
without imposing unnecessary government oversight”
(“Reinventing the Regulation of Human Tissue,” National
Performance Review, February 1997). Although it is still
considered a proposed approach, the 1997 document
utilizes FDA’s existing statutory authority under the
PHS and FD&C Acts to regulate a broad array of cellu-
lar and tissue materials. The framework proposed is a
tiered approach to regulation (FDA, “A Proposed
Approach to the Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products,” February 28, 1997). Products that
pose increased risks to health or safety would be sub-
ject to increased levels of regulation (i.e., either licen-
sure under the PHS Act or premarket approval under
the FD&C Act), while products that pose little or no
risk of transmitting infectious disease would be subject
to minimal regulation (e.g., facility registration and
product listing). However, products that are 1) highly
processed (more-than-minimally manipulated); 2) are
used for other than their usual purpose; 3) are combined
with nontissue components (e.g., devices or other thera-
peutic products); or 4) are used for metabolic purposes
(e.g., systemic, therapeutic purposes) will be subject to
clinical investigation as INDs, must be documented with
investigational device exemption applications (IDEs),
and will be subject to premarket approval as biological
products, medical devices, or new drugs.
This proposed approach addresses the FDA’s regula-
tion of stem cell products. In the case of a minimally
manipulated product for autologous use and allogeneic
use of cord blood stem cells by a close blood relative, the
FDA has proposed requiring compliance with standards
consistent with section 361 of the PHS Act, rather than
an IND and licensure pursuant to section 351 of the act.
However, minimally manipulated products that will be
used by an unrelated party will be regulated under sec-
tion 351 of the Act. The FDA also intends to develop
standards—including disease screening requirements,
establishment controls, processing controls, and product
standards: “If sufficient data are not available to develop
processing and product standards after a specified period
of time, the stem cell products would be subject to IND
and marketing application requirements.”14 Stem cell
products that are more-than-minimally manipulated will
require INDs and licensing under section 351 of the PHS
Act. For example, stem cell products that are to be used
for a nonhomologous function or are more-than-mini-
mally manipulated will be required to be licensed under
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section 351. The FDA also has articulated “increased
safety and effectiveness concerns for cellular and tissue-
based products that are used for nonhomologous func-
tion, because there is less basis on which to predict the
product’s behavior.”15
Implementation of the Proposed Approach
The FDA has begun to implement the proposed
approach with the publication on January 20, 1998,
of a Request for Proposed Standards for Unrelated
Allogeneic Peripheral and Placental/Umbilical Cord Blood
Hematopoietic Stem/Progenitor Cell Products” (63 Fed.
Reg. 2985 ), utilizing its standards-setting authority under
section 361 of the PHS Act.16 In this notice, the FDA
requests product standards to ensure the safety and
effectiveness of stem cell products, which should be
supported by clinical and nonclinical laboratory data.
The FDA also announced its intention to phase in over a
three-year period implementation of IND application and
license application requirements for minimally manipu-
lated unrelated allogeneic hematopoietic stem/progenitor
cell products. The notice states that “[i]f adequate infor-
mation can be developed, the agency intends to issue
guidance for establishment controls, processing controls,
and product standards....FDA intends to propose that, in
lieu of individual applications containing clinical data,
licensure may be granted for products certified as meet-
ing issued standards.” If, however, the FDA determines
that adequate standards cannot be developed, the agency
has expressed its intention to enforce IND and licensing
requirements at the end of three years. Proposals are due
on or before January 20, 2000.
On May 14, 1998, the FDA proposed Establishment
Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of Human
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products (63 Fed. Reg. 26744).
The agency describes the proposed registration and list-
ing requirements as a first step towards accomplishing its
goal of putting into place a comprehensive new system of
regulation for human cellular and tissue-based products.
Registration and listing is intended to allow the FDA to
assess the state of the cell and tissue industry, “to accrue
basic knowledge about the industry that is necessary for
its effective regulation,” and to facilitate communication
between the agency and industry (Ibid. at 26746). As
proposed, the registration and listing requirements
would apply to human cellular and tissue-based products
that the FDA will regulate under section 361 of the PHS
Act.17 Among the products designated for regulation
under that section and consequently subject to registra-
tion and listing are bone, tendons, skin, corneas, as well
as peripheral and cord blood stem cells under certain
conditions, and sperm, oocytes, and embryos for repro-
ductive use (Ibid. at 26746).
FDA Discretion Entitled 
to Great Deference
Today there is a vast array of biological products that
have been approved by the FDA and many others that are
awaiting FDA action.18 These products are scientifically
complex and rarely lend themselves to categorization. As
a result, the FDA invariably is required to determine on
a case-by-case basis whether its existing statutory
authority applies to a new product, which particular
authority to apply, and, if so, what evidence will ade-
quately demonstrate proof of safety, purity, and potency
(efficacy). The decision of whether and how to regulate a
product is made based upon the FDA’s expert determi-
nation and upon the particular facts and circumstances,
the historical application of the law to similar products,
the applicable statutory and regulatory criteria, and the
state of the FDA’s scientific understanding at the time of
the approval.
The FDA’s exercise of the significant discretion pro-
vided to the agency by Congress is entitled to great def-
erence by the courts.19 In a recent challenge to the FDA’s
approval of a biological product under the PHS Act, the
District Court for the District of Columbia held that
“FDA’s policies and its interpretation of its own regula-
tions will be paid special deference because of the breadth
of the Congress’ delegation of authority to FDA and because
of FDA’s scientific expertise.”20
Moreover, even if the FDA has not asserted jurisdic-
tion previously with regard to reproductive tissue, for
example, it is within the agency’s statutory authority
that its policies are evolutionary. The Supreme Court
has recognized that expert administrative agency inter-
pretations are not “carved in stone. On the contrary, the
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agency...must consider varying interpretations and the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis” (emphasis
added).21 Furthermore, the Court has acknowledged that
“regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to
last forever....[A]n agency must be given ample latitude
to ‘adapt their rules and policies to the demands of
changing circumstances.’”22
Conclusion
The FDA has developed a comprehensive approach to
the regulation of cellular and tissue-based therapeutic
products under its jurisdiction, including human stem
cells. Nonclinical and clinical stem cell research under-
taken to develop a therapeutic product intended to treat
human disease will continue to be regulated by the FDA,
while basic scientific research and other nonhuman
research will remain outside of the agency’s purview.
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Introduction
As part of the National Bioethics AdvisoryCommission’s deliberations for this report, a meet-
ing was convened on May 7, 1999, at Georgetown
University in order for the Commission to hear testimony
from prominent scholars of religious ethics on their tra-
ditions’ views of human stem cell research. Although it
would be inappropriate for religious views to determine
public policy in our country, such views are the products
of long traditions of ethical reflection, and they often
overlap with secular views. Thus, the Commission
believed that testimony from scholars of religious ethics
was crucial to its goal of informing itself about the range,
content, and rationale of various ethical positions
regarding research in this area.
The Commission heard testimony from scholars who
work within the Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern
Orthodox, Jewish, and Islamic faiths. Although the pre-
senters were able to reach consensus on several signifi-
cant issues related to embryonic stem (ES) and
embryonic germ (EG) cell research, disagreement
emerged among the religious traditions represented and
often within each tradition itself, particularly between
restrictive and permissive positions on several issues.
Roman Catholic Perspectives
The restrictive, “official” position within Roman
Catholicism opposes EG and ES cell research, primarily
because obtaining stem cells from either aborted fetal
tissue or embryos that remain following clinical in vitro
fertilization (IVF) procedures involves the intentional
destruction of a genetically unique, living member of the
human species. According to this view, it is impermis-
sible to obtain stem cells from in vitro fertilized blasto-
cysts, because doing so results in the destruction of the
blastocyst—a human life worthy of full moral protection
from the moment of conception. No amount of benefit to
others can justify the destruction of the blastocyst, an act
that would be equivalent to murder. 
Similarly, from this perspective, it is impermissible to
obtain EG cells from the gonadal tissue of aborted
fetuses, because although such harvesting is not directly
responsible for the death of the fetus, it nevertheless
involves complicity with the evil of abortion. Moreover,
to make use of any therapy derived from research on
either human embryonic or fetal tissue and to contribute
to the development or application of such research
through general taxation would involve complicity in the
destruction of human life. Federal funding, which in a
sense would make all citizens complicit in this research,
thus would greatly impose upon the consciences of
Catholics. 
However, even the restrictive position of the Roman
Catholic Church does not oppose stem cell research per
se. The central moral impediment to such research con-
cerns the sources from which stem cells are derived. The
act of harvesting stem cells from other sources—miscar-
ried fetuses, placental blood, or adult tissues—would not
be intrinsically immoral. In fact, this perspective, recog-
nizing the potential benefits to human health of stem cell
research, encourages investigation into the feasibility of
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such alternative sources. In practice, however, stem cell
research, even with alternative stem cell sources, would
remain morally problematic for two reasons. First, some
are concerned that any safeguards will be ineffective
because, in the face of potentially promising and lucrative
research, the temptation to transgress such safeguards
might be irresistible. Second, many fear that the benefits
of this research might not be distributed equitably and
are concerned that stem cell research perhaps may not be
the best use of national resources, given the preponder-
ance of so many other unmet human needs.
Although all Roman Catholics share a variety of
important basic convictions, individual Catholics often
differ in how to interpret them in practice. According to
a less restrictive Catholic perspective, this disagreement
is due, at least in part, to a commitment to the theory of
natural law—a commitment that, while a fundamental
part of the Catholic tradition, also involves reliance upon
an “imperfect science.” A commitment to natural law
involves belief in a moral order that can be “seen” by all
human beings in the reality of creation itself. But because
the act of “looking” entails “a complex process of dis-
cernment and deliberation, and a structuring of insights,
a determination of meaning, from the fullest vantage
point available, given a particular history—one that
includes the illumination of Scripture and the accumu-
lated wisdom of the tradition”—what any two human
beings see will not always be the same.1
With respect to stem cell research, the major areas of
disagreement among Catholics are also those upon which
the restrictive voice within Catholicism most strongly
bases its opposition: the moral status of the embryo and
the moral permissibility of using aborted fetuses as
sources of stem cells. In contrast to this restrictive view of
the embryo, another Catholic might, with the aid of sci-
ence, look to the reality of the early human embryo and
see that which is not yet an “individualized human enti-
ty with the settled inherent potential to become a human
person.”2 Because the early embryo, according to this less
restrictive view, is not a person, it is sometimes permissi-
ble to use it in research, though as human life it must
always be accorded some respect. Similarly, one might
decide that adequate barriers—such as a prohibition
against the directed donation of cadaveric fetal tissue,
and the distinction between somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT) for research or therapy and SCNT for reproduc-
tion—can be erected between the use of aborted fetal
tissue in research and the act of abortion itself so that
engaging in the former does not amount to complicity in
the latter. From this perspective, then, a Catholic may be
able to support ES cell research without sacrificing a
commitment to the fundamental principles that define
Catholicism, including the duties to protect human life,
honor the sacred, and promote distributive justice in
health care. Finally, because of the diversity within and
among ethical traditions, this perspective is congruent
with the restrictive Catholic view that individuals who
oppose this research should not be forced to contribute
to it but, contrary to the restrictive view, favors an
approach that would allow federal funding, but with
accommodations made to permit conscientious objection.
To summarize the testimony of the Roman Catholic
panel, all agree that in light of certain agreed-upon prin-
ciples, major Catholic concerns with regard to both
embryonic and nonembryonic stem cell research include
the following issues: 1) the moral status of the early
embryo, 2) complicity with abortion in using fetal tissue
as a source of stem cells, 3) the need for safeguards, dis-
tributive justice, and just allocation of national resources,
and 4) the difficulty in federally funding research to
which many are opposed on moral and religious
grounds. The major disagreements arise from conflicting
interpretations of the broad principles, which in turn
lead to different responses to these four major concerns.
Jewish Perspectives
The two main sources of Jewish ethics—theology and
law—yield several principles relevant to a Jewish ethical
analysis of stem cell research. First, human beings are
merely the stewards of their bodies, which belong to
God. Moreover, God has placed conditions on the use of
the human body, including the command that health and
life must be preserved. Second, human beings are God’s
partners in healing, and in order to fulfill God’s com-
mand, they have a duty to use any means available to
heal themselves, whether these means are natural or
artificial. Third, because all human beings, regardless of
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ability, are created in the image of God, they are valuable.
Fourth, human beings, unlike God, lack perfect knowl-
edge of the consequences of their actions and in the
process of trying to improve themselves or the world
must, therefore, be careful to avoid causing harm to
them.
Four potential moral impediments to EG and ES cell
research arise from these Jewish principles: 1) the moral
status of the fetus and of the act of abortion, 2) potential
complicity with evil, 3) the commandments to respect
the dead, and 4) the moral status of the embryo.
According to Conservative Judaism, the fetus until
the 40th day after conception is “like water.” Although
the fetus becomes a potential and partial person after the
40th day, and is thus entitled to a certain amount of
respect and protection, it remains primarily a part of the
pregnant woman’s body, and does not become an inde-
pendent person with full moral rights until the greater
part of its body emerges from the womb during birth.
Because of the command to preserve human health and
life, if either the health or the life of the woman is clearly
threatened by the fetus, abortion is not only permissible
but obligatory, as she is a full person while the fetus
remains only a part of her and a potential person. When
the woman’s health is at some increased risk but is not
clearly compromised by the pregnancy, abortion is per-
missible but not obligatory. More recently, some Jewish
authorities also permit abortion in cases in which the
fetus has a terminal disease or serious malformations.
According to Orthodox Judaism, on the other hand,
after 40 days of gestation, the fetus becomes a person
with full moral rights and may not be aborted except to
protect the pregnant woman’s health. Yet, even though
abortion after 40 days is viewed by the Orthodox Jews as
homicide, it does not follow from this perspective that
life-saving use of stem cells procured from illegitimately
aborted fetuses is impermissible (although the question
of who can legitimately give consent to such procure-
ment is problematic from this perspective). Although this
perspective recognizes the possibility that therapeutic use
of aborted fetuses may make abortion appear less heinous,
the strength of the commandment to preserve life, for
which all other laws must be suspended except those 
prohibiting murder, idolatry, and sexual transgressions,
overrides this concern. Thus, despite the disagreement
within Judaism regarding the moral status of the fetus
and the permissibility of abortion after 40 days, all agree
that neither source of stem cells is illegitimate. One
caveat to this consensus is that some within Conservative
Judaism who accept the permissibility of abortion to pre-
serve the life or health of the woman nevertheless require
that stem cells be procured only from fetuses that have
been legitimately aborted; Orthodox Judaism, by con-
trast, appears to hold that although abortion after 40 days
postconception is generally impermissible, there is no
complicity involved in using these aborted fetuses as
sources of stem cells.
Jewish thinkers agree that commandments to respect
the dead, which require that corpses not be mutilated or
left unburied longer than necessary, can be suspended in
order to save lives. Because of the strong commandment
to preserve life and health, for example, Jewish law per-
mits both autopsies and organ procurement when they
will benefit the living. Reasoning by analogy, if tissue pro-
curement from the cadavers of full persons in order to
benefit human health and life is permitted, then tissue
procurement from dead fetuses—which according to
some Jewish perspectives are less than full persons—
must also be permitted for the same purpose provided
that (for some interpreters) the abortion itself was 
permissible according to Jewish law.
There is also wide consensus within Judaism that no
serious moral impediments exist to using IVF embryos as
sources of stem cells because extra-corporeal embryos
have no status under Jewish law. These entities lack sta-
tus because all embryos prior to 40 days postconception
are “like water” and because as extra-corporeal entities,
they lack the status of potential and partial person that is
accorded to fetuses, which develop from embryos
implanted in a uterus. Although extra-corporeal embryos
merit a certain respect as human life, they are closest in
moral status to gametes and thus may be discarded,
frozen, or used as life-saving sources of stem cells. In fact,
so long as they are never implanted, there is no clear legal
prohibition against creating embryos for research pur-
poses, although extra-legal norms may raise ethical ques-
tions about this practice.
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Because stem cells can be permissibly procured either
from extra-corporeal embryos or from legitimately
aborted fetuses, stem cell research is not considered
intrinsically immoral. Rather, stem cell research becomes
morally problematic when applied in a variety of con-
texts. First, Judaism views the provision of health care as
a communal duty. Thus, a context in which the benefits
of stem cell research are not accessible to all persons who
are in need would be problematic. Similarly, it may be
problematic to focus national resources in this area of
research rather than in other areas of need. In addition,
although obtaining consent to procure stem cells is nec-
essary, it may be challenging. Finally, there is widespread
agreement that stem cell research should not be used to
enhance human beings, although some disagreement
exists over whether it may be used to improve health or
whether it must be reserved only for life-saving purposes.
Eastern Orthodox Perspectives
According to Eastern Orthodoxy, all human beings are
created in the image of God and grow continuously
toward the likeness of God. Although the embryo, fetus,
and adult are each at different stages of this process, all
share the same potential for attaining authentic person-
hood, and each, with God’s grace, will attain such per-
sonhood. According to this belief, God has given us
medicine in order to heal, and any misuse of this gift that
results in the destruction of potentially authentic persons
is considered illegitimate. Thus, although miscarried
fetuses may be used as sources of EG cells, neither elec-
tively aborted fetuses nor blastocysts may be so used.
However, despite the impermissibility of procuring ES
cells from blastocysts, because cell lines from this source
already exist and have the potential to save lives, it is con-
sidered wasteful to discard these lines, and it is in fact
permissible to use them. No complicity is thought to
arise from such use. On the other hand, it is not permis-
sible to procure EG cells from aborted fetuses, as such
procurement would involve complicity.
Even assuming that stem cells could be permissibly
procured, Eastern Orthodoxy shares with other religious
traditions a variety of concerns about the context in
which stem cell research might be applied, including
addressing the problems of equitable access to the bene-
fits of the research and other problems that can occur
when market forces control the research; using the
research for eugenic or cosmetic purposes, rather than
for healing; and obtaining the informed, voluntary
consent of the woman or couple.
Islamic Perspectives
Islam consists of two major schools of thought—Sunni
and Shi‘i—both of which refer to the same historical
sources. Although these two schools differ somewhat in
their views of abortion, in general, Islam regards the life
of the fetus as developing over several stages, and per-
sonhood is considered a process. Although from the
moment of conception the embryo is a human life merit-
ing some protection, it is not commonly thought to attain
personhood until it is ensouled, some time around the
fourth month of gestation. Thus, because of the enor-
mous potential to improve human health through this
type of research, the vast majority of followers of Islam
would agree that it is permissible to use early human
embryonic life for this purpose. Moreover, it is permissi-
ble to use the tissue from illegitimately aborted fetuses to
save lives, just as it is permissible to use cadaveric organs
to save lives, even when the cadaveric organ source has
been wrongfully killed. Finally, with caution, it can be
deduced that creating embryos for research purposes is
also permissible from an Islamic perspective, as long as
those embryos are not implanted.
Protestant Perspectives
Protestant positions range dramatically from the highly
restrictive to the nonrestrictive in this area. For example,
according to restrictive Protestant view, a person is not
defined by his or her capacities; rather, a person is a
human being with a personal history, regardless of
whether he or she is aware of that history. From this per-
spective, embryos are simply the weakest and least
advantaged people among us. Because procuring stem
cells from embryos requires the destruction of the
embryo, such procurement thus raises serious moral
issues, despite the ease with which it might be used to
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attain undeniably positive consequences for others, and
rather than accepting the use of illicit means to achieve a
good end, we should search for alternative, permissible
means. Similarly, using aborted fetuses as sources of EG
cells amounts to complicity with evil, and procurement
of EG cells even from permissibly aborted fetuses (how-
ever that category is defined) would involve using a
human life twice for another’s benefit—first, to benefit
the woman who aborted and then to benefit society
through EG cell research. Therefore, from this perspec-
tive, it is impermissible to derive stem cells from
embryos, whether spare or created for this purpose, and
from aborted fetuses, whether permissibly aborted or
not. The use of alternative sources of stem cells—for
example, from bone marrow or umbilical cord blood—
would, however, be permissible.
For Protestants whose views are less restrictive on this
issue, the moral status of the embryo is more ambiguous.
Although even nascent human life—which retains the
potential for full human life—deserves respect and pro-
tection from callous disregard, the early embryo and the
late fetus are viewed in moral terms as significantly dif-
ferent. Because the potential benefits of ES and EG cell
research are so substantial, the moral difference between
the early embryo and the developed fetus becomes com-
pelling in this case, and it is thus permissible to use
human life at the blastocyst stage to benefit other lives.
No embryos should be created solely for this purpose,
however, unless no other sources are available, and
attempts should be made to locate alternative sources of
stem cells that do not involve the destruction of embryos.
It is permissible to procure EG cells from aborted fetuses,
as long as safeguards are erected to prevent the thera-
peutic use of aborted fetal tissue from either increasing
the frequency of abortion or encouraging a callous view
of early human life. Moreover, although less restrictive
Protestant views permit the procurement of stem cells
from both proposed sources, this procurement must
occur within a context of respect for nascent human life,
only when significant benefit can be derived from it, and
only after broad public discussion and acceptance of
such research. If the general public is excluded from a
discussion of this research, then public support of this
and future beneficial research may be compromised.
Furthermore, the requirement that all members of society
have the opportunity to participate in open, sustained
dialogue about these decisions is critical from this per-
spective, and if federal funds are to be allocated toward
this research, conscientious objectors should be accom-
modated. Finally, most Protestants share previously artic-
ulated contextual concerns regarding 1) ensuring global
access to the benefits of this research, 2) avoiding the
negative consequences that might come with market-
controlled research, and 3) assessing the priority of these
research efforts relative to other current and pending
health-related research projects.
Summary of Broad Areas of Agreement
and Disagreement 
Not surprisingly, the panelists did not reach unanimity
on all aspects of human ES and EG cell research.
Although some differences exist among the various reli-
gious traditions, these mostly concern the appropriate
sources and methods of religious-ethical reasoning. On
substantive issues, less restrictive individuals across most
religious traditions appear to have more in common with
each other than with restrictive members of their own
faiths. (The same is true for commonalities among
restrictive members of all faiths.) The substantive issues
relevant to stem cell research on which there is internal
disagreement include the following:
1) The moral status of the embryo. The perceived status of
the embryo ranges from full moral personhood with
correlative inviolable rights to life to an early, extra-
corporeal biological entity lacking any significant
moral status. Between these poles, although the
embryo tends to be viewed as valuable because of its
current status as a form of human life and its poten-
tial status as a person, it is ultimately, if tragically,
subordinate to the health needs of actual persons.
2) Whether the use of EG cells derived from aborted fetuses
involves complicity with the perceived evil of abortion. On
one end of the spectrum is the view that many abor-
tions are permissible. Thus, complicity with evil is
either never or rarely a consideration. On the other
end of the spectrum is the view that all deliberate
abortions are immoral, and that any use of EG cells
derived from aborted fetuses involves complicity.
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Those who take more moderate positions argue that
even when abortion is wrong, it is not wrong to use
tissue that would otherwise be discarded, or that
complicity can be avoided by erecting barriers
between abortion and stem cell procurement, such as
a prohibition of directed donation.
3) Whether stem cell research should, ideally, be federally
funded. Some, based on their belief in the duty to heal,
hold that stem cell research should proceed as quickly
as possible (given certain conditions; see below),
while others hold that any federal funding that
enables immoral research is itself immoral and would
involve conscientious citizens in complicity against
their will. The moderate view holds that in the
absence of agreement on such issues as the moral sta-
tus of the embryo, conscientious objectors should be
allowed to opt out of federal support for the research
and that without any federal support, privatized
human ES and EG cell research will make contextual
goals such as distributive justice even more difficult to
realize.
Despite these areas of disagreement, widespread con-
sensus was reached both within and among the various
religious traditions on several important issues in ES and
EG cell research:
1) Stem cell research is not inherently immoral, and in
fact has the potential to contribute important knowl-
edge that can lead to therapies for certain diseases,
provided that morally legitimate sources of cells are
used (although this is defined differently), and pro-
vided that important contextual factors of justice and
regulation are addressed. (See #3 below.)
2) If society chooses to embark upon federally funded
ES and EG cell research, it must do so under condi-
tions of respect for the humanity of the embryo. It
would be preferable if there existed alternative
sources of stem cells that did not involve the direct or
indirect destruction of human life, and efforts should
be made to identify such sources.
3) In order for the research to be morally permissible,
several “background factors” must be in place,
including
n assurance of equitable access to the benefits of the
research,
n appropriate prioritization of this research relative
to other social needs,
n assurance that the research will be used to treat
disease, not enhance humans,
n public education, discussion, and acceptance of
human stem cell research, and
n public scrutiny, oversight, and regulation of the
research.
4) Assuming that privately funded research will contin-
ue in this area, it is preferable that a public body—
even one that is funded with tax dollars—be required
by law to review all private sector research and to
make this review part of the public record, despite the
possibility that the connection between the govern-
ment and ES and EG cell research may be perceived
as legitimating research that some citizens will con-
tinue to consider immoral.
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May 7, 1999. Washington DC. Meeting transcript, 3.
2 Ibid. 5.
This document describes some of the ethical, scientific,and legal issues that could be considered when
designing and/or reviewing studies that involve access to
and use of human stem cells. These Points to Consider are
relevant only for designing and evaluating studies in
which the role of the individual(s) who provide gametes,
cadaveric fetal tissue, or embryos is limited to providing
these materials for research intended to develop general-
izable new knowledge. This document results from the
recommendations described in this report and therefore
is intended for use by those who design, conduct, and
review research involving human embryonic stem (ES)
and embryonic germ (EG) cells using federal funds.
Private researchers and sponsors also may find this doc-
ument to be of use. These Points to Consider do not apply
to situations in which an individual would be the recipi-
ent of a stem cell-based therapy, nor do they apply to
studies involving human/animal hybrids.
I. Scientific and Research Design
Considerations
The ethical acceptability of any research protocol
depends, in part, on its scientific merit, the qualifications
of investigators, the protocol’s overall design characteris-
tics, and the precise nature of the materials and opera-
tions employed. In these respects, several issues arise
when designing research involving human ES and EG
cells, consideration of which would help ensure not only
that the research is well designed, important, feasible,
and timely, but also that a number of important ethical
matters are considered. These issues are of particular sig-
nificance given the nature of the materials to be used in
research. 
A. What are the sources from which human ES and 
EG cells will be obtained?
1. From existing cell lines 
2. From cadaveric fetal tissue (following elective
abortion or surgical termination of ectopic
pregnancy)
3. From embryos remaining after infertility treatments
4. From embryos created solely for research purposes1
B. Has previous and requisite research been conducted
using nonhuman animal models?
C. Are there valid alternatives to using human ES and
EG cells in the proposed research?
D. What are the future plans for conservation of
gametes, cadaveric fetal tissue, and embryos?
1. Will ES or EG cells be produced and stored for
later use?
2. If a particular protocol is being proposed that uses
embryos remaining after infertility treatments,
does it propose to use only the minimum number
of embryos necessary? 
3. What plans exist in the event that additional ES or
EG stem cells are needed?
E. In what setting will the research be conducted?
1. Are the investigators scientifically qualified to
carry out the proposed research?
2. Is the research environment (including facilities)
appropriate for the conduct of research involving
stem cells?
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II. Identification of Providers and
Donors and Recruitment Practices
and Compensation
Several issues should be considered when identifying
individuals (or couples) who may be asked to consider
providing gametes, fetal tissue, or embryos for research;
consideration of these issues could help to ensure that no
inappropriate burden, inducement, or exploitation
would occur.
A. Identification and recruitment practices
1. Are potential donors or providers identified
through advertisements to the general public? Are
they identified through direct solicitation? Do they
self-select?
2. Is the selection of such individuals equitable
and fair?
3. Are these individuals vulnerable to undue influ-
ence, coercion, or exploitation? Does the recruit-
ment method raise concerns about undue
influence or coercion of the prospective donors? 
4. Are the potential donors capable of consenting?
5. In which circumstances is it appropriate to identify
and recruit an individual as well as his or her
partner?
B. Compensation and reimbursement
1. Will any financial compensation be paid to indi-
viduals (or couples) who donate materials; and if
so, will the details of this compensation be dis-
closed?
2. Does the compensation reimburse the individual
(or couple) solely for the additional expenses that
relate to this particular project?
3. When is the offer of compensation made relative
to an individual’s (or couple’s) decision to make
available the materials from which stem cells will
be derived?
III. Consent to Donate
Several issues arise in the process of providing informa-
tion to individuals and couples who may be donating
cadaveric fetal tissue or embryos remaining after infertil-
ity treatments. Considering these issues would help to
ensure that prospective donors or providers of source
materials would receive timely, relevant, and appropriate
information to make informed and voluntary choices. In
some cases, these issues are unique to the provision of
gametes, embryos, or fetal tissue; in other cases. the items
are important in other situations as well. 
A. General considerations for individuals (or couples)
who donate cadaveric fetal tissue or embryos remain-
ing after infertility treatments 
1. Who will seek the consent? Will a clinician and/or
researcher be available to answer questions?
2. Is it appropriate for others to participate in the
consent process (e.g., partner or family member)? 
3. Will psychological support mechanisms be in place
if needed?
4. Are the purposes of ES or EG cell research (in
general) described fully?
5. Will the consent form clearly disclose that stem
cell research is not intended to benefit the donor
directly?
6. Is it clear that decisions to consent to or refuse the
procedures to obtain stem cells will not affect the
quality of care the patient will receive?
7. Will individuals be informed that no medical or
genetic information about the fetal tissue,
embryos, or stem cells derived from these sources
will be available to any outside individual or entity?
8. What measures will be taken to protect the pri-
vacy and confidentiality of individuals who pro-
vide cadaveric fetal tissue or embryos?
9. Is the source of funding for the research (public,
private, public/private, philanthropic) disclosed?
10.What known commercial benefits, if any, are
expected to arise for the investigators seeking to
obtain human ES or EG cells?
B. Additional considerations specific to consent to
donate cadaveric fetal tissue
1. Is there a description of what usually is done with
fetal tissue at the institution at which a pregnancy
will be terminated? Is this information available in
written form and provided to individuals?
2. Is permission to conduct research immediately
available?
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C. Additional considerations specific to consent to
donate embryos remaining after infertility treatments 
1. Are the methods of disposal of embryos remaining
after infertility treatments described? Is this infor-
mation available in written form and provided to
patients? 
2. Will information be made available about whether
the embryos were viable and normal or not? 
3. Is there a description of the options available (e.g.,
permit material to be used in research, cryopre-
serve, discard, or donate to another couple for
infertility treatment)?
4. Is it clear that the embryos used in research will
not, under any circumstances, be transferred to
any woman’s uterus? 
5. Is it clear that the research will result in the
destruction of the embryo? Is the method
described?
IV. Review Issues
Because of the special nature of human ES and EG cells,
several issues arise in the review and oversight of research
involving their use. The Commission has recommended
a system of national oversight and review, combined with
local monitoring. Careful and thoughtful consideration
of these issues will provide assurance that, regardless of
the source of funding, appropriate compliance with
applicable regulations, guidelines, and other standards
will occur. These considerations would supplement, not
replace, applicable federal and state regulations. 
A. Applicability of relevant regulations
1. What current guidelines, regulations, rules, or
policies apply to the conduct of this research? If
ambiguity exists, how will it be resolved?
2. What mechanisms are in place to assure compli-
ance with these regulations?
3. What regulations apply for collaborating with
international researchers (e.g., importing fetal 
tissue or embryos from other countries)?
B. Applicability of professional practice standards
C. Submission of research findings for publication
D. Other responsibilities of investigators and collaborat-
ing clinicians
Note
1 The National Bioethics Advisory Commission has recommended
that federal agencies should not fund research involving the deriva-
tion or use of human ES cells from embryos created solely for
research purposes. (See Recommendations 3 and 4.)
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